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LECTURE COURSE

History of International Relations in the Modern Era

For students of the second (master's) level of higher education
of specialty B9 History and Archaeology (educational program *"History"*)
and specialty A4.03 Secondary Education (Secondary Education (History and Civic Education) (educational program *"Secondary Education (History and Civic Education)"*

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This textbook is intended for Master's students specializing in History and related fields. It provides a structured and research-based overview of the evolution of international relations in the Early Modern and Modern periods, with a focus on the political, diplomatic, and ideological changes that shaped Europe from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century.

The material is designed to support academic learning, develop historical thinking, and encourage critical analysis of key processes and transformations in the international arena. Each lecture is accompanied by references to scholarly sources, allowing students to deepen their understanding and conduct independent research.

This textbook may also be useful for lecturers, postgraduate students, and all those interested in the history of diplomacy and international relations.

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Preface

This lecture course has been developed to meet the academic needs of Master's degree students specializing in History, International Relations, and related disciplines. It offers a structured and in-depth exploration of the evolution of international relations in the Early Modern and Modern periods, focusing on the complex interplay between diplomacy, power politics, and ideological transformations that shaped the international system from the mid-17th to the early 20th century.

The course begins with an examination of the formation and consolidation of the Westphalian system of international relations, established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This system marked a significant departure from medieval conceptions of supranational authority, introducing principles of state sovereignty, legal equality, and non-intervention – foundations that continue to influence modern international law and diplomacy.

Subsequent lectures trace the internal contradictions and external pressures that led to the gradual weakening of the Westphalian system in the 18th century. The course then turns to the transformative events of the American War of Independence (1775–1783), which not only challenged colonial empires but also introduced new ideas about self-determination and national legitimacy into the international arena.

Special attention is paid to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, which profoundly disrupted the established balance of power and diplomatic norms in Europe. The revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, along with Napoleon's expansionist ambitions, forced a rethinking of international order. The subsequent Congress of Vienna and the formation of the Vienna system marked a conservative reaction aimed at restoring stability through a balance of power and collective diplomacy, encapsulated in the concept of the "European Concert."

The course continues with an analysis of the mid-19th century processes of national unification in Germany and Italy, which altered the map of Europe and redefined the dynamics of international politics. Another crucial theme is the "Eastern Question," a persistent issue in 19th-century diplomacy that revolved around the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and the competing interests of European powers in the Balkans and the Near East.

Finally, the course examines the emergence of new political and military alliances — the Triple Alliance and the Entente — in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These developments signaled a shift toward bloc-based diplomacy and intensified rivalry among great powers, setting the stage for the First World War.

Throughout the course, each lecture is designed to foster critical engagement with historical sources, encourage analytical thinking, and help students understand the long-term processes that have shaped international relations. The lectures are accompanied by a carefully selected list of sources and scholarly literature to support independent research and academic discussion.

This lecture series not only provides essential knowledge of key historical events and systems but also encourages students to reflect on their relevance to contemporary global challenges. By connecting past and present, the course aims to deepen understanding of the patterns, principles, and consequences of international interaction.

Lecture 1. Formation and Development of the Westphalian System of International Relations

1.1 Introduction to the course and basic definitions

In the mid-17th century, international relations underwent a transformation. During the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which took place mainly in the territories of the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire and ended with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the modern state was finally formed with attributes such as internal and external sovereignty, bureaucracy, a regular army, clearly defined and internationally recognized borders, centralized control over territory, etc. It was from this moment that the modern state, which evolved into a "national state" or more precisely a "nation-state" during the 18th–19th centuries, became the leading subject of international relations.

Meanwhile, if the medieval conflict between the pope and the emperor conditioned the very possibility of the existence of alternative centers of power in the political sphere and the emergence of European constitutionalism, the dominance of the contractual principle in the life of European societies from the time of feudalism influenced the nature of international relations in many ways. Since the feudal state (each of the European states, as well as empires – the Holy Roman Empire, for example) essentially represented a complex system of contractual relations between subjects of different statuses and ranks. Through relevant treaties, relations of vassalage were regulated, obligations of subjects of feudal law (monarchs, representatives of feudal aristocracy, knighthood, clergy, cities) towards each other were fixed, and corresponding trade and political rights and privileges were established.

It seems that it was not by chance that the wide recognition of the theory of the "contractual" origin of power became possible at the dawn of the Early Modern period in Europe. In the conditions of the dominance of the contractual

principle, the issue of shaping international law arose, within which only the application of contractual norms of interaction between different states was possible. It was precisely in the 17th century, under the influence of the struggle for colonies and the overcoming of monopolism in international trade, that the development of international law received an additional impetus.

The evolution of international relations during the period under discussion is characterized by a clear Eurocentrism within the complex global system of international relations. However, this assertion does not imply that all major events in international relations unfolded exclusively within Europe. In China, for instance, during this time, there was a dynastic change (the fall of the Ming Empire and the establishment of the Qing dynasty), along with a period of rapid territorial expansion of the empire, extending from the late 17th to the first half of the 18th century, reaching the Amur in the north and the territory of present- day Kazakhstan in the west. Conversely, on the Indian subcontinent, the early 18th century witnessed the dissolution of the Mughal Empire, resulting in significant political ramifications and providing Europeans with additional opportunities for penetration into the subcontinent, and so forth. What is being highlighted is the variety of contexts. The world system of international relations during this period did not arise from the consolidation of regional systems of international relations into a unified whole, as might have been expected, but rather through the active expansion of the European international system externally. In this process, the fundamental principles and parameters of international relations in Europe were predominantly shaped in the mid-17th century within the framework of the so-called Westphalian system of international relations.

National state – a type of state that is a form of self-determination and organization of a nation within a certain sovereign territory, expressing the will of this nation, and characterized by sovereignty, independence, and the autonomy of state power within its territory, independence in international relations, and ensuring the integrity and inviolability of the territory.

Sovereignty – an inherent quality of an independent state symbolizing its political and legal independence. All rules within the territory of a given state are established by it alone and by it alone.

Monarchy – a form of government in which the highest state power belongs entirely (unlimited, absolute monarchy) or partially (limited, constitutional monarchy) to one individual – the hereditary monarch.

Absolutism – a form of government typical of late feudalism, characterized by the concentration of all state power in the hands of the monarch.

Republic – a form of government in which the supreme organs of state power are elected for a certain term, with defined legal powers, and there is a division of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial.

1.2 Formation of the Westphalian system of international relations

The Peace of Westphalia, achieved in 1648, marked a significant stage in the evolution of international relations. The exceptional importance of the transformations that occurred in the mid-17th century lies in the emergence of a system of relations, the basic principles of which, albeit with significant changes and some caveats, continue to exist and function to this day.

Key features of the international relations system:

Dominance within it of modern "national" states (possessing full sovereignty, a unified mechanism of administrative governance, constantly active professional armies, bureaucracy, defined and internationally recognized borders, and so forth).

Regarding the concept of the state in its modern sense, according to a number of Western authors, all the necessary prerequisites for its emergence fully materialized within the centralized, absolutist monarchies. The formation of absolutist structures in Europe created an entirely new domestic and foreign policy environment. Rivalry, primarily military, between dynastic states and the pursuit of power to mobilize the necessary resources for this impelled monarchical regimes to undertake a series of economic and administrative measures that facilitated the formation of modern nation-states.

From the Peace of Westphalia, the international relations system definitively took shape as a state-centric system. The sovereign state became the primary subject of international relations from this period onward. Each state enjoyed full internal sovereignty, autonomously determining its form of governance, principles of internal organization, relations with religious denominations, and so forth, and acknowledged no superior authority above itself. Gradually, the principle of sovereign equality of states became universally accepted within the

international system, regulating states' behavior towards each other independent of the prevailing forms of governance within each of them and the preference for one religious denomination over another. This principle gradually evolved into a foundational element of contemporary international law.

De-ideologization, or the removal of the religious factor as one of the primary drivers of policy.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War, did not lead to a radical reshaping of the political map of Europe. However, it did mark profound shifts in the entire system of international relations. After repeated failures of plans to establish a universal monarchy led by the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs in line with the Counter-Reformation, a sort of "de-ideologization" of international relations of that time occurred. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 had already established new principles in Europe regarding the relationship between political and confessional matters. However, it was only after the Peace of Westphalia that the external goals of governments definitively eliminated "ideological" tasks associated with the suppression of "heresy," "saving souls," and "defending faith," which objectively masked the desires of certain political factions and social forces in Europe at that time to export social and political reaction, to create a universal empire. Simultaneously, with the effective disintegration of the unified European Counter-Reformation camp, there ceased to be a need to counteract these aspirations. As a result, the decisive motive for state activity on the international stage became raison d'état, state interest, beyond any religious or other ideological facade.

State interest, dynastic interest.

Thus, the basis of foreign policy activity now rested on state interest. However, in each specific case, state interest had its own specific features. Its perception was influenced by the significant imprint of local cultural-historical peculiarities and traditions, as well as the character of the state itself. Indeed, what did a state of that time represent? Its forms of governance varied from the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV and most other continental states to the bourgeois republics of Switzerland, Italy, and the Hanseatic cities. In none of these countries did the majority of the population participate in the governance process. Therefore, the policies of early national states were fundamentally dynastic or class-based. In other words, the essence and content of state interest were arbitrarily defined by ruling monarchs or ruling commercial-industrial oligarchies.

Unlike religious interests, dynastic interests continued to play a significant role during the 17th and 18th centuries. The medieval view of the state, when sovereign lords essentially did not distinguish between the state and property, between public-law and private-law functions, gradually faded into the past. However, the absolute monarchies that predominated in Europe during this period had a form of state power organization in which the supreme bearer of power - the absolute monarch - had the greatest autonomy in determining the foreign policy course of a particular country than ever before. In France, as in other absolutist monarchies of that time, the sovereign's will be law. The monarchs' notions of "glory" and "honor" often proved to be more effective means of engaging other states in Pan-European affairs than trade or other national interests. According to some researchers, in the conditions of absolutism in 17th-18th century Europe, dynastic aspirations, in a sense, even took on the function of ideological justification and motivation for foreign policy. The defense of the ruler's honor and dignity, and consequently, the state's interests (let us recall Louis XIV's famous "L'état, c'est moi" ("The state, it is I")), often determined the actions of the diplomatic bodies of European countries, dragging these states into conflicts and wars that later came to be called "wars of luxury."

Formation of a balance of power (balance of forces) in relations between the most powerful European states or their coalitions.

De-ideologization led to a significant transformation in the behavior of participants in the international relations system. If before the Peace of Westphalia, all Catholic or Protestant leagues and states within them were aimed at an irreconcilable struggle with their opponents until their complete destruction (it suffices to recall the example of Emperor Ferdinand II of the Holy Roman Empire), in the new conditions, talk could no longer be about establishing absolute dominance in Europe by any one state. The external policy goals of the parties lost their maximalist character and became more realistic. Not only religiously motivated claims to global domination, but even assertions regarding the predominant position of one state in Europe invariably met with united opposition, which rapidly grew, from states that had until recently been in different (Protestant and Catholic) camps. As a result, in Europe quite spontaneously, based on the "natural order of things," the same "balance of power" began to take shape that later formed the basis of a whole series of international relations systems on the continent. As noted in this regard by H. Kissinger: "The balance of power rarely arose as a result of deliberate calculations. Usually, it was the result of resistance to the attempts of any

individual country to dominate others" (Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 55). It is worth noting, however, that a significant contribution to the emergence of the European balance was made by the political legacy left by the eminent French statesman named Armand-Jean du Plessis, better known as Cardinal Richelieu. Through his efforts, Germany was completely exhausted in the Thirty Years' War, and in Central Europe, a monolithic imperial giant under the aegis of the Austrian Habsburgs never emerged. Moreover, the Holy Roman Empire was divided into more than 300 completely sovereign domains, the most significant of which served as an important "dowry" in ensuring the European "balance of power."

Interstate alliances became more flexible and situational in the new conditions. Changing partners within a coalition became a not so rare phenomenon, especially when the strengthening of one state threatened the overall "European balance." Essentially, the possibility of permanent political maneuvers and the evolution of interstate alliances was part of a balance of power policy. Its essence was to prevent any single European state or coalition of states from accumulating forces significantly surpassing the strength of their potential adversaries.

The concept of the "balance of power," which dominated European socio-political thought at least since the late 17th century, contributed to a noticeable change in the character of wars and overall international conflicts on the continent. Even in the largest and bloodiest conflicts of the period under review, the goals of the parties invariably proved to be relatively limited, not foreseeing the complete destruction of the opponent. Additionally, while before the Peace of Westphalia conflicts between Protestant countries, which were rapidly developing, were restrained by the threat from the Catholic bloc under the Habsburgs' aegis, in the new conditions, the escalation of trade and economic conflicts between England and the Netherlands, and later between England and France, did not take long to occur. The era of states competing for economic and political advantage in Europe and the world definitively replaces religious disputes.

The policies of leading European states since the 17th century were no longer confined solely to relations with neighboring states. Their foreign policy activity expanded to Europe and even to the entire world. The main European states gradually transitioned to a modern system of organizing diplomatic services. The development of diplomacy was also facilitated by the fact that most European wars of the 17th and 18th centuries were coalition wars. In many European states, foreign affairs departments with clear and increasingly complex

structures were established, now including translators, cryptographers, and archivists. The number of diplomatic missions and embassies staffed with highly qualified personnel increased.

Growing role of colonies. A new development in international economic and political relations from the mid-17th century onwards was the increasing economic role of the colonial possessions of European states. Especially during this period (with the exception of Spain, which had outpaced its main competitors by about a century), European states began to transform into colossal colonial empires, in the economies of which the rational exploitation of colony resources played an increasingly significant role. The struggle for colonies shifted from the Portuguese-Spanish and Dutch-Spanish competitions to multilateral rivalry among European powers, primarily Spain, the Netherlands, England, and France. Moreover, the arena of this struggle essentially became the entire world. The competition that unfolded in the long-term colonial saga was closely intertwined with the system of relations on the European continent and, to some extent, served as an element of support for the overall European balance of power.

Formation of **mercantilism** as a type of economic nationalism. Mercantilism was not a coherent socio-economic theory but rather a set of practical recommendations based on the belief that international trade was the primary sphere for creating societal wealth. Statesmen and entrepreneurs of that time devised the theory of the "favorable balance of trade," according to which any country should sell as much as possible abroad and buy as little as possible. The main tool for ensuring the most favorable conditions of foreign trade for one's own country was the policy of state protectionism. Importation of foreign goods was prohibited or subject to high tariffs, which, in turn, were an important source of revenue for the state treasury. The entire state machinery, laws regulating consumption, were aimed at reducing the importation of foreign goods and encouraging the consumption of domestically produced goods. Additionally, having a large merchant fleet was seen as a significant advantage, as it made one's own export goods cheaper and allowed making money literally out of nothing (according to contemporaries) - through the transit of foreign goods. Furthermore, governments stimulated the development of fishing as an industry that provided training for sailors, generated demand for shipbuilding products, and facilitated favorable self-sufficiency in food products and the expansion of export potential.

The conflict potential of mercantilist doctrines lay in the fact that the volume of world trade was considered to be a fixed quantity. To expand their own share

of participation in the global market, the only path was not the exploration of new market segments but literally conquering it.

1.3 The main participants in international relations of the 17th-18th centuries and the specifics of their behavior on the world stage

The Peace of Westphalia, which formally ended the exhausting Thirty Years' War, did not bring an end to war in Europe. Throughout the 1650s, there were ongoing military actions between France and Spain. Due to the circumstance that Spanish possessions were scattered throughout Italy, along the banks of the Rhine, and in the Southern Netherlands, the war effectively continued on the territory of modern-day Belgium and the western part of Germany. It was only in 1659, after the warring parties were thoroughly exhausted, that France and Spain finally agreed to the so-called Treaty of the Pyrenees. The treaty was sealed in the spirit of the time by a marriage contract between the French king and the daughter of the Spanish king, Maria Theresa. Part of the marriage contract included the renunciation by the Infanta and her descendants of any claims to the Spanish throne in exchange for a payment of 500,000 écus from the Madrid court. This payment was not made, allowing the French later to use this circumstance to justify Louis XIV's claims to certain Spanish territories.

By the mid-17th century, major powers on the European stage included states such as France, England, the Netherlands, the Austrian Empire of the Habsburgs, Sweden, and Spain. Slightly less significant but still playing an independent role in European politics were sovereign German states such as Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Saxony, as well as Denmark in the north and Portugal and Venice in the south. Russia in the 17th century remained on the periphery of the European system and maintained relations mainly with its closest neighbors. Conflicts between European states during this period were completely free from the influence of clericalism and were primarily based on political and trade- economic disagreements between the parties.

The Peace of Westphalia significantly undermined the authority of the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, putting the heads of independent European states with the title of king on an equal footing with the emperor in terms of rights. They were all recognized as bearers of higher (sovereign) power,

characterized by independence and the might of their states. Thus, the Peace of Westphalia dealt a tangible blow to the remnants of the Middle Ages that persisted in the relations between states.

Spain recognized the independence of the United Provinces (Holland). This state, which emerged as a result of the rebellion of Dutch Protestants against Catholic Spain, achieved international legal recognition in 1648.

In addition to Holland, the Swiss Confederation also received international legal recognition as an independent state, having emerged in 1315 during the struggle of peasant and urban communities located in the high Alps against German, French, and Italian feudal lords.

The recognition of independence of both states was of immense significance. They were recognized as sovereign states on par with monarchies, despite being republics. This represented a break from the traditions of the Middle Ages, when republics were considered second-rate states. It was particularly important that the states that emerged did so not due to dynastic reasons, not at the whim of monarchs, but by the will of the citizens themselves. After satisfying their demands, European monarchs effectively admitted the possibility of recognizing the right of nations to self-determination.

The victors in the Thirty Years' War - the countries of the anti-Habsburg coalition - thus gained significant territorial and political advantages. France and Sweden (Sweden even became a member of the Empire with the right to send its delegates to the imperial assembly - the Reichstag) particularly strengthened their international positions. Both states were declared guarantors of the Peace of Westphalia. Along with them, the Russian state was named among the guarantors of the Peace of Westphalia, which formally did not participate in the Thirty Years' War and did not conclude a peace treaty. This indicated an increase in its international influence and recognition by other European states as its equal legal partner. However, the defeat of the Habsburgs and the victory of the anti-Habsburg coalition did not lead to the establishment of hegemony or dominance by any other country or group of countries in Europe.

The main group of contradictions at that time consisted of trade disputes and conflicts over fishing zones and the volume of transit maritime transport between England and the Netherlands. The Dutch military fleet was one of the strongest in Europe, and the Dutch merchant fleet, according to various data, exceeded the fleets of all other European countries combined by approximately 5-10 times in terms of the number of ships. Holland controlled transit transport

flows in Northern and Western Europe, along the rivers Rhine and Meuse. Amsterdam was the largest financial and banking center in Europe. Dutch East India and West India Companies actively pursued external trade expansion worldwide. Meanwhile, the English maritime power and trade-financial potential posed the most formidable competition to Dutch goods and services. Anglo-Dutch conflicts erupted into three wars between these states in the 1650s-1670s (1652- 54, 1664-67, and 1672-74). The last two wars were the most intense and acquired a Pan-European political significance because France was an ally of Holland in these wars.

Holland was a significant traditional ally of France since it had a powerful fleet and thereby compensated for France's relative weakness at sea. However, serious contradictions matured within the alliance during the Thirty Years' War. They were related to France's expansionist plans regarding the Southern Netherlands, which were under Spanish rule. The transition of the Southern Netherlands to French control was not part of Holland's plans. The Dutch not only rightly feared that France, while being a good ally, could later become a dangerous neighbor but also sought to prevent the resurgence of Antwerp as a world trade and financial center competing with Amsterdam, which could very well happen under the auspices of the French monarchy. As a result, during the war's outbreak, the allies were as concerned about each other's successes as they were about defeating their opponent.

Most of the military actions took place at sea - near the coasts of Africa, North America, and in the Caribbean basin. It was during the war of 1664-67 that the English captured New Amsterdam from the Dutch (later renamed New York). Versailles hesitated for a while with declaring war on England. The reason for this was that significant political events took place in Madrid simultaneously with the military actions. In 1665, the Spanish king Philip IV died. This fueled Versailles' appetite for the Southern (Spanish) Netherlands. Ultimately, Louis XIV decided to postpone making relevant demands to Spain, waiting for the complete mobilization of the army and clarification of the military situation on the English front. The successes of the Dutch at sea led to France's limited actual participation in the war. And when in 1667 a strong French army invaded the Spanish Netherlands and simultaneously began the so-called "Devolution War" (aimed at recognizing the inheritance rights of Infanta Maria Theresa) against Spain, the political situation in Europe began to change radically.

1.4 Dynastic wars of the late 17th - early 18th centuries

Dynastic War, the "Devolutionary" (1667 – 1668)

The Spanish army proved to be completely unprepared for war and practically ineffective. Consequently, nothing hindered the rapid advance of the French to the north, capturing one Dutch city after another. It became evident to external observers that due to the obvious decline in its military strength, Spain would be unable to offer France any worthy resistance. As a result, the question of the Southern Netherlands unexpectedly became the focal point of European politics amid the height of the Anglo-Dutch war.

In the same year of 1667, the Dutch achieved great success in the war. The Dutch fleet not only inflicted significant defeats on the English navy but also managed to penetrate the Thames estuary, where numerous warehouses and docks were burned, and most of the English warships were either sunk or taken to Amsterdam as prizes – captured military trophies. However, the threat of French occupation of strategically important areas and their control over the Scheldt estuary pushed England and the Netherlands towards peace. Thus, both countries entered into a peace treaty on July 31, 1667, in Maastricht. Furthermore, the English and Dutch agreed to form an alliance, which also included Sweden through the promise of generous subsidies. This so-called "Triple" alliance offered its mediation services to Louis in negotiating peace with Spain. If Louis refused negotiations, the allies threatened France with war. This was an offer Louis could not afford to ignore, given the unified opposition of virtually all major maritime powers of the time. Consequently, in 1668, the French were forced to negotiate the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle with Spain, achieving only minor territorial gains (through the occupation of French territories in southern Flanders, the cities of Lille and Douai).

In the second half of the seventeenth century, France emerged as the strongest European state in terms of overall state power. It clearly surpassed each of its competitors in terms of territory size, population, natural resource endowment, etc. Furthermore, France was a classic absolute monarchy during this period, with a high degree of centralization of governance and a complex bureaucratic apparatus. This circumstance provided French monarchs with a uniquely effective instrument for mobilizing resources to implement ambitious

foreign policy plans. Additionally, France had the largest permanent land army in Europe (200,000 soldiers in peacetime and up to 500,000 during wartime) and significantly expanded its military and merchant fleets.

From the 1660s, Louis XIV's France pursued an openly expansionist policy. Its main direction was Spain, and its main goals were the annexation of several territories of the Spanish Crown on the Rhine, as well as the southern Netherlands, to France. Meanwhile, an alliance with France as the strongest continental power was necessary for both England and the Netherlands to achieve their goals in a rather intense trade and economic rivalry, which tended to escalate into military-political confrontation. By exploiting the contradictions between England and the Netherlands, Louis XIV's diplomats managed to quickly undermine the "Triple" maritime alliance (the Swedes left it in exchange for financial subsidies from France) and secure support for their plans regarding Spanish possessions from the English King Charles II. Additionally, French diplomacy succeeded in neutralizing the military potential of the Habsburg Empire, which declared its neutrality in the impending conflict. Old adversaries (dating back to the Dutch Revolt at the end of the sixteenth century), Spain and the Netherlands suddenly found themselves allies in the confrontation between the two most powerful states of the time – England and France.

The Second Dynastic War (1672 – 1678)

In 1672, England and France began a war against Holland. By this time, Spain was no longer considered a serious opponent. The defeat of Holland on the battlefield was expected to make it much more accommodating regarding the annexation of the southern Netherlands by France. Simultaneously, the English aimed to deliver a significant blow to the economic and naval power of their main competitor.

In the summer of 1672, Holland was on the brink of defeat. The French army advanced swiftly, capturing new Dutch provinces, while the Anglo-French fleet dominated the North Sea. However, the stunning successes of the Anglo-French coalition ultimately led to its dissolution. In 1674, England, which did not desire a decisive strengthening of France (including its naval power and commercial-economic potential) at the expense of the Netherlands, concluded a separate peace with Holland and withdrew from the war. Following England, several of Louis XIV's less significant allies, including Cologne and Münster, also exited the conflict. Simultaneously, a new anti-French coalition began to form in Europe.

This drastic change in the political landscape was quite straightforward. The complete defeat of Holland would have entirely disrupted the fragile European balance and facilitated the establishment of French hegemony in Europe, which no major European power could allow. As a result, William III of Orange, who came to power in 1672, managed to divide the opposing camp and even began forming a new anti-French coalition. During the war, a rather paradoxical situation emerged in this regard. The more victories the French forces achieved on land and sea, the more complicated the foreign policy situation became for France. By the end of 1674, France found itself almost completely politically isolated. Furthermore, the Dutch skillfully played the English internal political card, and under the pressure of the opposition, King Charles II was forced at the end of 1677 to even form an alliance with the Netherlands. Formally, the Anglo- Dutch alliance was not directed against France. The English, as they had ten years earlier during the French-Spanish Devolution War, merely offered their "good offices" in establishing peace with Holland. However, in reality, this amounted to an ultimatum to the French King Louis XIV. War-weary France could not afford a confrontation with a new powerful opponent.

In 1678, the Treaty of Nijmegen (a series of peace treaties) was signed. Under the treaty, Louis XIV acquired Franche-Comté and some other less significant territories in exchange for the loss of several enclave possessions in Germany and the southern Netherlands. At the same time, the French were forced to abandon some of the prohibitive duties and tariffs on imported goods introduced by Colbert. From the moment the Treaty of Nijmegen was concluded, the primary "nerve" of European politics became the contradictions between France on one side and all other European states on the other. To balance the growing power of France, a broad coalition was formed for the first time, including England, Holland, Spain, and the Habsburg Austrian Empire.

By the last quarter of the 17th century, one of the goals of French policy was the consolidation of French borders. This entailed acquiring new territories and subsequently eliminating the enclave positions of several French crown possessions, which would allow the creation of a continuous chain of fortifications along the Rhine and in the southern Netherlands. To achieve this goal, Louis XIV initiated a true legal campaign aimed at proving ancient or newly acquired “rights” to various territories under the Treaty of Westphalia. The lands favored by the “Sun King” were promptly occupied by French troops, sometimes even before the corresponding judicial decisions were made. Anti-French pamphlets circulating in Germany at the time noted, not without reason, that

after the peace was concluded, Louis managed to annex more territories to his possessions than had come under his scepter during the war (including the annexation of Strasbourg in 1681).

Louis XIV's attempts to dictate his terms in Europe and to seize foreign lands under the pretext of dubious ancient rights provoked an inevitable response from the Habsburg Austrian Empire and several German principalities. This forced Emperor Leopold I to conclude an alliance in 1682 with several German princes, who committed to fielding a 30,000-strong army against the French. In early 1683, a defensive alliance was formed, including the Emperor, Holland, Spain, Sweden, and the Electors of Bavaria and Hanover. War with France seemed inevitable. However, Louis turned to the aid of the Ottoman Empire, fully in line with the concept of raison d'état. The Ottomans declared war on the Habsburg Empire, and in 1683, a 200,000-strong Turkish army approached Vienna.

It is important to note that in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire, despite its vast territories on three continents and being a major European power (Balkans, Wallachia, Moldavia, part of Hungary), had largely lost its offensive strength in Europe. Nevertheless, there were always states, primarily France, that were willing to support Turkey's claims in Europe for their own benefit from military, political, and financial perspectives. From the last quarter of the 17th century, the policy later known as the "Eastern Policy" or the "Eastern Barrier Policy," aimed at using Turkey (alongside Sweden) as a counterbalance to the Austrian Empire and later Russia, increasingly became an important aspect of French foreign policy. In this context, the "Christian King" of Europe, Louis XIV, even earned the ironic nickname "Christian Turk."

Taking advantage of the Austrian Empire's concentration of forces on the eastern front, Louis issued an ultimatum to Spain and secured the annexation of Luxembourg to France. Furthermore, under a new agreement concluded in Regensburg in August 1684, practically all of France's claims on the Rhine were satisfied. However, achieving territorial expansion, France found itself in complete political isolation in Europe. Contrary to the expectations of official Versailles, the Turks suffered a crushing defeat outside the walls of Vienna, and the Austrian Habsburgs were able to significantly strengthen their positions in Central Europe as a result of the war with the Ottoman Porte. They managed to clear Hungary, part of Serbia, Wallachia, and Bosnia of Turks. Moreover, the "Glorious Revolution" in England (1688) and the accession to power in London of William of Orange, Stadtholder of Holland, brought Britain into the camp of decisive and consistent opponents of France. Thus, the two largest dynamically

developing Protestant states unexpectedly united their resources in the fight against the possibility of establishing French political hegemony in Europe.

The Third Dynastic War, War of the Palatine Succession, the War of the League of Augsburg (1688 – 1697)

Official Versailles, however, failed to correctly assess the changing balance of power and continued to behave extremely arrogantly on the European stage. In 1688, a directive from Paris ordered the devastation of border territories that had recently been annexed to the French kingdom. According to contemporary military doctrines, ensuring border security required the creation of a chain of fortresses along the entire border. For the reliable defense of these long-term fortifications, French commanders – Louvouis, Vauban, and even Louis XIV himself – considered it necessary to devastate the areas adjacent to the chain of newly constructed French fortresses. This would drastically hinder the enemy's ability to supply ammunition and provisions to their troops in case of war, limit their maneuverability, and doom siege attempts to failure. Essentially, this measure indicated an adoption of a defensive military doctrine rather than expansionist designs by Versailles. However, the unprovoked destruction, which vividly reminded Europe of the relatively recent bloody events of the Thirty Years' War, led to an outburst of indignation against the French actions, especially in Germany.

In 1688, hostilities began on the Rhine. In the spring of 1689, the Madrid court officially allowed the troops of German principalities into the Southern Netherlands and opened the gates of its fortresses to them. Taking advantage of this, the French court declared war on Spain. In May 1689, war began between France and Holland and England. Soon after, Savoy and several southern German principalities led by Bavaria joined the conflict. The Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, meeting in Regensburg, officially declared war on France.

By the summer of 1690, France was at war with a powerful coalition that included most of Europe. The French had virtually no chance of victory. Versailles was saved from a crushing defeat by the inherent lack of coordination typical of large international coalitions. The war, known as the War of the League of Augsburg, dragged on for nine years (1688–1697). Although the league's main goal was to prevent France from gaining hegemony in Europe and acquiring the Spanish Netherlands, trade and colonial competition also became significant issues during the war. In the 1690s, Versailles made active attempts to reach a

separate peace with individual members of the League of Augsburg and took measures to sow discord within the opposing coalition. These attempts were not markedly successful (only the Duchy of Savoy left the coalition under the influence of generous French subsidies). Nevertheless, France managed to withstand the struggle against numerous opponents and maintained its status as the most powerful state in Europe.

In September 1697, the Treaty of Ryswick was signed between France, England, Spain, and Holland. According to the treaty, France effectively retained most of its acquisitions and conquests in Germany and the southern Netherlands, including Franche-Comté. The treaty also formally recognized Louis XIV's acknowledgment of William of Orange's legitimate claim to the English throne. The signing of the Treaty of Ryswick established an almost classical "balance of power" in Europe. However, it did not resolve the central issue on which the prospects for maintaining the established balance of power depended, namely, the issue of the "Spanish succession," nor did it address the ongoing struggle for colonial supremacy between England and France.

After the Treaty of Ryswick, all the leading European states were significantly weakened, and none directly sought to exacerbate relations or, even less, to start a new European war. Nevertheless, just a few years after the peace was concluded, European politicians and diplomats faced the question of the so-called "Spanish succession."

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What are the key principles of the Westphalian system of international relations, and how did they differ from the previous medieval order?*
2. *How did the Peace of Westphalia (1648) influence the development of state sovereignty in Europe?*
3. *Which actors dominated international relations in the 17th and 18th centuries, and what were the main features of their foreign policy behavior?*
4. *What were the causes and consequences of the major dynastic wars in Europe between the late 17th and early 18th centuries?*
5. *How did the formation of the Westphalian system contribute to the emergence of modern diplomacy?*

Lecture 2. Crisis of the Westphalian system of international relations in XVIII century

1. Wars of the successions and their significance

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714)

The issue of the Spanish succession arose due to the lack of heirs of King Charles II of Spain, a Habsburg, leaving the fate of the vast Spanish Empire— which included significant colonial holdings outside Europe and large enclaves on the continent (in Italy, the southern Netherlands, etc.)—dependent on the dynastic-diplomatic maneuvers of European courts. Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick, Versailles began diplomatic preparations to establish a de facto union between France and Spain by arranging for Louis XIV's grandson, the Duke of Anjou, to be crowned as the Spanish king.

Another claimant to the Spanish throne was Archduke Charles of Austria, representing the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg. The maritime powers, England and Holland, took a wait-and-see stance, aiming to secure the most favorable terms for acquiring colonial possessions and territories in Europe, as well as trade "compensations" from each claimant.

Louis XIV's policy towards Spain resembled his policy towards Holland: to conquer the metropolis and, with the seizure of Madrid, automatically gain vast territories outside Europe. According to many researchers, Louis XIV's foreign policy plans envisioned France as the successor to both the wealthy colonial empires of Holland and Spain. The relative failure in the Dutch direction was to be compensated by success in the Pyrenees.

Initially, France's diplomatic offensive towards Spain was fully successful. In 1700, amidst diplomatic negotiations regarding the "Spanish succession," King Charles II of Spain died. According to his will, the Madrid throne was to be inherited by Louis XIV's grandson, a Bourbon, who was crowned as Philip V. By early 1701, French troops were stationed in the southern Netherlands and Milan. No European state was willing to accept such a significant increase in France's

power. England, Holland, and Austria united against the French and Spanish Bourbons, with their main goals being to maintain the balance of power in Europe and prevent any single state from gaining control over the Spanish territories. Consequently, in 1701, a new Pan-European war began, lasting over ten years.

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Rastatt in 1714, which concluded this exhausting and bloody marathon of battles, significantly altered the balance of power on the European continent. Essentially, Versailles' plans for establishing French hegemony in Europe were thwarted. Although Louis XIV's son, Philip V, retained the Spanish crown, the system established by these treaties made it impossible for France to pursue hegemonic ambitions in the future. By 1715, when Louis XIV died, France bore little resemblance to the dominant power it had been in the 1660s-1680s. The Netherlands, which had been forced into prolonged and costly wars on the continent and trade routes in the world's oceans, lost its status as a great power and its position as a leading global financial state was ultimately undermined.

Some relatively secondary European states, such as the Kingdom of Prussia, and notably England, emerged in advantageous positions. The Treaty of Utrecht marked the economic and political rise of England, which showed a clear interest in ensuring that no single state on the European continent would occupy a dominant position, allowing England to play the role of arbiter in international disputes. Consequently, English politicians, regardless of their domestic political orientation, became staunch and interested supporters of the doctrine of the "balance of power" in Europe for many years.

Date	Event
1700	Death of the Spanish king Charles II (having no heirs, his successor was declared to be the French prince Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV)
1701 – 1714	War of the Spanish Succession
1701, September 7	Formation of the Grand Alliance – a coalition formed in The Hague by England and the Netherlands with the Holy Roman Empire
1702, May	The Grand Alliance declares war on France, soon joined by Brandenburg and most other German principalities, Denmark, Portugal, etc. France finds itself in international isolation
1700 – 1721	Northern War prevents the Swedish king Charles XII from aiding France in the war
1711	Election of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who, as a result of a series of negotiations by the alliance against France, declares himself King of Spain, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Charles IV, posing a threat to the interests of most states
1712	Negotiations begin in Utrecht between the allies (excluding the Empire) and

Date	Event
	France, culminating the following year in the signing of a peace treaty
1713, April 11	The Treaty of Utrecht between France and Spain, on one side, and England, the Netherlands, Brandenburg, and Savoy, on the other
1714, March 7	The Treaty of Rastatt between France, Spain, and the Empire
	Results of the War for Countries and Europe as a Whole:
France	• Louis XIV's intentions to change the balance of power in his favor and achieve French supremacy in Europe and the colonies suffered defeat
Austria	• Acquired Spanish possessions in the Southern Netherlands (Belgium) and in Italy (Duchy of Milan, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, etc.)
	• Obtained Gibraltar and Minorca in the Mediterranean, territories in North America (Newfoundland, etc.)
	• Obtained the exclusive right to trade African slaves in Spanish colonies in America (the asiento)
England	• Philip V Bourbon (grandson of Louis XIV) retained the Spanish crown, but only on the condition that his descendants renounce rights to the French throne (the Spanish Bourbon dynasty)

The War of Polish Succession 1733–1735

In the first half of the 18th century, Russia, which was growing stronger at the expense of Turkey, Poland, and Sweden, sought an alliance with France. But the French government was afraid of losing its old friends, which were these three states, and as a result, Russia moved closer to France's long-standing rival, Austria, and the Habsburg House.

By this time, the internal decay of Poland had gone so far that Russia, France, and other powers began to struggle for influence over Poland. When the Elector of Saxony, who was also the Polish King Augustus II, died, Russia and Austria supported the candidacy of his son, Augustus III, for the Polish throne, while France nominated Stanisław Leszczyński, who had been king before but was deposed. This choice was due to Louis XV being married to Stanisław's daughter, Maria. The French hoped to place their own man on the Polish throne in the person of S. Leszczyński.

The French ambassador in Warsaw, Monti, spent 3 million livres to sway the Poles in favor of S. Leszczyński. To distract the Russians and Austrians, a certain Chevalier Tiance, posing as S. Leszczyński, boarded a ship in Brest with great pomp and headed for the Baltic; at the same time, the real S. Leszczyński secretly made his way to Warsaw, disguised as a traveling salesman. However, the Polish nobles, having received French money, quickly went home and showed little eagerness to fight Russia and Austria for the honor of the French queen,

especially since there was a rather strong party against S. Leszczyński within Poland itself.

Russia was unreachable for France, and the French government received its first practical lesson on how dangerous it was to neglect Russian friendship. France tried to incite Sweden and Turkey against Russia but was met with their refusal. They had to defend S. Leszczyński on their own. But the fleet sent to Danzig was chased away by Russian ships, and the French landing force was captured. Then Louis XV, hearing rumors that the Russian Empress was still favorable to France, sent a secret envoy to Russia, a certain Abbot Langlois, under the name Bernardoni, to propose to Anna Ivanovna to recognize Stanisław Leszczyński as the Polish king. The abbot, with great difficulty, reached St. Petersburg, but was soon sent away. Left to its own devices, Poland had to agree to the demands of Austria and Russia in 1734.

2. The Austro-Prussian Rivalry in the 18th century

In the 18th century, the ruling class in England had at its disposal colossal resources. It could buy allies everywhere willing to defend English interests. This was made easier by the fact that Europe was not lacking in those willing to sell themselves for a respectable sum. Germany, politically fragmented after the Thirty Years' War, presented a pitiful sight. There were as many states as there were days in the year (in fact, there were even more). For example, the holdings of the so-called imperial knights – small lords who were directly subordinate to the emperor – numbered more than a thousand and were practically independent states: the emperor's power outside the hereditary lands of the Habsburgs had long since dwindled to nothing.

This crowned rabble led a rather miserable existence and, constantly in need of money, devised a unique method of enrichment. The petty princes of Germany, who had gained the right to conduct independent policies under the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, began to sell their armies to anyone who was willing to pay. There was the most shameless sale of soldiers, and with them, their homeland. In just half a century, German princes earned at least 137 million livres from France and 46.5 million pounds sterling from England. This business was so profitable that the German princes conducted actual raids on their subjects, conscripting them into soldiers and then selling them in whole armies to wealthy allies.

Amid this political chaos in Germany, two major states gradually stood out: Austria and Prussia. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the rapid expansion of Prussia and its transformation into a great power became one of the most important facts in Central European history. The nucleus of this state was the Electorate of Brandenburg, which fell into the hands of the Hohenzollern house at the beginning of the 15th century. In the early 17th century, Prussia, or the lands belonging to another branch of the Hohenzollerns, was joined to Brandenburg.

Since the time of Frederick William I, the so-called "Great Elector," Brandenburg-Prussia had begun to play a significant role in international affairs. From this time, Prussia became a rival of Austria within Germany. Prussia was a typical military-feudal state. Its ruling class – the nobility – lived by exploiting the labor of serfs tied to estates, whose products were sold in the developing markets of Western Europe. The Electors of Brandenburg, later the Kings of Prussia, were themselves large landowners.

The need to protect river trade routes and the constant struggle with neighbors, primarily Sweden, for control of the Baltic coast through which grain and other agricultural raw materials were exported abroad, turned Prussia into a military power. The Prussian kings were akin to their Junkers, as the nobility was called here. Greedy and unscrupulous in foreign policy, they increased Prussia's territory at the expense of neighboring princes' lands whenever a favorable moment presented itself. Big money and a big army – this was the simple policy of these "soldiers" and "sergeants" on the throne.

Frederick II achieved the greatest successes in expanding his state, and he cannot be denied either military talents or diplomatic skill. He was no less a "soldier" and "miser" than his predecessors, but he lived in the Age of Enlightenment, was a "friend" of Voltaire, and could skillfully mask his true nature as a despot and devotee of the rod with impeccable French phrases and philosophical reflections borrowed from the French Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century. This "philosopher of Sans-Souci," as he was later called, began his writing career by refuting Machiavelli's "The Prince." "The Prince," wrote Frederick in the preface to his "Anti-Machiavel," had introduced corruption into politics and aimed to destroy the rules of healthy morality..." However, as soon as he ascended the throne, Frederick II forgot what he had written. It can be said without exaggeration that no ruler was as faithful a follower of Machiavelli as Frederick II of Prussia. He conducted foreign policy personally and bore full responsibility for it. The rules he followed were formulated by him as follows: "If there is to be deceit, then let it be we who deceive."

Frederick began his reign by demanding from Maria Theresa, the daughter of Charles VI and recognized as the heir to the Austrian throne by the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, the wealthy industrial region of Silesia in exchange for his recognition of her inheritance rights. When Maria Theresa refused, he organized an anti-Austrian coalition and seized Silesia. This marked the beginning of **the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748).**

When France, following its traditional policy against the Habsburgs, decided to exploit Maria Theresa's difficult situation, Frederick II assured the French ambassador that he would "share with France if he remained in the winnings." The result was an agreement among France, Spain, Bavaria, Prussia, and Saxony to partition the Austrian inheritance. England and the Netherlands, rivals of France, sided with Austria, and Russia joined in 1747.

While the French fought their wars in Germany, "working for the Prussian king," Frederick II secretly made an agreement with Maria Theresa. He promised her he would never demand anything other than Lower Silesia with the cities of Breslau and Neisse; to demonstrate his loyalty to his allies, he agreed with Maria Theresa to besiege Neisse for two weeks for appearances, after which the city would surrender. Frederick later claimed he did this because France sought to disintegrate Germany, and he, Frederick, decided to "save" Maria Theresa for this reason. When the Austrians, freed from their most dangerous enemy, pressed the Franco-Bavarian troops, Frederick II sent his allies one hussar regiment to help. Simultaneously, he secured from Elector Charles Albert of Bavaria, elected emperor under French pressure, an agreement to annex Upper Silesia, which actually belonged to Austria. Realizing that the Austrians would not voluntarily give up this area, Frederick sharply turned against the Austrians, defeated them at Chotusitz, and then, with English support, received all of Silesia. When all these machinations of Frederick II became known in Paris, there was no end to the indignation.

The prolonged war concluded with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which confirmed the Pragmatic Sanction recognizing Maria Theresa's right to the imperial throne but ultimately handed Silesia over to Frederick II. Spain and Sardinia received territories in Italy, partly at the expense of Austrian holdings. France had to return the lands it had captured in the Netherlands and give back Madras and several territories in America to England. England also secured the extension of the Asiento contract.

This treaty further exacerbated the rivalry between Austria and Prussia. Maria Theresa was furious. She told the English ambassador, who unwisely

congratulated her on the peace, that she hoped to regain her possessions soon, "even if it meant giving away her last petticoat." For her, it was clear that Prussia had become Austria's most dangerous rival in German affairs, rising to the status of a major European power. A few years later, Austrian diplomacy succeeded in creating a coalition against Frederick II, including France and Russia. This coalition eventually launched the war against Prussia known as the Seven Years' War.

War of Austrian Succession, which spanned from 1740 to 1748. This war was not just a struggle for the Habsburg monarchy but also a conflict that involved most of the great powers of Europe and set the stage for future geopolitical dynamics.

Background and Causes. The War of Austrian Succession had its roots in complex European politics, dynastic claims, and territorial ambitions. Let's begin with the key background elements:

1. **Death of Charles VI and the Pragmatic Sanction**:

- In 1740, Emperor Charles VI of the Habsburg Dynasty died without a male heir. His only surviving child was Maria Theresa. To ensure her succession, Charles VI had issued the Pragmatic Sanction, a decree that allowed his daughter to inherit the Habsburg lands.

- Despite initially agreeing to the Pragmatic Sanction, many European powers saw Charles VI's death as an opportunity to challenge Habsburg dominance and claim parts of its territories.

2. **Claimants and Alliances**:

- **Prussia**: Frederick II (Frederick the Great) of Prussia, seeking to expand his territories, invaded the Habsburg province of Silesia, which marked the beginning of the war.

- **France**: Eager to weaken the Habsburgs, France allied with Prussia and supported other claimants like Charles Albert of Bavaria.

- **Spain**: Spain sought to reclaim territories in Italy and supported the anti-Habsburg coalition.

- **Great Britain**: Allied with the Habsburgs, Great Britain aimed to check French influence in Europe.

- **Other Powers**: Numerous other European states, including the Dutch Republic, Sardinia, and Saxony, were drawn into the conflict through various alliances.

Major Campaigns and Battles

The war was characterized by numerous campaigns and battles across Europe, particularly in Central Europe, Italy, and the Low Countries. Some of the key events include:

1. **Silesian Campaigns (1740-1742)**:

- Frederick II's initial invasion of Silesia was swift and successful, leading to the First Silesian War. The Treaty of Breslau (1742) temporarily ended hostilities between Prussia and Austria, with Prussia retaining most of Silesia.

2. **Battle of Dettingen (1743)**:

- Fought in Bavaria, this battle saw the British, Hanoverian, and Austrian forces defeat the French. It was the last time a British monarch (George II) personally led his troops in battle.

3. **Austrian and French Maneuvers in Italy**:

- The war also saw significant action in Italy, where Austria fought to retain its territories against Franco-Spanish forces. Battles such as the Battle of Fontenoy (1745) were significant in this theater.

4. **Second Silesian War (1744-1745)**:

- Renewed hostilities between Prussia and Austria resulted in another conflict over Silesia. The Treaty of Dresden (1745) confirmed Prussian control over Silesia.

5. **Maritime and Colonial Conflicts**:

- The war also extended to the colonies, where British and French forces clashed in North America and the Caribbean. The conflict in these regions is often referred to as the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War.

Conclusion and Treaties

The War of Austrian Succession formally ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). The treaty's terms included:

1. **Recognition of Maria Theresa**:

- Maria Theresa was recognized as the legitimate ruler of the Habsburg lands. However, her husband, Francis Stephen of Lorraine, was elected Holy Roman Emperor.

2. **Territorial Adjustments**:

- Prussia retained Silesia, significantly enhancing its power and prestige.
- France returned the Austrian Netherlands and other territories to Austria but gained minor concessions in India and North America.
- Spain regained some territories in Italy, but its broader ambitions were checked.

Aftermath and Significance

The War of Austrian Succession had several significant outcomes:

1. **Rise of Prussia**: Prussia emerged as a major European power, setting the stage for future conflicts with Austria and other states.

2. **Habsburg Resilience**: Despite significant losses, Maria Theresa's reign saw reforms that strengthened the Habsburg state.

3. **Diplomatic Realignments**: The war led to shifts in alliances, culminating in the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, where traditional enemies, France and Austria, became allies against Prussia and Great Britain in the Seven Years' War.

Conclusion. The War of Austrian Succession was a pivotal conflict in European history, influencing the balance of power and laying the groundwork for future wars. It highlighted the interconnected nature of European politics, where dynastic claims and territorial ambitions could quickly escalate into widespread conflict. Understanding this war is crucial for comprehending the broader dynamics of 18th-century Europe and the rise of modern statecraft.

3. The Seven Years' War

The strained relations between Austria and Prussia had not ceased since the War of Austrian Succession. The Austrian government was actively preparing for a new war. Austria, Prussia, France, and England—all were engaged in energetic diplomatic efforts, gathering allies. As a result, almost all of Europe was drawn into the conflict.

The unexpected alliance of two old rivals—France and Austria—and France's move against its former ally, Prussia, happened as follows. Since the beginning of the "second Hundred Years' War," England had supported the Habsburg monarchy as a rival to France. From the 18th century, this policy became doubly necessary because England had to protect Hanover, the familial possession of the new English dynasty, from the French on the continent. But since the War of Austrian Succession, it became clear to the English that a new military power had emerged on the continent: Prussia, which, alongside Russia and Austria, was willing to receive English subsidies. Since Maria Theresa demanded too large a sum for protecting Hanover and there was little hope that, being preoccupied with the war for Silesia, she could provide this protection, the English refused to pay her and tried to "hire" Frederick II. He agreed, thinking this would save him from a potential diversion by Russia. Additionally, Frederick II hoped his diplomatic skills would be enough to ensure that the treaty, effectively aimed against France, wouldn't alienate him from the French.

In Russia, they were seriously alarmed by Frederick II's successes. Chancellor Bestuzhev took a firm stance against Prussia, finding it dangerous for Russia "because of its proximity and the increase in its power." Since the Protestant part of Germany, particularly Prussia, had friendly relations with France, the enemies of England and Austria, Bestuzhev concluded a treaty with English ambassador Williams in 1755. According to it, Russia promised to field an 80,000-strong army against England's enemies on the continent in exchange for a one-time payment of 500,000 pounds and an annual subsidy of 100,000 pounds. The enemy, naturally, was Frederick II of Prussia and no one else. However, the English plans were quite different.

By hiring Frederick II, the English believed Austria would fight against France without England's expenses. Thus, England could cheaply form a coalition of Russia, Austria, and Prussia to crush Louis XV on the continent while capturing French colonies themselves. Frederick, signing the treaty with the English government, thought that by joining with the English and Russians, he would protect himself from an attack by Russia. Regarding his "friend" France, he hoped to act as a mediator in the Anglo-French dispute, gaining France's favor without breaking with England. He was also tired of Louis XV's condescending patronage and thought it was time to show "independence."

One can imagine the outrage of the Russian, French, and Austrian governments when they learned that Frederick II and England had signed a treaty

in Whitehall in January 1756, in which both sides promised to maintain peace in Germany and take up arms "against any power that infringes on the integrity of German territory." Austria and Russia saw this treaty as a betrayal by England. The English government, realizing that the results of its diplomatic maneuvering were the opposite of its expectations, calmly waited, relying on England's low vulnerability, protected by the sea dominated by its fleet. All the indignation fell on Frederick II. France, in response to the ingratitude of the Prussian king, decided to unite with Austria.

Maria Theresa, after the War of Austrian Succession, considered it possible to attract France to her side. One of the most prominent diplomats of the 18th century, Kaunitz, was sent to France. The groundwork for rapprochement with the old rival had been prepared for a long time. As early as 1748, Kaunitz assured Louis XV's mistress, Madame de Pompadour, that Austria was ready to give up part of the Belgian provinces (Flanders and Brabant) if only France would help Austria regain Silesia. In 1751, Kaunitz was appointed Austrian ambassador to Paris. Here, he convinced the French that only thanks to the indulgence of great powers like France and Austria did Prussia and Sardinia grow, seeing their task as sowing discord between the great powers and using it to round out their possessions.

Thus, the groundwork for the rapprochement between Austria and France was laid. The final push towards their alliance was Frederick II's overly "subtle" diplomacy. Immediately after the English pirate attack on French ships in 1755, Frederick II proposed a bold plan to Louis XV. Let Louis XV immediately seize Belgium; he, Frederick, would invade Bohemia and, defeating the Austrians, take over all of Germany. Thus, the Prussian king was already planning in the 18th century a scheme reminiscent of Bismarck's ideas in 1866. In Vienna, it was already known that Frederick was simultaneously negotiating with England. Maria Theresa immediately informed Louis XV about this.

The news of the conclusion of the Whitehall Treaty between Frederick and England confirmed the warnings from Vienna. Louis XV made his decision. On May 1, 1756, the first Treaty of Versailles was concluded between Austria and France, providing for mutual guarantees: each side promised to support the other with an army of thousands of men against any aggressor. Shortly before this, Empress Elizabeth had effectively renounced the Anglo-Russian treaty and concluded a defensive-offensive alliance with Austria (1756). To attack Frederick II, Russia promised to support Austria with an army of 80,000. In case of victory

over Prussia, Austria was to receive Silesia, and Russia, East Prussia. French diplomats succeeded in involving Augustus III, the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, in this coalition. In 1757, Sweden, tempted by subsidies and the hope of capturing Pomerania, also joined the coalition.

The coalition was finally formalized by two allied treaties: The Russo-Austrian treaty (February 1757), which repeated the conditions of the previous treaty but provided Russia with an annual subsidy of 1 million rubles, and the second Treaty of Versailles (May 1757), in which France promised to field 105,000 men and provide Maria Theresa with an annual subsidy of 12 million florins. In 1756, the war began. Frederick II's position soon became catastrophic, although he showed great talent as a commander. He acted quickly and decisively, managing to reach all borders, defeating enemies one by one, and losing only three out of ten battles. He was helped by the exceptional incompetence of the French absolutist generals, the unforgivable slowness of the Austrian commanders, and the abundance of English subsidies flowing to him. But he suffered heavy defeats from the Russians – at Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757 and Kunersdorf in 1759. In 1760, Russian troops even briefly occupied Berlin.

By early 1762, Frederick II's position had become very difficult. He was saved by a shift in Russian policy, accelerated by the death of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna in January 1762. The new Emperor Peter III not only renounced all conquests in Prussia but also expressed a desire to assist Frederick II. General Chernyshev's corps was ordered to join Frederick for joint offensive actions against Austria. These were the events on the eastern theater of the European war. The longer the war between France and Prussia dragged on, the more satisfaction the English ruling circles felt: for them, the European powers were diligently "pulling chestnuts out of the fire." Occupied in Europe, France found itself powerless overseas. By 1759, the English had captured Canada and in 1761 seized Pondicherry in India. The French fleet was almost completely destroyed.

The war ended with two peace treaties: The Treaty of Paris in the west (February 10, 1763) and the Treaty of Hubertusburg in the east (February 15, 1763). France lost Canada and other possessions in North America, namely the Ohio River valley and the entire left bank of the Mississippi River, except for New Orleans. Additionally, it had to cede the right bank of the same river to Spain and compensate it for the Spanish Florida ceded to England. France was also forced to give up Hindustan, retaining only five cities there. Austria permanently lost Silesia.

The Seven Years' War of 1756-1763 was the last major European conflict before the Great Bourgeois Revolution in France. This conflict highlighted the contradictions and the alignment of international forces that would exist throughout much of the 19th century.

Firstly, the Anglo-French struggle for colonies and world dominance entered a new phase. Secondly, the rivalry between Austria and Prussia for hegemony in Germany became particularly acute. These two main contradictions lay at the heart of the conflict. At the same time, the centuries-old antagonism between France and Austria – the Bourbons and the Habsburgs – disappeared, turning into a Franco-Austrian alliance. Finally, the Russian Empire energetically intervened in the European conflict. This was a characteristic new development, indicating the steadily growing weight of Russia and its rising international influence. Thus, the Seven Years' War in the west ended France's colonial power, ensured England's complete dominance at sea, and in the east marked the first step towards Prussia's future hegemony in Germany.



Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What were the main causes and outcomes of the War of the Spanish Succession?*
2. *How did the War of the Austrian Succession impact the balance of power in Europe?*
3. *In what ways did the Austro-Prussian rivalry shape the political landscape of Central Europe in the 18th century?*
4. *What were the global dimensions of the Seven Years' War, and why is it often referred to as the "first world war"?*
5. *How did the results of the Seven Years' War influence future colonial and European conflicts?*

Lecture 3. International Relations during the American War of Independence (1775–1783)

3.1 Causes and the Beginning of the War for Independence
3.2 Diplomacy of the USA and European States
3.3 The Treaty of Versailles of 1783 and International consequences of the USA's victory

1. Causes and the beginning of the War for Independence

The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) had a significant impact on North America. According to the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the eastern part of Louisiana was ceded to the British colonial empire, creating the prospect of economic exploitation of a vast territory.

The British government prohibited the colonists from settling in Louisiana because:

- It would complicate tax collection;
- It could provoke resistance from the Native Americans, whom the French had used against the colonists during the Seven Years' War.

The colonists perceived this prohibition as a gross violation of their legal rights, viewing these actions primarily as an attempt to infringe upon their rights and freedoms, which they considered their inalienable acquisitions in the spirit of the Enlightenment. The colonists sent petitions and protests to the British government, the essence of which was as follows:

- The colonists were willing to pay taxes and other state duties, but only if their rights were not violated, including participation in the legislative process;
- They must be represented in the British Parliament by their own deputies, and then they would obey the law, even if they did not like it.

In 1775, the Continental Congress met in Philadelphia, where all 13 colonies, except Canada, were represented. It led the colonies' uprising against the mother country.

On April 19, 1775, the first battle between colonial troops and rebel forces took place near the towns of Lexington and Concord, which soon demonstrated the inevitability of the colonies' break with Great Britain.

On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence of the United States. Initially, the colonists sought a compromise with the mother country. Likewise, many political figures in London, including members of Parliament, leaned toward compromise. However, the forces led by King George III ruled out any compromise. This led to the escalation of the constitutional conflict into a war for independence, which lasted until 1783.

2. Diplomacy of the USA and European States

In the face of imminent catastrophe, young American diplomacy had the task of securing international support through diplomatic and financial means, as well as supplies of arms, clothing, and ammunition. In March 1776, the "Committee for Secret Correspondence with Friends of the Colonies in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world," which acted as the foreign ministry, sent a member of the Continental Congress, Silas Deane, to France with the secret task of obtaining assistance. The official status of a neutral state did not allow the French government to openly support the colonies. Therefore, it unofficially entrusted a private individual – the famous playwright Beaumarchais – to organize aid to the colonists. Beaumarchais established a fictitious trading house, "Rodrigo Hortalez & Co," which successfully supplied arms, ammunition, clothing, and volunteers to America. From 1776 to 1778, secret agents Deane and Beaumarchais sent 30,000 muskets, 100 tons of powder, 200 cannons, clothing for 20,000 people, spending over 21,000 pounds. "Neutral" Spain provided Deane with about 300,000 dollars.

After the adoption of the Declaration, the USA sent an official ambassador to France – Benjamin Franklin. The embassy included Silas Deane, Chief Justice of the State of New York John Jay, granted equal rights with Franklin, as well as publicist Arthur Lee and Edward Bancroft (later revealed to be an English spy). In 1778, Franklin was appointed sole ambassador to France. Young American diplomacy had two main tasks:

- To at least secure increased military and financial aid from France;
- To maximally involve France in the war against Great Britain.

For this purpose, Franklin, Deane, and Lee sent a diplomatic note to the French government proposing to conclude a trade and alliance treaty.

During 1776, the French government provided the USA with 2 million pounds as a gift and 1 million pounds as a loan. But Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, refused to consider the main issue – concluding an alliance, which meant France entering the war against Britain.

The threat of the war program forced the colonies to negotiate with Great Britain, which soon interrupted them in hopes of finally defeating the American forces. At the end of 1777, there was a turning point in the course of military

operations, which determined changes in France's position in diplomatic negotiations with the USA. When news of a major victory of American forces under Washington's command at Saratoga in December 1777, where British General Burgoyne surrendered with a 6,000-strong army, leading to the start of Anglo-American negotiations, Minister Vergennes was forced to change his position. He believed that peace between the USA and Great Britain threatened France with the loss of its West Indian colonies. Franklin decided to take advantage of the situation. With the help of Beaumarchais, he persuaded Louis XVI of the necessity of an alliance with the USA. At the same time, Congress interrupted negotiations with Great Britain.

To weaken Britain's position, France did not rush to join the war and fulfill its promises to the USA. Eventually, on February 6, 1778, Franklin signed two very important treaties with France – on trade and alliance. This was a great victory for American diplomacy. France entered the war on the side of the colonists, whose government wanted revenge for its defeat in the Seven Years' War, to regain the colonies, restore the balance of power among the major states disrupted by Britain's victory. Since 1763, it had been preparing and carrying out reforms to increase the combat readiness of its army and navy. Spain, also ruled by the Bourbon dynasty, also participated in the war on the side of the colonists as an ally of France under the terms of the "family pact" of 1761.

According to the treaty, the USA was recognized as a sovereign and equal state. France undertook to act as a guarantor of their independence. The USA guaranteed the inviolability of French possessions in America. In fact, this was a complete expulsion of England from North and Central America: the USA gained the right to claim British possessions on the American continent and the Bermuda Islands, while France gained the right to English West Indian colonies, and Spain – to Florida, which it had lost.

For the French monarchy, this war was a risky step, as from the point of view of dynastic law, it was a war between conspirators and legitimate authority. Instead of coming to the aid of its "brother" the English king, the French king Louis XVI took the position of the rebels (which would soon resonate with him during the French Revolution).

After a series of defeats, Franklin again turned to the French government for help. He managed to obtain a large loan, send arms and ammunition to the USA for 20,000 people, and about 30 warships with new volunteers.

Meanwhile, France conducted military operations in India, off the coast of Ireland, along the Atlantic coast of England, and in the West Indies. Spain besieged Gibraltar.

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Most European states adopted a neutral position, guided by their own state and trade interests. They wanted to weaken Britain's international position but did not want to ruin their relations with it. Russia adhered to a policy of "armed neutrality" in response to the British naval blockade of American ports, which threatened to spread military operations to the seas washing Europe. In 1780, Russia defended freedom of navigation, threatening to use armed force in case of its violation. This position was supported by the states of Northern Europe – the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, later Prussia, the Habsburg monarchy, Portugal, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In 1780, the Netherlands broke its neutrality and joined the war against Britain. These states defended their own trade and other interests, but the results of their "armed neutrality" proved beneficial for the USA, as Britain was forced to open American ports to trading ships under neutral flags.

In 1781, there was a decisive turning point in the military operations after the victory of American forces and the French squadron at Yorktown in Virginia. In England, the Whig party, which advocated for an end to the war, came to power. Britain began peace negotiations. On the American side, they were conducted by Franklin, Jay, and Adams. The articles of the peace treaty were elaborated in Paris in 1782, and the final version was signed in Versailles in 1783.

3. The Treaty of Versailles of 1783 and International consequences of the USA's victory

The Treaty of Versailles of 1783 was signed on September 3, 1783, in Versailles, between Great Britain on one side and the USA, France, Spain, and the

Netherlands on the other. It consolidated the preliminary peace treaties previously signed by Great Britain and its allies:

November 30, 1782 - Peace treaty between the USA and Great Britain, under which Great Britain recognized its former colonies as a sovereign independent state, the borders of which were defined by special articles of the treaty, and renounced all future claims; it also committed to withdraw its troops, garrisons, and ships from the territory of the USA.

January 20, 1783 - Peace treaty between Great Britain on one side and France and Spain on the other, under which Great Britain ceded the island of Tobago in the West Indies to France and returned Senegal in Africa, and returned Menorca to Spain in the Mediterranean; in India, France and Great Britain returned all territories captured during the war to each other.

September 2, 1783 - Peace treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands, under which Great Britain obtained Negapatam (a Dutch factory in India).

Formally, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles meant some restoration of the balance of power, which was disrupted in favor of Great Britain as a result of the Seven Years' War. In reality, the Peace of Versailles of 1783 further shook the Westphalian system of international relations, the cause of which can be found in the principles underlying this treaty.

International consequences of the USA's victory:

- Emergence of a new subject of international relations, a sovereign bourgeois republic that won using contradictions between colonial powers.
- Weakening of Britain's maritime and colonial dominance.
- Ideological influence on the world, primarily on France, which embraced new democratic ideas (Mably, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Brissot studied and promoted the experience of the American Revolution).

- Growth of the patriotic movement in Ireland, the national-educational movement against Spanish-Portuguese rule in the countries of Latin America.

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What were the main political and economic causes of the American War of Independence?*
2. *How did European powers, particularly France and Spain, influence the outcome of the conflict through diplomacy and military support?*
3. *What were the key goals of American diplomacy during the war, and how were they achieved?*
4. *What were the main provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1783), and how did they reshape international relations?*
5. *In what ways did the victory of the United States affect the global balance of power and the colonial empires of European states?*

Lecture 4. European Diplomacy and International Relations During the French Revolution

4.1 European Diplomacy on the Eve of the French Revolution

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, significant transformations occurred in the forms and methods of aristocratic-dynastic diplomacy among European states. The diplomacy of 18th-century absolute monarchies began to evolve under the influence of the American Revolution and the War of Independence (1775-1783), ultimately receiving a decisive blow from the French Revolution (1789-1794).

The emerging bourgeoisie introduced the principle of national sovereignty, first proclaimed in the field of diplomacy by the United States during the struggle for independence, and further developed by French diplomacy during the French Revolution. In their struggle against feudal-monarchical forces, the French bourgeoisie promoted slogans of equality, liberty, and fraternity among nations. They demonstratively rejected the policies of conquest and secret treaties. However, this new foreign policy often remained a rhetorical declaration, with few practical applications before the Thermidorian Reaction on July 27, 1794.

The strengthening of parliamentary systems (notably in Great Britain) and bourgeois-democratic freedoms in advanced European countries impacted foreign policy leadership. Political parties and the press began to exert some influence on the formulation of their countries' foreign policies. Diplomacy became more transparent, with foreign ministers and ambassadors facing increased scrutiny. Improved communication methods influenced the organization of foreign policy management: faster communication enabled greater centralization and efficiency in diplomatic leadership.

New diplomatic methods emerged, distinct from those of the absolute monarchies. Exchanges of territories between dynasties became rare, and issues of dynastic marriages and inheritances no longer played their previous roles in international relations. Dynastic wars, characteristic of the first half of the 18th century, faded into the past. National liberation movements became a pressing issue in Europe and Latin America. Questions of customs policy and trade agreements gained importance, reflecting the industrial bourgeoisie's struggle for market access.

The European bourgeoisie introduced a new principle of foreign policy – non-intervention – derived from the idea of national sovereignty. This opposed the feudal-absolutist principle of open intervention in other states' internal affairs to suppress revolutions and the principle of legitimism, which justified the restoration of deposed monarchies. The struggle between the principles of aristocratic-dynastic diplomacy and the diplomacy of the rising bourgeoisie characterizes international relations from the late 18th to the first half of the 19th century.

The most significant events of this period included the French bourgeois revolution, which proclaimed new foreign policy principles; the Napoleonic Wars; the Congress of Vienna; and the formation of the Holy Alliance. These events led to a new territorial division in Europe and the colonies and a realignment of political forces in Europe – resulting in the final establishment of British naval and colonial hegemony, the loss of France's former influence in Europe, and the formation of a close alliance of European monarchs who controlled the political situation on the continent until 1830.

Key stages in the development of international relations from the late 18th to the first half of the 19th century include:

1789-1794: The defining event was the French Revolution's struggle against a counter-revolutionary coalition led by England.

1794-1815: The main feature of international life was the bourgeois France's struggle against England in Europe, on the seas, and in the colonies. On the European continent, Russia became France's principal and most powerful opponent, aiming to dominate all of Europe. This period saw the creation of the Vienna system of international relations.

1815-1830: With the formation of the Holy Alliance and a new realignment of forces in Europe, the great powers – key participants in the Congress of Vienna

– established dominance. With France accepted among these powers, there were five major players: England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France. Until the mid- 19th century, the first three states played a decisive role in international relations.

2. Causes of the French Revolution

The French Revolution of 1789 was driven by several critical historical factors. Despite facing economic challenges, particularly related to fair taxation, France was among the wealthiest and most influential nations in Europe at the time. The French populace experienced greater political freedoms and fewer instances of arbitrary punishment compared to other Europeans. Nevertheless, King Louis XVI, his ministers, and the French nobility were widely unpopular. This unpopularity stemmed from the heavy tax burden on peasants and, to a lesser extent, the bourgeoisie, which funded the opulent lifestyles of the aristocrats.

The rigidity of the ancien régime in France contributed to its downfall. The aristocracy faced rising challenges from merchants, tradesmen, and affluent farmers, who joined forces with disgruntled peasants, wage earners, and intellectuals inspired by Enlightenment philosophers. As the revolution progressed, power shifted from the monarchy and hereditary elites to more representative political bodies, such as legislative assemblies. However, conflicts among the previously allied republican factions led to significant discord and violence.

A growing number of French citizens embraced Enlightenment ideals of equality and individual freedom, as articulated by thinkers like Voltaire, Denis Diderot, and Turgot. The American Revolution illustrated the feasibility of implementing Enlightenment ideas in government. American diplomats, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, who lived in Paris, mingled with the French intellectual elite. Additionally, interactions between American revolutionaries and French troops serving as anti-British mercenaries in North America helped spread revolutionary ideals among the French populace. Over time, many French people began to criticize their undemocratic government, advocate for free speech, challenge the Roman Catholic Church, and oppose noble privileges.

In summary, the French Revolution was the result of multiple factors, both structural and specific to the era. It was not a single event but a series of

occurrences that collectively transformed political power, societal structure, and individual freedoms.

Enlightenment Ideas

There is debate about the extent to which Enlightenment ideas had permeated French society by 1789 and whether these ideas were sometimes adopted as a guise for bourgeois self-interest. The view that the Revolution facilitated an experiment in democratic ideas is widely accepted. For instance, Karl Marx, writing in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung after the 1848 Revolutions, argued that the bourgeoisie led the movement in both the English Revolution of 1648 and the French Revolution. The proletariat and lower middle classes either had not yet developed distinct interests or did not constitute independent classes. Therefore, when they opposed the bourgeoisie, as in France during the Reign of Terror, they pursued bourgeois aims in a non-bourgeois manner. French terrorism was a plebeian approach to combating bourgeoisie enemies: absolutism, feudalism, and philistinism. Thus, the traditional view of the Revolution as the manifestation of Enlightenment philosophy may be oversimplified.

Economics and Finances

In 1789, despite some difficulties, France was one of Europe's most economically robust nations. With a population exceeding twenty-eight million, France was second only to Imperial Russia in population size and was highly urbanized, with Paris being the second largest city in Europe after London. Other metrics also highlighted France's strength. It had a substantial number of male peasants, extensive cultivated land, high productivity, significant industrialization, and a large gross national product. While per capita wealth may have lagged slightly behind regions like the Low Countries and Switzerland, the overall size of the French economy made it the leading economic power in continental Europe.

Debt

Debt was a key factor that led to the prolonged fiscal crisis of the French government. By the eve of the revolution, France was essentially bankrupt. Extravagant spending on luxuries by Louis XVI, who began his reign in 1774, compounded the debts accumulated during the rule of his even more extravagant predecessor, Louis XV (1715–1774). Significant expenditures to fight the unsuccessful Seven Years' War against Britain (1756–1763) and France's financial support for the American War of Independence further increased the debt.

Louis XV and his ministers were greatly displeased with Britain's victory in the Seven Years' War and devised a long-term plan to build a larger navy and form an anti-British coalition. The plan aimed to eventually engage in a war of revenge to reclaim French colonies from Britain. However, in reality, it only resulted in a substantial accumulation of debt.

Louis XV had spent liberally to make Versailles a showplace city worthy of being the French capital. He constructed a Ministry of War, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where the Treaty of Paris (1783) ending the American Revolutionary War was signed), and a Ministry of the Navy.

In Louis XV's high council, the devout party, led by Comte d'Argenson, secretary of state for war, and the philosophical party, which supported Enlightenment ideas and was led by Machault d'Arnouville, controller-general of finances, competed for influence.

Acting on the advice of his mistress, the Marquise de Pompadour, the king endorsed the policy of fiscal justice designed by d'Arnouville. To finance the budget deficit, which was 100 million livres in 1745, d'Arnouville implemented a 5% tax on all revenues (the vingtième), affecting both the privileged classes and the general population. However, expenditures continued to exceed revenues.

Ultimately, Louis XV failed to resolve these fiscal issues due to his inability to reconcile the conflicting factions at court and establish coherent economic policies. Despite recognizing the growing anti-monarchist sentiments threatening his rule, he did nothing to counter them. By the time of his death in 1774, the French monarchy was at its lowest point politically, morally, and financially.

Under the new king, Louis XVI, radical financial reforms proposed by his ministers, Turgot and Malesherbes, angered the nobility and were blocked by the parlements, who claimed the king lacked the legal authority to impose new taxes. Consequently, Turgot was dismissed, and Malesherbes resigned in 1776. They were replaced by Jacques Necker, who supported the American Revolution and pursued a policy of taking out large international loans instead of raising taxes.

France sent Rochambeau, Lafayette, and de Grasse, along with substantial land and naval forces, to aid the Americans. French assistance was crucial in the British army's surrender at the Battle of Yorktown in 1781. Although the Americans gained their independence and the French military was rebuilt, the British destroyed the main French fleet in 1782. The Treaty of Paris (1783) brought little gain to France, except for the colonies of Tobago and Senegal. The

war cost 1,066 million livres, financed by new loans at high-interest rates, but no new taxes were imposed. Necker hid the fiscal crisis by reporting that ordinary revenues exceeded ordinary expenses and omitting mention of the loans.

When Necker's tax policies failed, Louis dismissed him in 1783 and appointed Charles Alexandre de Calonne, who increased public spending to 'buy' the country out of debt. This policy also failed, leading Louis to convene the Assembly of Notables in 1787 to discuss a revolutionary fiscal reform proposed by Calonne. The nobles, shocked by the extent of the debt, rejected the plan. This rejection indicated to Louis that he had lost his ability to rule as an absolute monarch, plunging him into depression.

While Britain also had substantial debt from these conflicts, it had more advanced fiscal institutions to manage it. Although France was wealthier than Britain, both countries had national debts that accounted for about half of their annual government expenditures. The difference lay in the interest rates: France's debt was financed at nearly double the interest rate of Britain's, requiring higher taxes and limiting financial flexibility for emergencies.

Edmund Burke, an opponent of the revolution, wrote in 1790 that the public, whether represented by a monarch or a senate, could only pledge the public estate derived from just and proportioned taxation. The French king's inability to impose such a tax due to noble privileges led to the decision to convene the Estates-General in 1788.

The financial strain of servicing old debt and the royal court's excesses fueled dissatisfaction with the monarchy, contributing to national unrest and culminating in the French Revolution of 1789.

Taxation

Since France was not one of the major trading nations, it had to generate most of its tax revenue internally rather than through customs tariffs. Taxes on commerce included internal tariffs among the regions of France, creating arbitrary tax barriers (sometimes physically, as in Paris) at regional boundaries. These barriers prevented France from developing a unified market. Tax collections, such as the extremely unpopular salt tax (the gabelle), were contracted to private collectors known as "tax farmers." These tax farmers collected more than required, remitted the tax to the State, and kept the surplus for themselves. This led to arbitrary and unequal collection of France's consumption taxes.

Peasants had to pay a tenth of their income or produce to the church (the tithe), a land tax to the state (the taille), a 5% property tax (the vingtième), and a tax on the number of people in the family (capitation). Additionally, royal and seigneurial obligations were paid through labor (the corvée), in kind, or rarely in coin. Peasants were also obligated to their landlords for rent in cash (the cens), a payment related to their annual production (the champart), and taxes on the use of nobles' mills, wine-presses, and bakeries (the banalités). In prosperous times, these taxes were burdensome; in harsh times, they were devastating, causing starvation after poor harvests.

Many tax collectors and public officials bought their positions from the king, sometimes annually or in perpetuity. Often, they paid additional fees to upgrade their positions to inheritable ones. These officials tried to reimburse themselves by excessively taxing the populace. For instance, in civil lawsuits, judges required both parties to pay a bribe (the épices), making justice accessible only to the wealthy.

The system exempted nobles and clergy from taxes (except for a modest quit-rent, an ad valorem tax on land). Consequently, the tax burden fell on peasants, wage-earners, and the professional and business classes. People from less-privileged backgrounds were also blocked from acquiring positions of power, causing further resentment.

Failure of Reforms

During the reigns of Louis XV (1715–1774) and Louis XVI (1774–1792), several ministers, notably Turgot and Necker, proposed reforms to include nobles as taxpayers. However, these proposals were rejected by the parlements (provincial courts of appeal), whose members bought their positions from the king and paid an annual fee (the paulette) to transfer their positions hereditarily. Membership in these courts or other public positions often led to elevation to the nobility (the Nobles of the Robe), as opposed to the Nobles of the Sword (nobility of military origin). Despite their differences, both categories sought to retain their privileges.

The need to raise taxes put the king at odds with nobles and the upper bourgeoisie. As a result, the king appointed "rising men" of non-noble origin as finance ministers. These ministers, Turgot, Chrétien de Malesherbes, and Jacques Necker, lobbied for taxation reforms and other moderations, such as Necker's

attempts to reduce the king's court's lavishness. However, they all failed, and bureaucratic waste persisted, to the detriment of non-seigneurial classes.

In contrast, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, appointed finance minister in 1783, reinstated lavish spending reminiscent of Louis XIV's era. By the time Calonne convened the Assembly of Notables on 22 February 1787 to address the financial situation, France was virtually bankrupt. The king could not secure enough loans to cover royal court and government expenses. According to François Mignet, the loans amounted to 1.64 billion livres, with an annual deficit of 140 million livres. Calonne's chief critic, Étienne Charles de Loménie de Brienne, archbishop of Sens, succeeded him, but the fundamental financial situation remained unchanged: the government had no credit. The Assembly of Notables approved the establishment of provincial assemblies, regulation of the corn trade, abolition of corvées, and a new stamp tax. However, the assembly dispersed on 25 May 1787 without implementing a long-term successful program.

4.3 International Relations during the Great French Revolution (1789-1794)

After the conclusion of the American War of Independence (1775-1782), the aristocratic-dynastic diplomacy of the absolute monarchies of the 18th century was dealt a devastating blow by the Great French Revolution of 1789-1794. During this time, the principle of national sovereignty continued to develop.

The foreign policy of French absolutism had deeply dissatisfied the French bourgeoisie long before 1789. The strengthened bourgeoisie no longer needed the protection of absolutism. They no longer wished to endure the dominance of noble and dynastic interests in internal, and especially in foreign policy. Against the idea of the divine origin of royal power and the autocracy of absolute monarchs, radical philosophy in the era of bourgeois "Enlightenment" in the 18th century proposed the idea of national sovereignty. At that time, the term "nation" referred to the Third Estate. Based on the concept of the nation as described above, the bourgeoisie demanded national foreign policy instead of noble and dynastic policy. Therefore, subordinating all means of managing the state's foreign policy to the bourgeoisie became a necessary part of the bourgeois revolution. This was consistently implemented during the revolutionary events and completed in the years of the Thermidorian Reaction and the Directory.

The specific direction of international activity during the period of the triumph and establishment of capitalism in advanced countries was determined by the main lines of their foreign policy. At the center of international politics in the period of 1789-1794 was the struggle of the French Revolution against the counter-revolutionary coalition led by England.

Formation of France's Foreign Policy during the National Constituent Assembly

After the storming of the Bastille, the National Assembly, relying on the principle of popular sovereignty, began to intervene in the diplomacy of the royal ministry, seeking to subordinate it to its own goals. From time to time, the National Assembly issued decrees regarding the communications of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on external affairs. In May 1790, the National Assembly sharply clashed with royal authority over foreign policy issues. At that time, there was a threat of war between Spain and England over claims to part of the Pacific coast of North America. In the spring of 1790, both sides were preparing for war. Through the allied "Family Compact" of 1761, the Spanish court demanded assistance from Louis XVI. The Foreign Minister informed the National Assembly of the king's intention to arm the fleet against England. His statement caused an uproar in the National Assembly. The bourgeoisie was outraged by Spain's policy of barring French goods from Spanish colonies and did not support the "Family Compact," seeing it only as a dynastic alliance. Many believed, not without reason, that the king was using the pretext of war with England to increase military forces to fight the revolution and use them to disperse the National Assembly.

Therefore, the left wing of the National Assembly decided to strip the king of the right to declare war and make peace. The National Assembly decided that it would control diplomatic negotiations and approve treaties. After heated debates, the majority of deputies were swayed by Count Mirabeau, who had begun receiving a secret subsidy from the king at that time. On May 24, 1790, Count Mirabeau secured a compromise decision in the National Assembly regarding the right to declare war and make peace. According to this decision, only the National Assembly could declare war and make peace, but only if the king proposed it. Thus, the right to declare war and make peace was divided between the king and the National Assembly. During the debates, deputies harshly condemned monarchical secret diplomacy and alliances, stating that France needed only "national treaties" with "just nations."

In connection with considering Spain's demands for the execution of the "Family Compact," the National Assembly created a permanent committee to oversee diplomatic affairs. Count Mirabeau became the head of the Diplomatic Committee. The Diplomatic Committee and the National Assembly finally subordinated the official diplomacy of the king and the ministry to themselves, and the large moderate bourgeoisie finally took control of France's foreign policy. At the proposal of the Diplomatic Committee, the National Assembly retained the alliance with Spain since it might be needed against England. However, it removed all offensive articles from the treaty, leaving only defensive and commercial obligations. The foundations of France's foreign policy were proclaimed to be "universal peace and principles of justice."

When in 1789 a revolution occurred in the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), the National Assembly opposed intervention to protect Belgium from Austria, fearing conflict with feudal-monarchic Europe. Despite the enthusiasm of newspapers and clubs for the Belgian revolution, the Belgian notification of independence proclamation, decided by the king and the foreign minister, was returned in an undeveloped form. The National Assembly did not protest.

Despite the peaceful intentions of the National Assembly, the abolition of some feudal obligations drew France into conflicts with monarchic Europe. In France, in Alsace, there were a number of small possessions of German imperial princes. The revolution destroyed old feudal rights there. The princes complained to the German imperial diet and sought intervention from Austria and Prussia, as well as Russia and Sweden, to restore their privileges. Sweden had been a guarantor of the Holy Roman Empire's constitution since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Russia guaranteed it after the Treaty of Teschen in 1779.

Wishing to avoid conflict, the National Assembly decided to compensate the princes for losses as private individuals. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs began negotiations with them, which dragged on until the beginning of the war with the coalition. Ultimately, the operation did not take place. Austria, Russia, and Prussia encouraged the princes to resist in hopes of having an additional pretext for war with France. Catherine II urged the princes to demand Austrian and Prussian intervention, hoping to quickly involve these states in a war with France. The Convention canceled the decision to compensate the Alsatian princes only when the war with the coalition had already begun.

The confiscation of church lands carried out by the National Assembly and the project for the civil organization of the clergy caused a conflict between

France and the Pope. In an attempt to settle the matter, the ministry initiated secret negotiations with Rome, which were fundamentally condemned by the National Assembly. However, no agreement was reached. The revolution spread to the territory of Avignon, populated by French people, which belonged to the Pope. In April 1791, the population of Avignon demanded its reunification with France. The diplomatic committee proposed to the National Assembly to apply the principle of territorial annexation in practice based on the expressed will of the population. By the decree of the National Assembly of September 14, 1791, Avignon was annexed to France "according to the desire freely and solemnly expressed by the majority of communes and citizens."

The annexation of Avignon further exacerbated relations not only with Rome but also with neighboring monarchic states, which feared that their populations might wish to join revolutionary France. Since then, the principle of national sovereignty, introduced into European international politics by the French Revolution, was referred to in issuing all decrees on territorial annexations during France's revolutionary wars with the coalition. Prior to this, this principle had only been applied in the diplomacy of the United States during the struggle for independence.

Demands for the purification of the diplomatic personnel from supporters of absolutism began to echo in the National Assembly. Under the pressure of these demands, even Count Mirabeau, who had secretly aligned with the court, was forced in January 1790 to recognize the need for almost complete replacement of France's ambassadors at foreign courts. In March 1791, seven ambassadors were replaced. The Assembly established a special oath for the ambassadors. Some of the old diplomats refused to take it and were recalled. Thus, during the period of the National Constituent Assembly, the bourgeoisie's power was still unstable. Belligerent actions could undermine it, and the National Assembly, until its dissolution in the fall of 1791, maintained a peaceful direction in foreign policy and diplomacy.

While official diplomacy was under the oversight of the Diplomatic Committee of the National Assembly, the court conducted its secret intrigues aimed at involving foreign states to restore absolute monarchy. Rumors of this spread both in the National Assembly and in clubs, fostering distrust toward the former diplomatic personnel who secretly aided the king in dealing with foreign courts. The old diplomatic personnel were heavily compromised by the failed attempt of the king to escape from France in the summer of 1791. The foreign

minister was accused of involvement in this affair. After his escape, the king was temporarily suspended from power, and almost all foreign courts ceased relations with the French ambassadors. However, fearing further unfolding of the revolution, the National Assembly reinstated the king's power. According to the constitution of 1791, they granted him the conduct of all foreign relations with the right to conclude treaties subject to further ratification by the legislative body.

A special decree adopted in December 1791 established that "the French nation forever renounces all wars of conquest and will never use its strength against the freedom of any people." The conquering aspirations of the French bourgeoisie manifested later, when its power was consolidated as a result of the revolution.

The development of French foreign policy during the Legislative Assembly period (from the fall of 1791 to August 10, 1792)

In September 1791, Louis XVI accepted the constitution and officially informed the European courts of his solidarity with the Legislative Assembly. At the same time, the queen in secret letters informed the monarchs that Louis XVI was not free in his actions. Under such circumstances, the Legislative Assembly opened in October 1791. The threat of war was growing. Fearing that the king was using diplomatic relations to prepare a counter-revolution, the Legislative Assembly forced the king to replace the foreign minister compromised during Louis XVI's failed escape.

The fears of the Legislative Assembly were not unfounded. Several aristocrats close to the king (among the most active royalists) formed a secret committee to help him prepare a counter-revolution and consisted of supporters of the "Austrian system." The king secretly used secret funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for them. In the fall of 1791, the Legislative Assembly elected a Diplomatic Committee of 12 members to monitor the activities of ministers and be informed of the most important correspondence with foreign states. It was supposed to be renewed every month by one-third. It included moderate deputies and leaders of the Girondins.

The main issue of foreign policy at that time was the growing threat of war. The court and aristocratic military wanted war, hoping for allies' victory, for a counter-revolution as a result of foreign invasion of France. The Feuillants and Girondins saw France's main foreign policy goal as preventing the formation of a

coalition and splitting Austria and Prussia, using their mutual enmity. Both considered Austria France's main enemy. However, if the Feuillants hoped to prevent war and achieve a compromise, the Girondins, on the contrary, wanted to facilitate their military victory by isolating Austria from Prussia. They even sought to secure neutrality from Prussia in case of an Austro-French war. They also sought to secure, if not an alliance, then at least neutrality from England in the event of war. Two diplomatic missions were unsuccessfully sent to Prussia. The former Bishop of Autun, Duke de Talleyrand-Périgord Charles Maurice, sent to England, also received no clear response from the English ministry. All these diplomatic efforts proved futile. Their success was partially hindered by the secret diplomacy of Louis XVI and the queen. Their secret agents secretly opposed French missions sent to the Prussian king.

Representatives of the Jacobins, M. Robespierre and Marat, understood that war was inevitable. But they sharply opposed the Girondins' intention to start it before eliminating internal enemies – the aristocracy and reactionary military.

But the main reason for the failure of the French representatives was that the European governments still didn't believe in the power of revolutionary France and disregarded its proposals. They wanted the restoration of absolutism and dreamed of taking away territories from France as a "reward" for their counter-revolutionary services.

On March 15, 1792, the king was forced to appoint General Dumouriez, close to the Girondins, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He saw Austria as the main enemy and dreamed of surrounding France with a belt of dependent states after its defeat. At this time, the leading role in the diplomatic committee was played by the Girondin Jacques Pierre Brissot. Many old officials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs were supporters of the king and the "Austrian system." Dumouriez replaced them with new people close to the Girondins, and many former ambassadors were replaced with new ones.

In pamphlets on diplomacy circulated at the time by the Girondins and Dumouriez, the idea developed that revolutionary diplomacy should be based on the principles of the declaration of rights and renunciation of conquests, be simple and clear, and do without any tricks or similar tactics, and the ambassadors themselves should be equally called "France's envoys."

In March 1792, Emperor Leopold II died. His successor, Francis II, clearly desired to start a war with France. He rejected its demand to break the alliance

with Prussia and stop supporting the armed emigrant groups preparing to invade France. Without waiting for a hostile attack, on April 20, 1792, the French Legislative Assembly accepted the king's proposal to declare war on Austria and Prussia. This marked the beginning of the period of revolutionary wars, which lasted until the beginning of the Thermidorian reaction.

The weak French army, inherited from absolute monarchy and led by a noble officer corps, could not and did not want to offer decisive resistance to the interventions. In secret letters, the queen emphasized the publication of a threatening manifesto by the coalition, hoping it would intimidate the revolutionaries. However, the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, which threatened France with the destruction of Paris and the extermination of the revolutionaries, only worsened the situation at the court. The initial military failures and the king's clear betrayal served as a catalyst for the fall of the monarchy in France.

4.4 International relations in a period of the French Revolutionary Wars

The French Revolutionary Wars, spanning from 1792 to 1802, were significant conflicts between the French Revolutionary government and various European states. Fueled by revolutionary fervor and marked by military innovations, these wars saw the French Revolutionary Armies triumph over multiple coalitions, extending French dominance to the Low Countries, Italy, and the Rhineland. The conflicts involved vast numbers of soldiers, primarily due to the implementation of modern mass conscription.

The French Revolutionary Wars are commonly divided into two phases: The War of the First Coalition (1792–1797) and the War of the Second Coalition (1798–1801). Notably, France remained at war with Great Britain from 1793 to 1802 without interruption. Hostilities concluded with the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, though warfare resumed shortly after with the Napoleonic Wars. The Treaty of Amiens is typically regarded as the endpoint of the French Revolutionary Wars, although other events before and after 1802 are sometimes suggested as the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. Together, these conflicts are often referred to as the "Great French War."

The War of the First Coalition (1792–1797) represented the initial major effort by multiple European states to contain Revolutionary France. France declared war on Austria on April 20, 1792, with Prussia joining Austria a few weeks later. These powers launched invasions of France by land and sea, with Prussia and Austria attacking from the Austrian Netherlands and the Rhine, and Great Britain supporting provincial revolts in France and besieging Toulon. Despite suffering setbacks, such as the Battle of Neerwinden (March 18, 1793) and internal conflicts like the Vendée Revolt, France responded with drastic measures. The Committee of Public Safety was established (April 6, 1793), and the levée en masse conscripted all able-bodied men aged 18 to 25 (August 1793). The rejuvenated French armies counter-attacked, repelled the invaders, and expanded French territories. They established the Batavian Republic as a satellite state (May 1795) and secured the Prussian Rhineland through the first Treaty of Basel. Spain reached a separate peace with France (second Treaty of Basel), and the French Directory pursued further conquests in Germany and northern Italy (1795).

North of the Alps, Archduke Charles of Austria turned the tide in 1796, but Napoleon's campaigns in northern Italy against Sardinia and Austria (1796–1797) led to significant French victories in the Po Valley. These culminated in the peace of Leoben and the Treaty of Campo Formio (October 1797). The collapse of the First Coalition left Britain as the sole combatant against France.

The Second Coalition (1798–1802) marked another attempt by European monarchies, led by Austria and Russia, to contain or eliminate Revolutionary France. They formed a new alliance and aimed to reverse France's previous military gains. Austria and Russia assembled fresh armies for campaigns in Germany and Italy in 1799.

In the summer of 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte launched an expedition to Egypt. During his absence, violence in Switzerland erupted, prompting French support against the old Swiss Confederation. When revolutionaries overthrew the Canton governments in Bern, a French army intervened, ostensibly to support the Swiss Republicans. In northern Italy, Russian General Aleksandr Suvorov achieved a series of victories, driving the French forces under Moreau out of the Po Valley and forcing them back to the French Alps and the coast around Genoa. However, the Russian forces in the Helvetic Republic (Switzerland) were defeated by French commander André Masséna, leading to Suvorov's eventual withdrawal. The Russians ultimately left the Coalition when Britain insisted on the right to search

all vessels it stopped at sea. In Germany, Archduke Charles of Austria defeated the French under Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, driving them back across the Rhine and securing several victories in Switzerland. Jourdan was replaced by Masséna, who then combined the Armies of the Danube and Helvetia.

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What were the main features of European diplomacy and the balance of power on the eve of the French Revolution?*
2. *What internal and external factors contributed to the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789?*
3. *How did France's foreign policy priorities shift during the National Constituent Assembly (1789–1791)?*
4. *What were the key alliances and oppositions among European powers during the French Revolutionary Wars?*
5. *How did the French Revolutionary Wars influence the transformation of the European political order?*

Lecture 5. International Relations from the Directory to the Fall of Napoleon (1795–1815)

5.1 The Foreign Policy of the Directory and Consulate in 1795–1801

The Italian Campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte and the Diplomacy of French Generals

On July 27, 1794, the Thermidorian coup took place in France, which ended the Jacobin dictatorship and brought representatives of the large bourgeoisie to power.

Military Successes: The enormous efforts of the Jacobin dictatorship began to bear fruit even after its leaders were executed. In the second half of 1794, the Republic's army launched an offensive on all fronts. General Pichegru's army occupied Holland, and the army led by General Jourdan defeated the Austrian, Prussian, and Hessian forces. The entire Rhine fell into French hands. Even on the Pyrenean front, where the French had long struggled against Spain, General Schérer's army began to advance at the end of 1794.

Diplomatic Gains: The victories of the French army intensified the conflicts within the anti-French coalition. The Polish uprising led by Tadeusz Kościuszko in the spring of 1794, its suppression, and the third partition of Poland severely worsened relations between Austria and Prussia.

Thanks to military victories, France managed to sign two peace treaties in Basel, Switzerland, which marked the beginning of the dissolution of the first anti-French coalition.

- **April 5, 1795:** A peace treaty with Prussia was signed, which required France to withdraw from Prussian territory on the right bank of the Rhine (Article 4) and allowed the French Republic to occupy part of the Prussian king's possessions on the left bank of the Rhine (Article 5). A secret article stated that if the left bank of the Rhine remained with France after a general peace, the Prussian king would agree with the French Republic on territorial compensation.
- **July 22, 1795:** A peace treaty with Spain was signed, removing Spain, like Prussia, from the anti-French coalition, thus securing France's southwestern

borders against invasion. According to the treaty, France returned the conquered territories (Guipúzcoa, part of the Basque Country) to Spain (Article 4) but received the Spanish part of the island of Santo Domingo (Article 9). Spain agreed to form an alliance with France (Article 13) and immediately start peace negotiations with Holland. The exchange of ratification documents took place on August 23, 1795, in Basel.

The Directory was the governing body of the state (government) in the last period of the Great French Revolution; it was also the system and period in the history of France. The rule of the Directory was characterized by maneuvering between the right and left, which caused constant political crises – the biggest in Germinal and Vendémiaire when government troops used armed force to suppress first the workers' districts and in Vendémiaire, even the central, wealthy sections controlled by the royalists.

The Directory (Executive Directory) – the government of the French Republic from November 1795 to November 1799. The results of the Thermidorian coup of 1794 were confirmed by the Constitution of the Year III, developed and adopted by the Convention in the autumn of 1795. The Convention itself was dissolved on October 26, 1795. Legislative power was concentrated in two chambers – the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Elders; executive power was transferred to the Directory. The Directory consisted of 5 men and was annually renewed by one-fifth of its composition. The first members of the Directory were L. M. La Revellière- Lépeaux, J. F. Rewbell, F. L. O. Letourneur, P. Barras, L. N. Carnot.

The Batavian Republic was the first in a series of sister republics and was later incorporated into the First Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte. Its politics were influenced by France, which organized at least three coups to bring friendly political groups to power. However, the process of creating the Dutch constitution was inspired by internal processes rather than external ones, until Napoleon forced the local government to recognize his own brother as the new monarch.

Military and Diplomatic Practice of That Year

There were other noteworthy events in the military and diplomatic practice of that year. On May 16, 1795, France signed the Treaty of The Hague with the Batavian Republic (which replaced the Republic of the United Provinces). This

treaty granted territorial concessions (Maastricht, Venlo, Flanders) and monetary payments to the revolutionary republic, ensuring the functioning of the French occupation army of 25,000 men. Thus, the Batavian Republic became a vassal of France.

By a decree of October 1, 1795, the territory of the Southern Netherlands (future Belgium) was annexed to France. This annexation provoked a local uprising, which was brutally suppressed by the conquerors.

In 1795, there was an attempt to establish a liberal republic by restricting voting rights – the so-called Directory regime. The Thermidorian Convention developed a new constitution, making the Directory, consisting of 5 members, the highest executive body.

Military Campaigns of 1796:

In 1796, France struck at the remnants of the anti-French coalition on the continent – Austria and Piedmont. The main French forces were concentrated on the Rhine. They were supposed to enter Northern Germany and move towards Vienna. However, the Rhine army was defeated. Contrary to expectations, the outcome of the military campaign was decided by the army operating in Northern Italy, commanded by General Napoleon Bonaparte. In this campaign, his brilliant talent first emerged. Within a few weeks, Napoleon defeated the Austrian and Piedmontese forces opposing him and by May 1796 forced Piedmont to make peace with France. His troops then occupied all of Northern Italy up to Venice in the east and the Papal States in the south.

Bonaparte at the Pont d'Arcole, by Baron Antoine- Jean Gros, (c. 1801), Musée du

On the occupied territories, puppet states were created – the Cisalpine Republic (located "on this side" of the Alps) and the Ligurian Republic (former Genoa).

Eventually, Austria laid down its arms, and on October 18, 1797, in Passeriano near **Campo Formio**, it signed a peace treaty with France. Austria recognized French conquests on the left bank of the Rhine, in Northern Italy, and on Mediterranean islands, including Corfu, except for Venice, which came under the control of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

A few months later, in April 1798, the French conquered Switzerland, which was dismembered, partially annexed, and partially turned into the Helvetic Republic, allied with France.

In reality, during the Directory, French diplomacy was concentrated not in the hands of ministers or directors but in the hands of the republic's generals, who concluded treaties and signed diplomatic acts. Napoleon Bonaparte concluded a convention with Tuscany, peace with the Pope, and peace with Austria in 1797 without asking for permission from the Directory. Only with Spain in 1796 did the Directory conclude peace itself.

Inspired by Victory: The victory over the anti-French coalition inspired the Directory to go to war with Great Britain. Since two expeditions organized by the French against the British Isles (namely to Ireland) in 1796 and 1798 ended in complete failure, it was decided to strike where the British least expected it – in Egypt.

Egypt Campaign: Egypt, which was part of the Ottoman Empire, was formally not connected with Great Britain. It was ruled by the Mamluks, who recognized the supreme power of the Turkish sultans. Egypt controlled the shortest route from Europe to India. By conquering it, France would not only compensate for colonial losses in the wars of the 18th century but also threaten British possessions in South Asia.

Military Action: On May 19, 1798, the French fleet, carrying 40,000 soldiers, left Toulon. Successfully avoiding encounters with British ships waiting for them in the Mediterranean, they reached the Nile Delta in early July. On the way, the French captured the island of Malta, which was held by the Knights of St. John, heirs of the spiritual-knightly Order of the Hospitallers, created during the Crusades. After defeating the Mamluk army in the famous Battle of the Pyramids on July 21, 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte set out to conquer Syria. However, he was defeated there and forced to return to Egypt. On August 1 and 2, 1798, the British fleet, commanded by the famous Admiral Horatio Nelson, destroyed the French ships in Aboukir Bay. Thus, Bonaparte's army was trapped.

Bonaparte Before the Sphinx (c. 1886) by Jean-Léon Gérôme, Hearst Castle

Simultaneously, the Situation for France in Europe Deteriorated Sharply

In 1798, a new Second anti-French coalition was forming. During Napoleon's Egyptian campaign, England made significant efforts to revive the anti-French coalition, which was to include England, Russia, Austria, Turkey, and the Kingdom of Naples. Although Paul I was against Russia's participation in the

wars, he held a completely different opinion regarding the French Revolution. The Russian Black Sea squadron, commanded by Admiral Fyodor Ushakov, liberated the Ionian Islands in the Adriatic Sea and Naples from French troops. A Russian army, commanded by Alexander Suvorov, was prepared and sent to Italy.

Italian Campaign: The Italian campaign of the Russian army improved the position of the anti-French coalition. In the first week of the campaign, Russian troops cleared all of Northern Italy. These victories caused concern in Vienna – they feared the strengthening of Russia in Europe. The Austrian command withdrew its forces from Switzerland, leaving the Russian corps alone against a stronger enemy. Then, Suvorov's troops, in very harsh winter conditions, crossed the Saint Gotthard Pass in the Alps and fought at the Devil's Bridge and in the Muttental valley to come to the aid of the Russian corps. They then managed to escape through the mountains to the Rhine valley.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Prince of Benevento (1754–1838), was a talented diplomat and careerist, a former bishop, and a distinguished aristocrat. Seeking wealth and a career, he joined the revolution and became the foreign minister of the Directory. He fully entered the service of Napoleon, engaging in secret connections and intrigues with Alexander I and K. Metternich. After Napoleon's fall, he helped the Bourbons return to the throne, for which Louis XVIII appointed him foreign minister.

From 1783 to 1801 and from 1804 to 1806, the British cabinet was headed by **William Pitt the Younger** (the son of Lord Chatham, a Whig party minister during the Seven Years' War). Great Britain was the only country that participated in all the anti-French coalitions, even if its armies did not fight on the continent. Its allies fought with British money, receiving British subsidies to wage war against France. Sometimes, there were even quarrels and resentments among them over the distribution of subsidies or their untimely delivery.

Foreign Policy of the Consulate: Ending the War

Napoleon Bonaparte returned from the Egyptian

campaign to France with a group of loyal soldiers. In August 1799, he secretly left Egypt, and the French army, abandoned by him, surrendered in September 1801.

Napoleon's popularity in France was growing. Under the slogan of defending the Republic, he prepared and executed the coup of 18 Brumaire (November 9, 1799), taking a step toward establishing his absolute power. France officially remained a republic, where, according to the Constitution of 1799, three consuls governed, but only the first consul could pass laws and manage foreign and domestic policy while being the commander-in-chief. This was Napoleon Bonaparte, who became the first consul on December 25, 1799. His closest aides were Talleyrand and Fouché.

Almost all European countries were against France. The main enemy remained England, which pressured other states to create a coalition. To strike at the coalition, Napoleon began preparing for war with Austria. Napoleon's two main goals at that time were: 1) victory over England, and 2) forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia. Napoleon sought to maintain good relations with Russia, which he saw as his main ally against Great Britain. The policy of good relations with France was pursued under Paul I, and after his death, under Alexander I, although the latter was a supporter of creating a Pan-European coalition against France.

In the center of Europe, Napoleon struck against the Austrian army. After major victories of the French troops at Marengo on June 14, 1800, and later at Hohenlinden on December 3, 1800, Austria was forced to make peace with France.

On February 9, 1801, the Franco-Austrian peace treaty was signed in the French town of **Lunéville.** Under this treaty, Austrian territories on the left bank of the Rhine, Belgium, and Luxembourg were ceded to France. Parts of Austria became vassal states dependent on France. With the signing of the Treaty of Lunéville, the Second Anti-French coalition ceased to exist, and Great Britain was forced to negotiate with Napoleon.

In London, the terms of the preliminary peace were signed, and all military actions between France and England ceased in October 1801. A second round of peace negotiations took place in Amiens, lasting almost six months, and concluded with the signing of the **Treaty of Amiens on March 27, 1802,** between France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic on one side, and Great Britain on the other. According to the treaty, the French army evacuated from Egypt, Elba, Rome, and Naples; France returned Egypt to Turkey; England pledged not to interfere in the affairs of Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and the German states and agreed to evacuate its troops from Malta. England did not recognize France's new possessions along the Rhine and other annexations, and both sides guaranteed the integrity of Turkey's territories. According to Article 3 of the treaty, England

agreed to return to France and its allies all possessions and colonies captured during the war, except the island of Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in Ceylon.

The Peace of Amiens was a brief respite in the war. England welcomed the peace as it opened European markets, but the loss of Malta was burdensome. The peace was also advantageous for France as it allowed addressing various internal problems and preparing for war (building the fleet and army). Napoleon Bonaparte had no intention of opening European markets to England.

England's hostility forced Napoleon to accept the impossibility of reclaiming previously lost colonies in North America. This opportunity arose with the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso on October 1, 1800, with Spain, which ceded part of its Louisiana to France. Napoleon decided to sell it to the USA. On April 30, 1803, a treaty was signed under which the USA paid France $15 million (80 million francs).

2. Alexander I and Napoleon Before the Third Coalition

Continuing his mother's policy, Paul I did not accept the revolutionary France's demand that Russia deny refuge to royalist supporters. He provided material assistance to French citizens arriving in Russia. At the same time, Paul I took decisive measures against England and Austria. He broke ties with Austria, and after the English captured Malta, the Russian ambassador left London. On Napoleon's initiative, negotiations between France and Russia began. Paul I welcomed the coup in France in 1799. In December 1800, he entered into an alliance with France. All these actions, along with preparing Russian troops for a campaign to India, aggravated already tense relations with England and increased domestic dissatisfaction with the foreign policy direction. On the night of March 12, 1801, Paul I was assassinated, and Alexander I ascended the throne. Napoleon was enraged, believing that English diplomacy was involved in the coup.

After the palace coup, Alexander I carefully tried to end the Russo-French alliance without offending Napoleon. In instructions to Russian ambassadors in European capitals, Alexander I formulated the main principles of Russo-French relations: Russia was ready to maintain good relations with any state, regardless of its form of government, if it acted in the spirit of justice. Ambassadors were instructed to assure French

representatives and Napoleon himself that the rapprochement between Russia and England had no aggressive intentions as long as France respected the rights and dignity of Russia's allies.

Diplomatic Maneuvering: Alexander I wanted to adopt a wait-and-see approach, hoping that France would, with Russia's mediation, conclude several treaties stabilizing the situation in Italy, Germany, and the Middle East. However, French diplomacy opposed this. Napoleon insisted on a bilateral Russo-French treaty defining relations between the two states without addressing pan- European issues. He aimed to halt the rapprochement between Russia and England and Austria, which was unacceptable to Alexander I. Negotiations continued until October 8, 1801, when a bilateral Russo-French treaty was signed in Paris, establishing peaceful relations between the countries. This effectively marked a defeat for Russian diplomacy. Napoleon retained his freedom of action, allowing him to pressure neighboring states, especially in Central Europe and the Middle East.

Secret Convention: A secret convention was signed simultaneously, whereby Russia and France agreed to jointly address issues in Germany and Italy. France promised to start immediate peace negotiations with Turkey with Russian mediation, and Russia pledged to help release French prisoners.

Terms of the Convention:

- Russian troops were to leave the Ionian Islands.
- Russia and France were to maintain the neutrality of the Kingdom of Naples.
- It was declared that there would be general peace, the restoration of balance, and the freedom of the seas.

Alexander I's miscalculation was agreeing to make the convention a secret agreement at France's request. It soon became evident that Napoleon had no intention of fulfilling the convention's terms ("new" political consciousness of Napoleon). The resolution of relations with Russia and the signing of the peace treaty with England allowed Napoleon to pursue an aggressive policy towards relatively weak neighboring states, primarily Switzerland and Northern Italy. These actions indicated a clear trend: France was concentrating its efforts on the final military-political defeat of Austria and the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire, which had been France's "eternal enemy" since the late 16th century.

The Alliance Between Great Britain and Russia and the Formation of the Third Anti-French Coalition

The Treaty of Amiens proved to be unstable. Both sides realized the inevitability of war, with the issue of Malta becoming the pretext. Napoleon demanded that the British evacuate the island. Great Britain pointed to France’s

violations of all the treaty's articles, which were evident in aggressive actions against Switzerland, Italy, and Holland, and the preparation of a French landing on the British Isles.

On March 8, 1803, Napoleon made an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of Malta, and George III stated in the House of Commons that France threatened the security of England. In reality, this was a declaration of war, although hostilities only began in May. Anglo-French relations worsened daily, and on May 12, 1803, the British ambassador left Paris.

From London, proposals for a military alliance were again sent to St. Petersburg, but the English were again refused. Russia made one last attempt to act as a mediator in the conflict, hoping to delay the start of armed conflict. On June 8, 1803, by imperial decree, Malta was taken under the protection of Russia. For this sacrifice, Alexander I demanded guarantees from France for the inviolability of Italy, Northern Germany, and Turkey. This decision was unacceptable to both France and England.

On May 12, 1803, hostilities began at sea between England and France. The epicenter of the conflict was not Northern Germany, Denmark, and the Baltic Sea basin, as believed in St. Petersburg after the French occupied Hanover, but the Mediterranean.

Napoleon occupied Hanover (the personal possession of the English king), and French troops gained the ability to control the situation in the Baltic, pressuring Prussia and Denmark, and threatening the Hanseatic cities and the entire system of maritime trade routes connecting Russia and England. The entire traditional system of Russia's political and foreign trade relations connected with the Baltic Sea and Northern Germany was threatened. The only solution could be a defensive alliance with Prussia.

At the end of May - beginning of June 1803, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the basis for a Russo-Prussian convention to protect Northern Germany from French aggression. By the summer of 1803, Russia was ready to act against France if Prussia allied with it. At this time, secret negotiations were taking place between Prussia and France, and when Russia learned of them, all hopes for an alliance with Prussia were abandoned. Instead, Russia took a course toward war with France.

Friedrich Wilhelm III, through the secretary of the royal cabinet, J.V. Lombard, conducted negotiations in Brussels with Talleyrand. Talleyrand assured him that France did not intend to occupy northern Germany, would grant Prussia full freedom of action in the region, and would not increase the number of troops in Hanover. In return, Prussia was required to guarantee the neutrality of the German states and promise not to allow foreign troops (specifically Russian) to pass through its territory.

The Duke of Enghien had been living in Ettenheim in Baden for two years. His murder was a blatant violation of international law and an infringement on the sovereignty not only of Baden but of all Germany.

The only ally for Russia on the continent could be Austria, which watched the negotiations between Russia and Prussia with concern, fearing a triple alliance of Russia, Prussia, and France. Vienna did not want to participate in the affairs of Northern Germany.

Dramatic and Tragic Events: Negotiations for an alliance were accelerated by a series of dramatic and tragic events. In the winter of 1804, royalist émigrés organized a conspiracy led by Count d'Artois, attempting to assassinate Napoleon Bonaparte. The Duke of Enghien, a prince from the House of Bourbon, who was not involved in the conspiracy, was arrested and executed for this.

On March 21, 1804, Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself emperor. Russian diplomacy used the execution of the duke to encourage Austria and Prussia to join the Third Anti-French coalition. Austria set conditions for its participation: to strengthen its position in Germany, to prevent Prussia from gaining power, and to take back from France the lands of Northern Italy conquered by Napoleon. This complicated the preparations for war.

British Support: England supported Russia in creating the coalition. Both England and Russia hoped that Austria, which aspired to a leading role in Germany, would be the center of the bloc. However, Austria was preoccupied with a conflict with Bavaria and most of the electors. The struggle over the distribution of indemnities, where only Russia's intervention saved Austria's position, taught nothing to Franz II. The government of Franz II wanted to assert the rights of a suzerain over its vassals (electors) based on outdated feudal law, citing the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire. Talleyrand managed to turn the princes to his side, subordinating the foreign policy of the German states to France.

Diplomatic Maneuvering: In early 1805, Alexander I threatened Austria with an alliance with Prussia to give the former determination. At the same time, Russia continued to try to bring Prussia into the future coalition. The Prussian government conducted friendly-toned negotiations with both France and Russia simultaneously.

Both Prussia and Austria were most afraid of being drawn into a war for the interests of their rival. The idea of Russia that joint efforts were necessary to resist the aggressor was foreign to both the Viennese and Berlin courts. Avoiding official statements, K.A. Hardenberg, who directed Prussian policy, delayed

negotiations, filling them with empty promises to the Russian envoy in Berlin, M.M. Alopeus, and Vincenzengerode.

Summer of 1805: Prussia's Negotiations with France

In the summer of 1805, Prussia conducted more successful negotiations with France. In exchange for the cession of Hanover, Prussia was required to maintain neutrality, recognize Napoleon's conquests, and not allow "foreign" (Russian) troops to pass through its territory. Russian diplomacy failed to overcome the antagonism between Austria and Prussia.

Anglo-Russian Alliance: To finalize the coalition, it was necessary to formalize the Anglo-Russian alliance. In the spring of 1805, Novosiltsev went to London. The terms were quickly worked out: issues of maritime law, the Eastern Mediterranean, and assistance to the Kingdom of Naples, whose independence both states were interested in, were resolved. England placed the greatest importance on the Middle East, worried about the French threat to the southern part of the Kingdom of Naples and the prospect of a landing in Albania and Morea. Russia was willing to make concessions in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially regarding Malta and the Kingdom of Naples, where England wanted to maintain its influence.

England's Foreign Policy Concept:

- **Colonial Affairs:** England introduced issues related to the seizure of colonies into international relations, had the most powerful fleet, and fought for maritime hegemony.
- **External Trade:** External trade played a significant role in its policy.
- **Subsidies:** England's foreign policy included the specific form of allocating and distributing financial subsidies for the war against France.
- **Resistance:** England was the most determined opponent of the French during Napoleon's expedition to Egypt.
- **Neapolitan Republic:** England eliminated the "daughter Jacobin" republic in Naples.

While helping its continental allies in the fight against France and seeking to weaken its opponent, England closely monitored to prevent any influence or strengthening other than its own, especially concerning Russia.

3. The Period of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Coalitions

During the preparation for the Third Coalition, the main conceptual disagreement between England and Russia was their different understanding of European issues.

Differing Views: Russia did not wish to completely exclude France from an active political role, as it saw France as a counterbalance to British ambitions. England, trying to weaken France as much as possible, was willing to attract Austria and Prussia with promises of generous rewards at France's expense. Russia, on the other hand, did not want the neighboring states to become stronger.

Anglo-Russian Convention: On April 11, 1805, the Anglo-Russian Alliance Convention was signed, outlining measures to establish peace in Europe. Thus, in early summer 1805, after Sweden joined the alliance, the Third anti-French coalition was formed. Additionally, Austria and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies joined the coalition.

Attempts to Pressure Prussia: Right before the military campaign began, the allies tried to force Friedrich Wilhelm III to abandon the "Basel system" – a friendly neutrality towards France. Austria showed a willingness to compromise, and Russia even threatened direct military pressure, but the Potsdam cabinet remained firm.

Weaknesses in the Coalition: The new coalition proved to be weak. The disagreements among the allies were not overcome, as they believed that victory over Napoleon would solve everything. The only thing the allies agreed on was that the goal of the coalition was not political changes within France. It was not about restoring the old regime but about establishing an order in Europe that would no longer allow France to make further conquests and threaten the independence of neighboring states. This was the difference between the Third Coalition and the previous ones, which had restoration slogans. The cracks in the political foundation of the coalition widened and became apparent during the first military trials. The fragility of this political foundation determined the coalition's defeat even before Napoleon dealt his military blows.

Territorial Expansion of France in Europe: The War with the Third Coalition

Conflicts between Russia and Austria emerged during the development of military operation plans, which were entrusted to the Austrian Hofkriegsrat. The plan devised in Vienna primarily focused on solving the territorial problems of the empire – strengthening positions in Southwestern Germany and Northern Italy. Austria’s forces were divided, with the majority under Archduke Charles being directed to Italy, even though it had been agreed in the negotiations between

Russia and Austria that the main military operations would be conducted in Central Europe.

Prussia's Changing Position: The outbreak of war changed Prussia's position. Napoleon violated Prussia's neutrality by moving troops to support Bavaria through the Ansbach pass, which angered Berlin. As a result, on November 3, 1805, Prussia signed a convention with Russia on joint actions against France. This was a diplomatic success for Russia, although belated.

Napoleon abandoned plans for a sea invasion of the British Isles and arrived in Bavaria before the Austrian troops could initiate combat operations there.

Russian Military Movements: The Russian army, led by Mikhail Kutuzov, moved towards Austria in August 1805. Kutuzov's situation was difficult. He lacked the authority to make independent decisions. His plans diverged from those of Austria and the directives of Alexander I, who sought to subordinate military matters to diplomatic considerations. Kutuzov was heavily dependent on Austria for troop movements and supplies. Napoleon, who arrived at the theater of war earlier, took the initiative.

On October 20, 1805, Napoleon defeated the 32,000-strong Austrian army of General Mack at Ulm, forcing it to surrender. This put the Russian army, which was concentrating at Braunau on the Inn River, in a very difficult position.

On October 29, 1805, Napoleon entered Braunau, but Kutuzov had already begun a retreat maneuver, skillfully withdrawing his troops from danger. However, the Austrian emperor demanded the defense of the bridgehead fortifications on the Danube near Krems and the protection of Vienna, a demand confirmed by Alexander I.

Kutuzov's Maneuvering: Kutuzov continued his maneuvering. On November 5, Murat was repelled in a battle near Amstetten, and Kutuzov withdrew to Krems. Kutuzov knew that Napoleon had moved Mortier's corps to the left bank of the Danube to cut off the Russian troops. The Russian army crossed the Danube and burned the bridge, thwarting Mortier's maneuver. Mortier was defeated on November 11 near Dürenstein and was pushed back across the Danube.

November 12, 1805: Murat Captures Vienna

On November 12, 1805, Murat captured Vienna and crossed the Danube. Kutuzov was once again threatened with encirclement. To save the army, he sent a 6,000-strong detachment under Bagration with orders to delay Murat, which he successfully did.

Murat, unaware of the forces opposing him, began negotiations for a truce. The truce document, signed by two generals, was sent to Kutuzov for ratification. Kutuzov, however, did not respond and continued his retreat, passing through the most dangerous area, the town of Znaim. When Napoleon realized that Kutuzov

had outsmarted him, he ordered Murat to immediately attack Kutuzov's rearguard. On November 16, Bagration held off Murat's forces, which were five times larger, for an entire day. Though surrounded, he managed to break through with 3,000 men and rejoin Kutuzov, who was already in Olmütz, where all Russian forces were being concentrated.

Kutuzov's Maneuvering: Kutuzov thus saved the Russian army. The Russian forces gathered in Olmütz outnumbered the French forces. Additionally, Austrian troops under Archduke Charles were moving from Italy to the rear of the French. If the subsequent events had favored the allies, Prussia would have entered the war against Napoleon.

Kutuzov insisted on gathering all the allied forces, possibly retreating to Bohemia, further weakening the French by detaching them from their bases and reinforcements, and then delivering a decisive blow to Napoleon. However, the view of the Austrian General Staff prevailed, supported by Alexander I, who prioritized fulfilling obligations to allies.

Battle of Austerlitz: On December 2, 1805, the Battle of Austerlitz took place, in which the allied forces were defeated by Napoleon. The Austrian General Staff's plan involved extremely complex maneuvers aimed at cutting off the French from Vienna. Kutuzov warned against complex maneuvers and attacking without knowing the enemy's location. On the day of the battle, Kutuzov was with one of the Russian columns. He believed that the key to the battle was the Pratzen Heights and tried to hold his troops there. Alexander I, who arrived at the column, ordered the heights to be abandoned and to advance. The French immediately attacked and captured the key positions, breaking through the center of the allies. The battle was then lost.

Aftermath of Austerlitz: It became impossible to involve Prussia in the war. Austria also hurried to leave the coalition, fearing that Prussia, with its 200,000-strong army, might join Napoleon at the last moment and secure dominance in Germany. On December 26, 1805, right after Austerlitz, Austria signed the Peace of Pressburg with France. This treaty brought significant losses to Austria. It recognized France's rights to the territories beyond the Alps, acknowledged Napoleon as the King of Italy, and made territorial concessions to France's allies: it ceded Tyrol and several small territories to Bavaria, and five Danubian towns and some minor lands to Württemberg. Additionally, Austria had to pay France 40 million florins in indemnities.

Prussian Envoy Haugwitz Congratulates Napoleon

The Prussian envoy, Haugwitz, congratulated Napoleon on his victory, and Russia was forced to cease military actions and withdraw its expeditionary corps. Alexander I placed the responsibility for the defeat on Kutuzov, dismissing him from command and appointing him as the military governor of Kyiv.

Franco-Prussian Treaty: On December 15, 1805, a Franco-Prussian treaty was signed in Vienna, in which both sides agreed to mutually guarantee their current possessions and future territorial acquisitions. The Potsdam cabinet informed the Russian government of the treaty's signing in early January 1806, and in February 1806, the Third Anti-French coalition officially ceased to exist.

Continued Tensions: Formally, the state of war between Russia and France persisted, and tensions escalated further. Under the Pressburg Treaty, France gained the territory of Dalmatia, which previously belonged to Austria. Now, France could pressure Turkey and threaten Russia's interests in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.

Napoleon's Continental Blockade

Post-Defeat Strategies: After the defeat of the allies, two trends emerged in the development of Russia's foreign policy tactics:

1. The need for a peaceful respite to regroup, identify possible partners, understand Austria and Turkey's positions, and develop Russian-Prussian relations.
2. Continuing armed struggle against France and strengthening allied relations with England, which now had the greatest significance.

New War Goals: Now, the war aims included not only protecting Russia's interests in Northern Germany and the Baltic Sea basin but also focusing on the southern direction. In a memorandum to the emperor, A. Czartoryski indicated the necessity of reinforcing Russian troops on the Ionian Islands, strengthening the squadron in the Mediterranean, bolstering Russia's position in the Balkans, and concentrating a Russian corps near the Moldavian borders.

Napoleon's Regional Influence: Napoleon used the terms of the Pressburg Treaty to expand his influence in the region. By capturing Dalmatia and securing Naples, Napoleon effectively controlled the entire western Adriatic coast from Venice to Otranto. The only remaining task was to oust the Russian garrisons from the Ionian Islands and the Bay of Kotor (Russia's strategic points in the fight against France in the Mediterranean). Napoleon's successes led to a change in the foreign policy of the Turkish Sultan Selim III, who recognized Napoleon as emperor.

French Diplomacy: In August 1806, French General Sebastiani attempted to spoil relations between Russia and Turkey in Constantinople, establishing diplomatic relations with Persia, an adversary of the Ottoman Empire. Under his influence, Selim III replaced the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia with pro-French boyars, prompting the occupation of these principalities by Russian troops. In response, Turkey declared war on Russia in December 1806. In January 1807, Turkey broke off relations with England, fully siding with Napoleon. Consequently, the front of Franco-Russian conflicts significantly expanded.

In the spring of 1806, St. Petersburg attached particular importance to the Russian-English alliance. After the death of W. Pitt and the coming to power of C. J. Fox's ministry, the possibility of signing an Anglo-French peace treaty arose, which would have been undesirable for Russia because of its weak position on the seas. At the same time, the Russian government began negotiations with France. P. L. Ubry was sent to Paris to determine the chances of a long armistice or even a general peace. However, it was unsuccessful.

As for Austria, Russia supported the Vienna cabinet in its confrontation with Napoleon. Napoleon wanted to move troops to Dalmatia through Austrian territory. Austria eventually gave in. The main efforts of the Russian government on the continent were aimed at establishing an alliance with Prussia. Both France and Russia fought for it diplomatically. For Napoleon, the conquest of Prussia gave him power over all of Germany, neutralization of Austria, control over the entire North German coast, and increased his chances in the fight against England. For Russia, the alliance with Prussia gave Russia influence over German affairs, protection of Baltic trade, and, most importantly, the creation of obstacles to the movement of French troops to the Russian border.

On March 5, 1806, Frederick William III ratified a new treaty with Napoleon, according to which Hanover was ceded to Prussia and Prussia undertook to close ports to British ships in Northern Germany. As a result, England declared war on Prussia. On July 12, 1806, the Rhine Union was created, in which Bavaria played a major role, and Napoleon became the protector of this association. Frankfurt am Main became the capital of the Rhineland Union, and Archbishop Dalberg of Main was elected primate. Initially, this confederation included 16, and in 1811 - 36 German states.

Napoleon appointed himself protector of the union with the right to intervene in domestic and foreign policy. The rights of France and the duties of the Rhineland Union were formalized in a special treaty. In response, there were plans for a confederation of North German states under the leadership of Prussia and under the patronage of Russia, which in turn led to a confrontation between France and Prussia. As a result, in October 1806, Napoleon declared war on Prussia. Prussia itself had formed factors that pushed the country to war with France. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through Prussia, and the influence of politicians who demanded immediate action against Napoleon grew. This party was headed by Queen Louise, who was popular among the guards officers. This rise was caused by Napoleon's policy in Germany after the Peace of Pressburg.

The creation of the Rhineland Alliance, the intention to take Hanover from Prussia, the French occupation of Essen, Elten, and Verdun, and the capture of Holland all pushed Prussia to the outbreak of hostilities. The formation of the Fourth Anti-French Coalition was similar to the process of creating the Third

Coalition. Again, there were disagreements between Russia and Prussia, the essence of which was that Russia sought to consolidate all European states to fight France, while Prussia saw the alliance as a means to secure its foreign policy interests, the main of which was to obtain Hanover and resolve the Pomeranian conflict with Sweden in its favor, at least indirectly subordinating the North German states to itself by creating a confederation.

Prussia began hostilities when the coalition had not yet been formed. At the time of the opening of the campaign, no general plans for military action had been developed, etc. Only at the end of September 1806 was an agreement reached on the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between England and Prussia, and a treaty of peace and friendship between them was signed on January 28, 1807, in Memel, where Frederick William III was hiding from the French troops occupying the whole of Prussia.

Military operations unfolded rapidly. On October 1, 1806, Prussia issued an ultimatum to Napoleon, and on October 14, 1806, French troops defeated the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena and Auerstedt. Once again, Russia was left face to face with the French. A direct consequence of the defeat of Prussia was Napoleon's proclamation of a continental blockade of England: all states that did not want a conflict with France had to close their ports to English ships.

On October 21, 1805, the combined Franco-Spanish fleet was almost completely destroyed by a British squadron under Admiral Nelson in a naval battle off **Cape Trafalgar** near Spain. This battle put an end to the naval rivalry between Great Britain and France that had lasted throughout the eighteenth century. The very idea of blocking all European ports for English ships was a utopia.

At the same time, Napoleon was harming the trade of other countries by suppressing their national feelings. Napoleon forced states devastated by war to join the continental blockade. Even Russia, whose territory was not affected by the hostilities in 1805-1806, felt the burden of public debt, military spending, and the cessation of trade with England. Alexander I delayed the blockade in every way possible. In fact, Russia joined the blockade only during Napoleon's Erfurt meeting with Alexander I. In addition, Napoleon effectively blocked the Russian government's ability to receive foreign loans. With the rupture of Russian-English relations, the flow of loans and subsidies from London stopped. Russia sought a way out of the situation by developing trade with neutral countries. It was carried out on American, Hanseatic, and Greek ships.

British goods continued to be smuggled into Russia under a neutral flag. A series of decrees and agreements of 1808-1809 formed a program for organizing

Russian trade in the face of the decline of the British role in the Russian market and the general disruption of trade.

The continental blockade did not so much destroy the trade ties between Russia and England as it disorganized the very system of Russian foreign trade. The development of neutral trade was one of the measures that helped to avoid economic collapse. But it was precisely because neutral trade undermined the continental blockade, which had already proved ineffective in 1810, that Napoleon fought against it.

In August 1810, he proclaimed the so-called Trianon Tariff, according to which all colonial goods, i.e. any raw materials from any country or colony in the world, regardless of whether that country was at war with France or not, were subject to confiscation and destruction. To put pressure on Russia to adopt a similar resolution, in December 1810 Napoleon annexed Holland and the Hanseatic cities to France, subjecting them to the tariff. On December 31, 1810, a new tariff was adopted by Napoleon, and the next day Russia adopted the "Neutral Trade Regulations" for 1811. The new tariff significantly increased import duties, reduced or eliminated duties on exported goods. It was an open challenge to the Trianon tariff. On the part of Russia, this meant a rejection of the Tilsit system and preparation for war with France.

5.4 Russian-French relations in 1807-1812. The Period of the Sixth and Seventh Coalitions

Russian-French relations in 1807-1812

In 1807, when Russia entered the struggle against Napoleon, it was no longer just fulfilling its allied duty, but also fighting for its own immediate interests. The very position of Russia as a great power was at stake. Napoleon's main goal was to force Russia to join the continental blockade, turning it into an instrument of his policy, to use it for the economic defeat of England. Russia needed to eliminate the threat posed by Napoleon, restore Prussia, and prevent an uprising in Poland under the auspices of France. It had to stop French diplomacy from supporting Turkey and Persia. This would have allowed Russia to maintain its position in Central Europe and the Balkans, and to strengthen political and economic ties with England.

After the bloody Russian-French-Prussian battle of Preisisch-Eilau on February 7, 1807, which brought no victory to either side, it became clear that the war was dragging on. Russia, expecting victory, invited Austria to join the coalition with the support of England and Sweden, but Vienna decided not to take any risks

(Archduke Charles insisted on neutrality). Napoleon offered Prussia to sign a separate peace, but Frederick William III refused, and on April 14, 1807, he signed the Bartenstein Convention with Russia to conduct the war to a victorious end. The goals of the war were to eliminate the Rhineland Alliance, expel the French from Germany, and create a federation of German states guaranteed by Russia, England, and Sweden.

The Allies intended to involve England and Austria in the convention. The Barstein Convention helped strengthen the Prussian-Russian alliance and thwarted Napoleon's attempts to split it and force each side to a separate peace. On May 5, 1807, the new British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, who expressed broad public sentiment in England, declared his readiness to join the coalition, which did not materialize because of the Peace of Tilsit. Austria also did not join, as it did not want to enter the war for the sake of Prussian interests. The summer campaign ended quickly.

On May 15, 1807, Napoleon took Danzig. He sought to cut off the Russian troops from their base in Koeningsberg, push them back to the Neman and reach the Russian border. In turn, L.L. Bennigsen decided to push the French to the Vistula.

On June 14, 1807, a decisive battle took place between France and Russia near Friedland. Russia was defeated and retreated across the Neman River. French troops came directly to the borders of Russia. In 1807, three groups were formed around Alexander I. They had different opinions on foreign policy. They all agreed on one thing: the need to end the armed conflict with France as soon as possible. Prerequisites for changing Russia's foreign policy: Prussia's defeat, Austria's indecision, the war with Turkey, England's focus on solving its own problems, England's use of the alliance with Russia only as a means of solving them, military failures, the threat of international isolation, pressure from relatives, general fatigue from the war, and financial difficulties.

All this influenced Alexander I to agree to an armistice. The Tilsit negotiations took place in several stages. Russia declared that it would agree to an armistice if its territorial integrity was preserved. Napoleon himself initiated the peace talks. The goal of French diplomacy was a separate peace with Russia.

On June 25, 1807, the Russian and French emperors met on a raft on the Neman River and held a conversation in a closed pavilion that lasted about an hour. Both sides realized the need to end the war. The basis of the disagreement was the question of the degree of political rapprochement between the two states and the amount of mutual concessions. The next day, the emperors met again in Tilsit, and Alexander I was present at the formation of the French guard. Alexander I's position: Russia's rejection of the alliance with England and recognition of the changes in Europe as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, while he

sought French non-interference in Russian-Turkish relations and the preservation of Prussia led by Frederick William III. Napoleon's position: to establish allied relations with Russia to complete the conquests in the West, on the Iberian Peninsula, to fight against England, and at least to get Russia to join the continental blockade of England. The most pressing issue under discussion was the alliance. During the negotiations, a sharp diplomatic struggle unfolded.

Two treaties were signed, one on peace and one on alliance. The Union Treaty provided for: 1) joint actions of both states against any third state hostile to them; 2) Russia's mediation in the conclusion of the Anglo-French peace treaty and Russia's obligation, in case of England's refusal to conclude peace with France, to break off all relations with it by the end of 1807 and join the continental blockade; 3) France's mediation in the Russian-Turkish conflict, and in the case of a joint war against Turkey, the division of its European provinces, with the exception of Rumelia and Constantinople.

In case of England's refusal to accept the terms offered to it, and no one doubted this answer, Russia expressed its readiness to join the continental blockade, but only on condition that an anti-English alliance of Scandinavian states was created. In addition, the text of the agreement did not contain any restrictions on Russia's neutral trade, under whose flag the blockade could be violated. In each individual case of casus belli, a special convention was to define the forces that each party had to use against the other. Which each side should use against the common enemy.

However, during the existence of this alliance agreement until 1812, the parties did not begin to develop such a convention against either England or another state. The issue of military cooperation was resolved in a very vague manner and left room for various delays. As for the future obligations of the Allies, each side had a wide range of interpretations. According to V.G. Sirotkin, "Russia actually recognized and ceded to Napoleon in Tilsit only what it had already conquered." In a letter to his mother Maria Fedorovna, Alexander I wrote: "An alliance with Napoleon is only a change in the way we fight against him."

The Treaty of Tilsit defused the situation in Central Europe for a while. 1807-1808 was the time when reforms began in European countries. In Russia, it was the transformation of the administrative system developed by Speransky, in Prussia, the profound reforms of H. von Schein, in Austria, military reform, and in Germany, the awakening of national consciousness. Alexander I realized that the time had not yet come to resume the struggle and tried to convince Austria of this. No matter how hard Alexander I tried to reject French mediation in the

Turkish question, he had to accept the favor (under the terms of the treaty). As a result, Napoleon, as a mediator, stirred up revanchist sentiments in Istanbul, which led to an aggravation of relations between Russia and Austria.

Tilsit also provoked a war between Russia and Sweden, an ally of England, as Alexander I wanted to annex Finland. Napoleon quickly took advantage of the Peace of Tilsit.

In November 1807, he invaded Spain, first to fight Portugal (an English ally) and then to oust the Bourbons and hand the throne to his brother Joseph Bonaparte. In response to his actions, a national liberation movement broke out in Spain and a guerrilla war began.

On July 16-23, 1808, the French troops under General Dupont were defeated in the Battle of Bailen. Napoleon needed Russia's support more than ever to demonstrate the inviolability of allied commitments, as Napoleon needed to use significant forces in the Iberian War, and Austria could take advantage of this. Alexander I also needed a personal meeting with Napoleon to formally recognize France's accession of Finland and the Danube principalities to Russia. In the summer of 1808, Russian diplomacy faced a difficult task: to restrain Austria from immediately acting against France and at the same time preserve it as a state and as an ally.

On September 27-October 14, 1808, the Congress of Erfurt (Erfurt Meeting of the Emperors) was held, as a result of which Emperors Alexander I and Napoleon signed a convention confirming and renewing the alliance concluded in Tilsit.

For this purpose, Napoleon made significant concessions: France recognized Russia's rights to Finland and the Danube principalities. This was necessary for Napoleon to obtain from Alexander I a corresponding consent to Russia's participation on the side of France in its conflict with Austria in case of its occurrence. In this way, Napoleon hoped to secure the rear to end the war in Spain. Alexander I refused to join the anti-Austrian commitments, so Napoleon refused to withdraw his troops from Prussia until the full payment of the contributions and undertook not to contribute to the expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw and to completely stop military supplies to the Polish army. Not a single problem was solved in Erfurt.

Alexander I managed to ensure that the issues of the fate of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Finland were recognized as issues of bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey and Sweden, while Napoleon actually achieved one thing: he won some time to end the Iberian War.

Invasion of France into Spain. The Fifth Coalition

In 1807, Napoleon's troops moved into the Iberian Peninsula. The pretext was Portugal's refusal to break ties with England and join the continental blockade. The French invasion of Portugal was repelled due to an uprising in the country and the help of British military units. Following this, in 1808, the military occupation of Spain began. Napoleon placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. However, the people of Spain rose against the French invaders. The national liberation movement spread across the entire peninsula. Fighting the rebellious Spanish people required France to concentrate significant military forces there.

The Habsburg monarchy, which had gradually recovered after its defeat in 1805, took advantage of this situation and prepared for a new war with France. In 1809, the fifth coalition against Napoleon's empire was formed, consisting mainly of England and Austria. In April 1809, Austria initiated military actions. However, this time it also faced a severe defeat.

In July 1809, in the fierce Battle of Wagram, Napoleon's army again defeated the Austrians. In October 1809, the Treaty of Schönbrunn was signed. Austria's territory was significantly reduced, losing its access to the sea, and Galicia was ceded to the Duchy of Warsaw. The Illyrian Provinces were created from Dalmatia, Istria, and Trieste and annexed to the French Empire. Austria had to reduce its army, pay a large indemnity, and join the continental blockade.

However, Napoleon's victory over Austria came at a high cost: the war was tough and bloody for France, causing significant damage to the French army. Although Alexander I had promised Napoleon during their meeting in Erfurt in 1808 to participate in the war against Austria, he effectively avoided military actions. Russia's involvement in this war was merely nominal. From 1809, tensions between Russia and France began to escalate. Napoleon gave Galicia, taken from Austria, not to Russia but to the Duchy of Warsaw, revealing his dream of restoring Poland. Simultaneously, wishing to alienate Russia from Austria, Napoleon first offered and then, in 1809, handed over Tarnopol and the Tarnopol district, territories belonging to Austria, to Russia. In this case, Bonaparte pursued similar goals as with the transfer of the Białystok district from Prussia to Russia.

Another defeat for Austria turned it into a compliant satellite of Napoleonic France. The Franco-Austrian War of 1809 dealt a severe blow to the international relations system established at Tilsit in 1807. Prussia's role diminished even further, and the expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw posed a threat to Russia's western Belarusian and Ukrainian lands, which were claimed by the Polish nobility. Napoleon gave them unfounded hopes of restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

From 1809 to 1811, Napoleon made new conquests: The Papal States with the city of Rome were annexed to the French Empire, and Pope Pius VII was forcibly taken to France. The Kingdom of Holland, the Duchy of Oldenburg, and part of the Kingdom of Hanover were occupied, while cities on the North Sea coast – Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck – lost their independence. By 1811, the French Empire had a population of 71 million, almost three times more than before the revolution (Russia had a population of 36 million at that time). Almost all of continental Europe worked for France. Napoleon's foreign policy became increasingly aggressive, leading France towards a new major European war.

Napoleon's Invasion of the Russian Empire in 1812

From 1810, the French government began developing a new foreign policy aimed at a victorious war against Russia, the only remaining powerful state on the European continent. There were many reasons for the worsening relations: Russia did not strictly adhere to the continental blockade, raised tariffs on French industrial goods, and France was strengthening the Duchy of Warsaw militarily, turning it into a staging ground for an attack on Russia. Furthermore, Napoleon indicated to Alexander I that his verbal promises to support Russia's policy towards Turkey were merely empty promises, not backed by any agreement. However, the main reason for the new war was Napoleon's desire to crush Russia and then defeat England to establish his world dominance. By early 1812, tensions between Russia and France had escalated so much, and military preparations had advanced so far, that war became inevitable.

The diplomatic preparation for the war with Russia did not meet Napoleon's expectations. Although Prussia and Austria were forced to sign treaties with France against Russia, they simultaneously conducted secret negotiations with Alexander I. French diplomats counted on conflicts between Russia and Sweden and Turkey. However, in April, Russia formed an alliance with Sweden, and on the eve of the war, in May 1812, Kutuzov signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Turkey. Allied relations between England and Russia were restored. Isolating Russia diplomatically was unsuccessful.

Preparing for the war, Napoleon mobilized enormous human resources both in France and in all the vassal states. By the summer of 1812, Napoleon had concentrated an army of over 600,000 men on the Russian border for the main attack. Russia had significantly smaller forces: three armies spread across the entire border, totaling about 220,000 men.

Napoleon Bonaparte's "Grande Armée" began its invasion on June 24, 1812. This unprecedented large-scale aggression triggered unanimous resistance among the Russian population. For the peoples of Russia, this war became a Patriotic War. Napoleon's strategic plan was traditional: to create a significant

superiority of forces at the main point of attack and defeat the enemy in a series of major battles. However, this plan failed. The dispersed Russian armies avoided a decisive battle and retreated deeper into the country.

On September 7, 1812, near Moscow, at Borodino, a major battle took place. In this bloody confrontation, the French army lost about 60,000 men out of the 135,000 involved, while the Russian army lost over 40,000 men out of 120,000. Although the Russian army retreated, it was not defeated and retained its combat capability. The battle was essentially a significant moral and political victory for the Russian army, dispelling the myth of Napoleon's "Grande Armée" invincibility. "Of all my battles," Napoleon said, "the most terrible was the one I fought before Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians earned the right to be invincible. Of the sixty battles I fought, the battle before Moscow displayed the most courage and achieved the least success."

On September 14, the French army entered Moscow. However, in Moscow, it found itself in a besieged fortress as the flames of people's war raged around it. Napoleon faced the specter of an impending military catastrophe. He made three proposals to the Russian government to start peace negotiations on the most favorable terms for Russia. However, Alexander I did not respond to his appeals. On October 18, the Napoleonic army was forced to begin its retreat from Moscow. The retreating army suffered colossal losses. The crossing of the Berezina River turned into a disaster. Shortly after, Bonaparte abandoned his army and secretly left for Paris.

The defeat of Napoleon's army in Russia triggered a national liberation movement against French domination in the enslaved countries of Europe. Nations rose in a struggle to free themselves from Napoleonic oppression. The defeat in Russia led to the defection of Napoleon's former allies. In December 1812, Prussian General Yorck signed a convention to cease military operations against Russia. In February 1813, a treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia was signed in Kalisz.

The Sixth and Seventh Anti-Napoleonic Coalitions

In the spring of 1813, a new sixth anti-Napoleonic coalition was formed, which included England, Russia, Sweden, Prussia, Spain, and Portugal. Austria joined the coalition in August 1813 after Napoleon rejected the allies' peace proposal, which required him to give up his conquests east of the Rhine.

The decisive battle between Napoleon's armies and the sixth coalition took place from October 16 to 19, 1813, near Leipzig. The allies not only had a significant military advantage but also enjoyed support from the patriotic population of Europe. The Battle of Leipzig became known as the "Battle of the Nations." Napoleon's army was defeated and retreated behind the Rhine. In early

1814, the war was carried into France itself. In German history, the 1813 military campaign is known as the national liberation war of the German people against Napoleonic oppression.

The French emperor once again rejected the allies' peace proposals, which demanded France return to its pre-revolutionary borders. In early March 1814, England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria signed the Treaty of Chaumont, agreeing to continue the war against Napoleon until his complete defeat. The treaty primarily obligated the allies not to make separate peace deals with France and to continue fighting until total victory. Each signatory agreed to provide 150,000 troops against France, except for England, which instead promised an annual subsidy of 5 million pounds sterling. Separate and secret articles of the treaty outlined the post-war reorganization of Europe and the fate of colonies captured by England: France was limited to its previous territory; a confederation of independent states was to be created in Germany, cantons in Switzerland; Italy was to be divided into separate independent states, and Austria was to regain its former Italian possessions; Holland was to be united with Belgium, and the Bourbons, expelled by Napoleon, were to be restored in Spain. England retained many of its previously seized colonies, such as Malta, Mauritius, and Tobago.

The weakened Napoleonic army could not withstand the massive allied forces. On March 31, 1814, allied troops entered Paris. Napoleon abdicated in favor of his son. However, the Senate, under pressure from European powers, decided to restore the Bourbon dynasty to the French throne, installing the Count of Provence, brother of the executed Louis XVI. Napoleon was exiled for life to the island of Elba.

The wars of liberation fought against France were contradictory. They began as wars for independence, but the interests of the monarchies and ruling elites of the states in the anti-French coalitions gave Napoleon's wars reactionary characteristics. Their ultimate goal was to re-divide Europe, restore feudal-absolutist orders, and fight against the revolutionary ideas sown in Europe by the French Revolution.

On May 30, 1814, a peace treaty was signed in Paris. The terms of this treaty were predetermined by the Treaty of Chaumont, signed three months earlier. France lost all its territorial gains and returned to its 1792 borders. The treaty provided for an international congress to be convened in Vienna to resolve all issues related to the collapse of Napoleon's empire.

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What were the main goals and achievements of French foreign policy under the Directory and the Consulate (1795–1801)?*
2. *How did the relationship between Alexander I and Napoleon evolve in the period leading up to the War of the Third Coalition?*

3. *What were the causes, participants, and outcomes of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Coalitions against Napoleonic France?*
4. *How did the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) shape Russian-French relations and the European balance of power?*
5. *What factors led to the breakdown of the Franco-Russian alliance and the formation of the Sixth and Seventh Coalitions?*

Lecture 6. The Vienna Congress and the formation of a new system of international relations. "European Concert"

1. The Vienna Congress and a Final Act
2. International relations in the period of the Holy Alliance

1. The Vienna Congress and a Final Act

The Vienna Congress: Restoring and Reorganizing Europe after the Napoleonic Wars

Shortly after the victory over Napoleon, representatives of all European countries, except Turkey, gathered in the capital of Austria to discuss issues related to the restoration of feudal order in Europe and some former dynasties that had been overthrown during the Napoleonic wars. Another common goal that united all participants was the fight against revolutionary and democratic movements. Additionally, the Congress had to ensure lasting guarantees to prevent the restoration of the Bonapartist regime in France and attempts to conquer Europe, as well as to satisfy the territorial claims of the victorious powers.

Arrival of Talleyrand and His Diplomatic Strategy

On September 23, a week before the Congress was set to open on October 1, 1814, French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord arrived in Vienna along with other French diplomats. Alexander I knew him well, as Talleyrand had often asked for and received money from the Tsar, not being very upset if he was refused. Talleyrand's brilliant mind, unmatched skill, resourcefulness, and knowledge of people made him a very dangerous opponent. The weak side of his position was that he represented a defeated country at the Congress. He needed to show maximum cleverness and ability to maneuver.

The Polish-Saxon Question

When Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, he already knew which issue would take most of the Congress's attention – the so-called Polish-Saxon question. Alexander I, whose troops had occupied the Duchy of Warsaw after Napoleon's retreat, openly declared that he would not give up the duchy to anyone. Since it consisted mainly of lands that Prussia had seized during the three partitions of Poland and which had only been taken from Prussia by Napoleon in 1807, King Frederick William III of Prussia demanded compensation in the form of the annexation of the Kingdom of Saxony to Prussia. Alexander I agreed to this condition, planning

to take away the Saxon king's lands as a punishment for being a loyal ally of Napoleon for so long. Talleyrand immediately saw that it would be most advantageous to fight on this basis. A diplomatic fight was necessary to achieve his main goal: to break the Chaumont Alliance, that is, to drive a wedge between Austria, England, Russia, and Prussia.

Russia's Position and Delays

In April-May 1814, Russia, by its military strength at the disposal of the Russian government at that time, was undoubtedly stronger than all other countries of the war-torn and exhausted continental Europe. That is why Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich did everything possible to postpone the Congress to autumn and give Austria some time to recover. Alexander I agreed to this delay, despite not liking Metternich and understanding his intrigues and the game of politicians' hostile to Russia, who flattered the Tsar to his face – Lord Castlereagh and King Louis XVIII of France.

Concerns of European Leaders

All of them watched anxiously to see if Alexander I intended to play the role of the new ruler of Europe. Alexander I was not very keen on Louis XVIII ascending the freed French throne. When he did ascend, the Russian Tsar insisted on the need to grant France a constitutional charter. Not because he liked constitutional institutions, but because he was convinced that the Bourbon dynasty would be swept away by a new revolution unless a constitutional system was established in France as a lightning rod. Alexander I had a negative attitude towards King Louis XVIII and his brother Charles of Artois, and they, in turn, feared him and were ready for any trick to get rid of his guardianship.

The Principle of Legitimacy

Talleyrand, even before the start of the Vienna Congress, understood well that from the point of view of France's interests, it was most rational to put forward the so-called "principle of legitimacy." This principle meant that Europe, represented by its sovereigns and diplomats at the Vienna Congress, should keep intact what had legally existed before the start of the revolutionary wars, that is, before 1792.

If this principle were accepted and implemented, not only would France be assured of the integrity of its territory, which it could not defend by military force at that time, but Prussia and Russia would also be restrained in their territorial expansion ambitions. Talleyrand would, of course, find it advantageous to make prior arrangements with Metternich, who also did not want to give Poland to Russia or Saxony to Prussia, and with Lord Castlereagh, who shared Metternich's view on this issue. But such an agreement had not yet been reached, and it was being established rather slowly. Both Prince Metternich and Lord Castlereagh

were suspicious of Talleyrand, allowing for the possibility of a new betrayal on his part.

Talleyrand's Diplomacy at the Congress

Upon arriving in Vienna, Talleyrand was invited to participate in a meeting of representatives of the four "great" powers. He appeared not as a representative of a defeated nation. In an arrogant and very confident tone, he immediately asked why other members of the French delegation were not invited to this meeting, while Prussia, for example, was represented not only by Karl August von Hardenberg but also by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Referring to the fact that the Treaty of Paris was signed by representatives of not four but eight powers, he demanded the inclusion of representatives of Spain, Portugal, and Sweden in the preliminary meetings, in addition to those of France. Eventually, he succeeded in being included in the governing committee, thus gaining the opportunity to intrigue with the aim of causing conflict among the recent allies.

Negotiations with Alexander I and Castlereagh

In early October 1814, Talleyrand met with Emperor Alexander I and proposed his notorious “principle of legitimacy.” The Russian Tsar must renounce parts of Poland that did not belong to Russia before the revolutionary wars, and Prussia should not claim Saxony. “I place right above benefits!” Talleyrand said in response to the Tsar’s remark that Russia should get the benefit it deserved from its victory. This apparently infuriated Alexander, who, generally speaking, could control himself but in this case declared, “Better war!”

Further Negotiations

Then followed negotiations with Lord Castlereagh. Alexander I told him that he did not aim to immediately, right at the Vienna Congress, reunite all parts of former Poland. He could only speak for now about the Polish territory currently occupied by his troops in 1814. He would create a Kingdom of Poland from this part, where he would be a constitutional monarch. He would not only restore the Kingdom of Poland from areas that he could rightfully annex to Russia by conquest; he would even donate the Białystok region, received by Russia in 1807, and the Tarnopol region, acquired by it in 1809, to this constitutional kingdom.

Lord Castlereagh found the proposed constitution, which the Tsar wished to give Poland, too “liberal” and therefore dangerous for Austria and Prussia. He expressed concern that Austrian and Prussian Poles would become agitated, envying their fellow Poles who enjoyed a constitution. The Tsar insisted so persistently that he was concerned about the independence and freedom of Poland that the minister of bourgeois England urged him not to be so liberal. The Austrian government feared even more than the English the creation of a liberal regime in Poland and the excessive, as it seemed to them, strengthening of Russia’s power through the annexation of most Polish lands. The Austrian

chancellor then proposed to Lord Castlereagh a way out: to inform the Prussian representative Karl August von Hardenberg that Austria and England agreed to give the entire Saxony to the Prussian king. But in return, Prussia must immediately betray Alexander I, join Austria and England, and together with them prevent the Tsar from taking over the Duchy of Warsaw. Thus, Saxony was to serve as payment to the king for betraying Alexander.

The Congress of Vienna and the Balance of Power

Soon after the victory over Napoleon, representatives from all European powers, except Turkey, gathered in the capital of Austria to address the restoration of feudal order and certain dynasties that had been overthrown during the Napoleonic Wars. The congress participants were united by a common goal: to fight against revolutionary and democratic movements. Additionally, the congress aimed to ensure lasting guarantees against the restoration of the Bonapartist regime in France and its attempts to conquer Europe, as well as to satisfy the territorial claims of the victorious powers.

On September 23, a week before the congress was scheduled to open on October 1, 1814, Prince Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Périgord, the French Foreign Minister under Louis XVIII, arrived in Vienna with other French diplomats. Tsar Alexander I knew him well; Talleyrand had often asked the Tsar for money and didn't take offense if denied. However, Talleyrand's brilliant mind, unmatched agility, cleverness, and understanding of people made him a very dangerous opponent. The weakness in his position was that he represented a defeated country at the Vienna Congress. He needed to be highly resourceful and skillful.

When Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, he already knew the issue that would dominate the congress: The Polish-Saxon question. Alexander I, whose troops occupied the Duchy of Warsaw after Napoleon's retreat, openly declared that he would not cede the duchy. Since it consisted mainly of lands taken from Prussia in the three partitions of Poland and then taken by Napoleon in 1807, King Frederick William III of Prussia claimed compensation by annexing the Kingdom of Saxony. Alexander I agreed to this on the condition of taking the Saxon king's lands, citing his long loyalty to Napoleon as the pretext. Talleyrand immediately saw the advantage of fighting on this basis to achieve his main goal: breaking the alliance between Austria, England, Russia, and Prussia.

In April-May 1814, Russia was undoubtedly the strongest of the war- ravaged and depleted continental European states due to its military power. This is why Austrian Foreign Minister Klemens von Metternich did everything possible to postpone the congress to the fall, allowing Austria time to recover. Alexander I agreed to this delay, despite his disdain for Metternich and his understanding of the political intrigues hostile to Russia, although they flattered the Tsar to his face.

All of them anxiously watched whether Alexander I might want to play the role of Europe's new ruler. Alexander I was not keen on Louis XVIII ascending the French throne. When Louis XVIII finally took the throne, the Russian Tsar insisted on granting France a constitutional charter, not because he liked constitutional institutions but because he believed the Bourbon dynasty would be swept away by another revolution if a constitutional regime was not established as a safeguard. Alexander I had a negative view of King Louis XVIII and his brother Charles of Artois, and they feared him and tried various schemes to free themselves from his oversight.

Before the start of the Vienna Congress, Talleyrand understood that it was rational for France to push the "principle of legitimacy." This principle argued that Europe, represented by its sovereigns and diplomats at the Vienna Congress, should preserve the lands and boundaries that existed before the revolutionary wars of 1792. If accepted, this would ensure France's territorial integrity and curb Prussia's and Russia's expansionist ambitions. Talleyrand found it beneficial to first negotiate with Metternich, who also did not want Poland given to Russia or Saxony to Prussia, and with Lord Castlereagh, who shared Metternich's view. However, such a common agreement was yet to be reached.

When Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, he was invited to join the meeting of representatives of the four "great" powers. He attended not as a representative of a defeated nation but with an arrogant and confident tone, immediately questioning why other members of the French delegation were not invited while Prussia was represented by both Hardenberg and Humboldt. Citing the Treaty of Paris, signed by representatives of eight powers, he demanded that Spain, Portugal, and Sweden also participate in preliminary meetings. Eventually, he was allowed into the leading committee, giving him the opportunity to sow discord among the recent allies.

In early October 1814, Talleyrand met with Alexander I and proposed his "principle of legitimacy." The Russian Tsar should give up parts of Poland that did not belong to Russia before the revolutionary wars, and Prussia should not claim Saxony. "I place right above advantage!" Talleyrand said when the Tsar remarked that Russia deserved benefits from its victory. This seemingly angered Alexander, who declared, "Better war!"

Subsequent negotiations with Lord Castlereagh saw Alexander I state that he did not aim to immediately reunite all parts of Poland at the Congress but could only speak of the Polish territory occupied by his troops in 1814. He intended to create a Kingdom of Poland where he would be a constitutional monarch. Alexander offered even to include the Białystok region and Tarnopol district in this constitutional kingdom, lands acquired by Russia in 1807 and 1809, respectively.

Lord Castlereagh found the proposed Polish constitution too "liberal" and dangerous for Austria and Prussia, fearing it would incite Austrian and Prussian Poles to envy their more privileged counterparts. The Austrian government, more fearful than the British, opposed the creation of a liberal regime in Poland and perceived Russia's potential gain of Polish territories as an excessive increase in its power. Metternich proposed to Castlereagh that they inform Prussian envoy Hardenberg that Austria and England agreed to cede all of Saxony to the Prussian king in return for Prussia's support against Alexander I and the Russian claim to the Duchy of Warsaw.

The Secret Alliance and Its Consequences

King Frederick William III ultimately decided against this plan. He realized the danger of Talleyrand revealing the plot to Alexander I and proposing a Franco-Russian alliance against Prussia. The fear of such a union and the bitter memories of the Tilsit Treaty were too vivid. The king decided to inform Alexander I to demonstrate his noble intentions. The Tsar summoned Metternich and spoke candidly. Talleyrand maliciously reported to Louis XVIII that Alexander I spoke to Metternich more harshly than to a disloyal servant.

The congress's work stalled due to internal struggles. Talleyrand changed his tactics while maintaining his goal of deepening the rift among the victors. France was more interested in preventing Prussia's growth, its immediate neighbor and enemy, than in stopping Russia. Talleyrand indicated to Alexander I that France would not support England and Austria's opposition to a Polish kingdom under Alexander's empire but would not agree to Saxony's transfer to Prussia. Frederick William III and his diplomats, Hardenberg and Humboldt, played minor roles at the congress. Assured of Saxony by Alexander I, who called the Saxon king a traitor, Frederick William III was initially complacent.

Talleyrand's work was facilitated by the sharp contradictions among the recent allies, especially England and Austria's opposition to Russian and Prussian plans. To limit Russia's influence gained from defeating Napoleon, Castlereagh and Metternich even formed a secret alliance with France. Talleyrand seized this opportunity to divide France's former enemies.

On January 3, 1815, a secret agreement was signed by Austria, France, and England against Russia and Prussia. It obliged each to support the others with armies of 150,000 soldiers if any one party faced danger from any other power, and they pledged not to make separate peace deals. The agreement was to be kept secret from Alexander I and others.

The secret treaty strengthened resistance to the Saxon project, leaving Alexander I with the choice of breaking off and possibly going to war or yielding. Having achieved his aims in Poland, Alexander I did not want to quarrel over

Prussia or fight three great powers. He conceded: Prussia received only part of Saxony, and the Saxon king retained his significantly reduced domain.

The Congress of Vienna entrenched Germany's political fragmentation. Alexander I and Metternich believed it wise to maintain Germany's feudal fragmentation. England was indifferent, and Prussia was too weak to fight. The congress's leaders showed no inclination to meet the rising bourgeoisie's aspirations, and the failure of German unification hopes marked a victory for reactionary forces.

Metternich's plan created the "German Confederation," with a "German Diet" in Frankfurt am Main. The confederation included Austria, Prussia, and 36 other German states. It was designed to prevent future French advances toward the Rhine and secure Austria's leading role in Germany, with Austria's representative chairing the Diet and having the decisive vote. This arrangement was not meant to unify the German people but to perpetuate their fragmentation and preserve small feudal monarchies.

Belgium was given to the new Dutch king; Denmark retained not only the duchy of Schleswig but also the German Holstein; Austria received the Italian population of Lombardy and Venice. Germany remained divided into 38 independent states. Poland was once again divided into three parts, with a new Kingdom of Poland created from the lands of the former Duchy of Warsaw, which, according to the congress's decision, was to be "in perpetual union with Russia" and governed by a constitution granted by the Russian Tsar. Poznań, Gdańsk (Danzig), and Toruń remained with Prussia, and Western Ukraine (Galicia) stayed with Austria. The city of Krakow "with its surrounding territory" was declared "for all times a free, independent, and completely neutral city" under the protection of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

As compensation for the Polish territories it lost, Prussia received not only the northern part of Saxony but also the island of Rügen and Swedish Pomerania, and in the west, the Rhine-Westphalian region. Despite opposition from Talleyrand and Metternich, the Kingdom of Hohenzollerns was significantly strengthened due to support from the Tsar and the position taken by the English diplomats at the congress. Although Prussia remained divided into two parts – the old eastern and the new western parts – it soon began to gain strength and became a threat to its neighbors after 1815.

Austria also significantly strengthened, receiving Tyrol, Valtellina, Trieste, Dalmatia, and Illyria. In Modena, Tuscany, and Parma, close relatives of Emperor Franz I were placed on the throne, forming close alliances with Austria. Similar treaties bound Austria with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, where Bourbon power was restored, and with the Papal States. Thus, Habsburg power extended over almost the entire territory of Italy, which remained politically fragmented.

The two most powerful European states, England and Russia, emerged from the prolonged wars with France significantly strengthened. England expanded its already vast colonial possessions. It retained full control over the seas, eliminating its main rival, France, and forcing other countries to recognize its self-imposed "maritime law," which allowed stopping and inspecting neutral countries' merchant ships at sea to confiscate goods headed to enemy ports. Especially important was British dominance over Malta and the Ionian Islands, which were turned into naval bases, serving as strongholds of English bourgeoisie near the Middle East.

Tsarist Russia emerged from the wars with Napoleonic France significantly expanded, gaining lands from the former Duchy of Warsaw, Finland, and Bessarabia. On the European continent, Russia no longer had any equals.

In addition to resolving major political and territorial issues, the Congress of Vienna adopted several special additional provisions as acts appended to the main treaty. Among them, special importance was given to the "Declaration of the Powers on the Abolition of the Slave Trade," signed on February 8, 1815, and the "Regulation on the Diplomatic Ranks," adopted by the congress on March 19, 1815.

The latter established uniformity in the ranks of various diplomatic representatives for the first time, becoming a norm in international law for many years. This regulation ended the endless quarrels and conflicts over precedence, common in 18th-century diplomatic practice. The ranks were established as follows: 1) Ambassador, Papal Legate, and Nuncio; 2) Envoy; 3) Chargé d'Affaires. Later, in 1818, the rank of Minister Resident was added between envoys and chargés d'affaires.

The victorious monarchs who gathered in Vienna in September 1814 had three main goals: to create guarantees against possible future aggression from France; to satisfy their territorial claims; and to eliminate all consequences of the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century and restore the old feudal-absolutist orders everywhere.

Only the first of these goals was fully achieved. As for the second goal, satisfying territorial claims, only a few victorious countries emerged from the long and bloody wars with France truly expanded at the expense of other weaker European states. The third goal of the Congress of Vienna, to eradicate revolutionary principles and fully establish the principles of legitimacy, was not achieved by its participants. The Holy Alliance of European monarchs, created to suppress the national liberation movement in Europe, symbolized the onset of reaction.

The Congress of Vienna decided the fate of France, confirmed the redistribution of colonies and territories of European countries in the interests of

the victorious states. Thus, a new system of international relations was established, known as the Vienna system, which set new approaches and forms of relations in Europe and the world, laying new contradictions on the continent.

The Return of Napoleon and the Final Act

As the congress was concluding, participants were shocked by the unexpected news: on March 1, 1815, Napoleon landed in France and entered Paris on March 20, restoring the empire. Rumors of discord at the congress had influenced his decision to leave Elba. In Paris, Napoleon found the secret January 3 treaty among Louis XVIII's papers and immediately sent it to Alexander I.

Reading the treaty, Alexander I reddened with anger but controlled himself. When Metternich, relying on the Tsar to save Europe from Napoleon, visited, Alexander showed him the secret document. Metternich was so stunned that he was speechless for the first and last time in his life.

Despite the shock, the fear of Napoleon prevailed, and Alexander I declared to Metternich that their common enemy was Napoleon. The defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo on June 18, 1815, by the Seventh Coalition.

In the eighteenth century, it became imperative to define new rules of the game in the new international political and political-diplomatic conditions. The previous Westphalian international order (the Westphalian system of international relations), which maintained the balance of power in Europe through constant struggle (diplomatic, political and military) between European states, was destroyed by Napoleon Bonaparte. And his "order", based on imposing a monopoly on France through war, was swept away by France's defeat in 1812-1814. It was to define a new system of international relations that a decision was made to convene a congress of representatives of all European countries, except Turkey.

The influence of international congresses and conferences on the development of international law, diplomacy and foreign policy was especially evident in the period after the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) and following the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). The practical achievements of European diplomacy and international law as a result of the Congress of Vienna were the creation of a new system of international relations in Europe, the establishment of an international regime on border and international rivers, the establishment of the principle of legitimacy, the regulation of the status of permanent neutrality, and the determination of the ranks of diplomatic agents. Particularly noteworthy are the provisions included in the appendices of the Final Act of the Congress.

The Congress of Vienna set a precedent for the regular convening of inter-popular conferences of great powers, during which they were able to discuss and

find ways to effectively resolve international problems. In the early years of the European Concert, the main topics discussed were discussed, mainly pan-European problems; in subsequent years, states convened their representatives to address specific international problems (for example, the Paris Congress of 1856, which summarized the results of the Crimean War).

It should be emphasized that the states took into account the decisions of the congresses at least until new ones were adopted new ones were adopted (e.g., the territorial division according to the decisions of the Congress of Vienna was eventually canceled in the part concerning Italy and Germany, but their cancellation was confirmed by the open or tacit consent of the great powers). The historical consequences and legal norms enshrined at the Congress of Vienna continued to be improved and adapted to the new realities of the time during the work of the following international institutions (congresses and conferences): The Paris Congress (1856), the Berlin Congress (1878), the Berlin (African) Congress (1884-1885), the Hague Conference (1899), the Hague Conference (1907), the Paris Conference (1919), and modern diplomatic conferences of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For example, in the twentieth century, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Additional Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, etc. were adopted, which were directly based on the decisions of the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815.

The enormity of the anti-Napoleonic wars also determined the enormity of the Congress of Vienna, an outstanding diplomatic event of its time. As after any major war, people dreamed of a lasting peace. It was the dream of people who had suffered from war: the dream of rulers, the dream of philosophers, the dream of diplomats... The participants of the Congress of Vienna did not attempt to reach for such ideal constructs as eternal peace, which Immanuel Kant had been concerned with. They quite rightly decided to confine themselves to the art of the possible and create a system of international relations, a political diplomatic system that would ensure lasting peace in Europe. Against all odds, the creators of the Vienna system succeeded. Vienna was chosen as the venue for the Congress because of Austria's central location in Europe and the role of mediator played by K. von Metternich. The latter was balancing between France and Russia, and thus was able to exert a strong influence on the negotiations. And Vienna fully met the expectations that it was the ideal city for multilateral negotiations.

The Congress of Vienna (November 01, 1814 - June 08, 1815) was the largest and longest summit in the history of international politics and world diplomacy. It lasted nine months and was attended by the heads of 216 European states. All of them were de jure recognized as equal. Their task was of the utmost importance: to restore order in Europe after Napoleon Bonaparte. Order exactly as enlightened monarchs of the time imagined it. The vast majority of small

European heads of state (princes) were nothing more than extras around the Big Five: Russia, Austria, England, Prussia and France, who de facto decided the future fate of Europe... General meetings of all diplomats were not convened.

The Congress of Vienna was not even officially opened. Its work was geographically centered in the then Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Ballhausplatz (now the State Chancellery). Committees or commissions were formed on the most important issues. During the Congress, the participants signed a number of treaties on state borders, adopted numerous declarations and resolutions, many of which were included in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and its annexes. At the Congress of Vienna, the whole of Europe was covered by a system of general treaties for the first time. In early September 1814, as contemporaries noted, "the migration of the whole of Europe" began in Vienna. Kings and emperors, ministers, authorized observers and plenipotentiaries, as well as many individuals who took their own initiative and joined the political and diplomatic life of Europe at that time, gathered here.

The Congress was attended by representatives of more than 200 European states (with the exception of Turkey, which was not invited), from great powers to tiny principalities of a few square kilometers, those who set out to decide the fate of nations and those who were waiting for these decisions to be made as soon as possible. The Congress of Vienna ("The Battle of the Diplomats") was not a boring "meeting" or "diplomatic gathering," but a celebration of life, a "glorious moment" or "happy moment," as Ludwig van Beethoven called his cantata, influenced by the events, ceremonies, and surroundings of the Congress of Vienna. Balls, performances, hunting, and walks were organized daily for the monarchs and ambassadors who came to Vienna. However, the Congress, which was its peculiarity, worked for about a year and never met for business.

Characteristics of the Vienna System of International Relations.

Its principles were laid down by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna (as we have already discussed). This system was based on the joint agreement of the powerful European monarchies regarding the status quo in Europe and excluded the possibility of a leader. It provided for the possibility of collective intervention in the affairs of those states threatened by revolutions, as well as the possibility of diplomatic consultations. The Vienna system had certain characteristics and features. These characteristics include the following:

1. The Congress of Vienna played a key role in the formation of stable relations between the leading European states. The era of the "European concert" - the balance of power between European states - began. Any aggravation of relations between them could lead to the destruction of the international system. After the French Revolution, the system of nation-states was finally strengthened. The state considered itself the guarantor of the security of its citizens and at the same time developed nationalism to preserve unity. Along with the nation-state and the consolidation of national sovereignty, a system of political balance - a compromise between the principles of sovereignty and the general interest - was established in international relations.

2. Unlike the Westphalian system of international relations, the elements of the Vienna system were not only states, but also coalitions of states.

3. One of the foundations of the European concert was the principle of maintaining a balance of power. The responsibility for this was assigned to the great powers. It was realized through a large number of international conferences. Among them were the Paris Conference of 1856, the London Conference of 1871, and the Berlin Conference of 1878.

4. Within the balance of power, states could change the composition of allies for their own interests without violating the overall structure of alliances and the nature of international relations.

5. The European Concert, being a form of hegemony of the great powers, for the first time limited the freedom of action of these states in the international arena.

6. Although annexations and contributions remained a form of international practice, the great powers no longer considered the elimination of another great power as a realistic goal.

7. During the Vienna system, the concept of political equilibrium acquired a broader interpretation. Due to the established balance of power, wars and armed conflicts in Europe temporarily almost ceased, except for minor ones. Characteristics of the Vienna system of international relations.

8. The Vienna system was aimed at establishing the balance of power and consolidating the borders of nation-states.

9. The Vienna system fixed a new geographical map of Europe. This system was based on the imperial principle of controlling geographical space. During the Vienna system, empires were finally formed: British (1876), German (1871), and French (mid-nineteenth century).

10. The Vienna system, like the Westphalian system, was Eurocentric. It covered the European space and those territories for which the leading powers were fighting a colonial struggle. Outside of the Vienna system was China, which was put in a semi-colonial position as a result of the opium wars. Japan, which had begun to "open up" to the world, was also not part of the Vienna system.

11. The Congress of Vienna did not formalize the colonies. One of the main causes of the First World War would be the struggle for the redistribution of colonial possessions.

12. Modernization processes and the development of capitalist relations began.

13. The peculiarities of the Vienna system were also due to the difference in the civilizational and modernization level of its participants. Great Britain and France had already entered the process of scientific and technological progress; Austria and Prussia lagged far behind in this area, while Russia had hardly been affected by technological progress at all.

14. Since monarchies were the leading actors at all stages of the development of the Vienna system, they were characterized by stability and identity of its actors. States in a homogeneous (stable) system can be opponents, but not enemies. However, mutual contradictions and the growth of national liberation movements led to the destruction of the Holy Alliance, which took place after the revolutions of 1848. With the emergence of a united Italy and Germany and the formation of hostile blocs, the actors were no longer homogeneous.

In the course of its evolution, the Vienna system went through 5 stages of development:

1. The stage of formation (1814-1815);
2. The consolidation stage (1815-1822);
3. The stage of sustainable development (1822-1848);
4. The period of crisis (1848-1871);
5. The stage of decline and liquidation (1871-1914).

2. International relations in the period of the Holy Alliance

The creation of the Holy Alliance did not resolve the contradictions that existed between the leading European powers.

First, the Austro-Russians. Metternich was afraid of both the revolutionary movement and Russia, and the latter was even more dangerous for Austria. The Austrians were also concerned about the Franco-Russian alliance. When Charles X became King of France and Nicholas I became Emperor of Russia, this alliance became even closer. Russia also feared revolutionary movements (the Decembrist uprising and the Polish uprisings) and the strengthening of other members of the Holy Alliance (including Austria);

Second, Prussia's position was not stable. It also feared the possibility of revolutions and a Franco-Russian alliance, so Prussia began to move closer to Austria and away from Russia. All the members of the Union were afraid of Russia because they believed that it could extend its hegemony to the entire European continent.

Thus, the contradictions were apparent from the first years of the Holy Alliance's existence and distracted it from its original goals. Subsequent events seriously tested the strength of the Vienna system of international relations.

In 1818, the first congress of the Holy Alliance was held in Aachen. There, France secured the withdrawal of allied troops from the country and joined the four victorious powers. Harsh disputes erupted over the issue of joint actions to help Spain in its struggle against the rebellious colonies. France and Austria were ready to help the Spanish king, but much depended on England's position. Great Britain, although not a signatory to the protocol, had always been on the side of the Union, but lately it had preferred to follow its own interests. The national bourgeoisie demanded universal suffrage. The ruling circles, represented by Lord Kestrel, Prince Regent George, supported the position of the national bourgeoisie. England was not interested in preserving the Spanish colonial empire because it itself sought to penetrate Latin America and strengthen Austria and France. As a result, England managed to block the decision to help Spain.

The 2nd Congress was held in 1820 in Troppau. At that time, revolutions broke out on the periphery of Europe (Spain, Naples, Piedmont). After a lengthy negotiation process, a protocol was adopted that in principle

justified intervention in countries where revolutions were taking place. Based on this document, Austria organized an intervention on the Apennine Peninsula.

At the 3rd Congress in Leibach on May 12, 1821, the same issues were discussed. While the Italian states managed to suppress the revolutionary uprisings, the revolutions in Spain and Portugal continued. The situation in these countries was discussed at a congress **in Verona in November 1822.** On December 1, the Verona Protocol was signed (England did not join it) to provide armed assistance to the Spanish monarch.

In 1823, French troops invaded Spain and restored the monarchy there. The special position of Great Britain was as follows: repressive measures could not stop the revolutionary wave, the national liberation movement should not be fought, but, on the contrary, supported. In accordance with this thesis, England recognized the new Latin American countries-Mexico, Argentina, and Peru-and resolutely refused to support the intervention in Spain. A crack appeared in the relations between the great powers. But, as further events showed, it did not widen, as a new complex problem emerged.

In 1821, the Greek uprising against the Ottoman yoke began. The Turks unleashed the most brutal repression on the rebels. The great powers could not ignore the Greek question, although it was quite controversial. On the one hand, the Greeks rebelled against their rightful monarch and thus violated the principle of legitimacy. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire entered a period of crisis and could not control its periphery. The question of dividing its heritage arose. It was complicated by the fact that the peoples inhabiting the Ottoman Empire, especially those who professed Christianity, sought to create their own national states. Problems related to the division of Turkey's territory, the establishment of the regime of the Black Sea straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), and the establishment of the influence of states in the Middle East and the Balkans determined the main content of the Eastern Question in the nineteenth century. The first step in developing a new approach to the Eastern Question was taken by England.

In 1823, England recognized the Greeks as a belligerent. And because the uprising in Greece or the Greek question was an integral part of the Eastern Question, Great Britain's actions forced other leading European powers to become more active. Austria opposed it because it considered the rebels to be rebels. Russia's position was twofold. Russia had serious interests in the Balkans, and real state interests spoke in favor of the Greeks, but ideological dogma spoke against them. Alexander I was unable to resolve this

contradiction, and at the end of 1825 he died. The situation in Greece was becoming increasingly complicated. The troops of the Egyptian Pasha Mehmet Ali were deployed to the Balkans, and the situation of the Greek rebels deteriorated sharply.

In the spring of 1826, the new Russian Emperor Nicholas I proposed his own interpretation of the **Eastern question:** the situation in the Balkans, with the exception of Greece, was declared a matter for Russia, and the Greek question was a matter for all states. On this basis, the positions of England, France, and Russia on the Greek question were coming closer together. On April 4, 1826, the Anglo-Russian Protocol of St. Petersburg was signed, which stated that Greece should become a special state with its own government, constitution, and laws. The Sultan was proposed to be the supreme sovereign. Nicholas I managed to include a clause stating that if Turkey refused to accept England's mediation in the exercise of the rights granted to Greece, each of the signatory countries would act "jointly or individually".

From August 1, 1826, Russian-Turkish negotiations took place in Akkerman, and on October 7 of the same year, the Akkerman Convention was signed, which guaranteed Russia's patronage over the Danube principalities and Serbia. Later, France joined the anti-Turkish Anglo-Russian coalition.

On October 20, 1827, a joint squadron at Navarino defeated the Turkish fleet. Turkey had already been rejecting the demands of the great powers, but a number of events led to a change in the position of the Shining Port - the death of a prominent British politician, Canning, and the Russo- Persian War (1826-1828). To distract Russia from Balkan affairs, British diplomacy began to push Persia into a military conflict with the Russian Empire. This war ended in a Russian victory.

On February 10, 1828, the Treaty of Turkmanchay was signed, according to which Iran renounced all claims to Northern Azerbaijan, ceded Eastern Armenia (the Khanates of Yerevan and Nakhchivan) to Russia, undertook to pay a contribution (20 million rubles in silver), recognized Russia's exclusive right to keep a military fleet in the Caspian Sea, and confirmed the freedom of merchant shipping on it. In May 1828, the Russo- Turkish War broke out, ending in Russia's victory.

On September 14, 1829, the Peace of Andrianople was signed. According to it, Russia received the islands in the Danube Delta, the Black Sea coast from the mouth of the Kuban River to the pier of St. Nicholas, the

fortresses of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki. Turkey was obliged to pay a contribution of 33 million rubles in gold. Freedom of navigation in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, as well as freedom of trade for Russian merchants throughout the Ottoman Empire were guaranteed. Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldova were granted autonomy. Greece became an independent state and was recognized by the European community, and in 1830, outside of a direct connection with the Treaty of Andrianople, by Turkey.

The outcome of the Russo-Turkish War strengthened Russia's influence in southern Europe and clearly demonstrated the incomparability of the power of the Ottoman Empire and Russia. They prompted Nicholas I to reconsider his position on the Eastern question. He came to the conclusion that it was beneficial for Russia to have a weakened Turkey as its neighbor, which could dictate any terms. The Russian emperor did not want to support the idea of dividing the Ottoman Empire, because this would strengthen the positions of England and France on its southern and southwestern borders.

The leading powers of Europe assumed that the main threat to the stability of the Vienna system came from the Eastern Question. However, in 1830, a wave of social upheaval that swept across the European continent slightly adjusted these perceptions. Nevertheless, the revolutionary storms in Europe failed to shake the foundations of the Vienna system. Despite the relative stability of the Vienna system of international relations, revolutionary uprisings in Europe lasted for almost twenty years from 1830 to 1848, and in a number of countries were accompanied by government coups, with the revolution beginning again in France.

On July 25, 1830, Charles X signed ordinances abolishing the French Constitution. Mass demonstrations took place in the country. As a result of 3-day battles in Paris, the revolution won. Charles X was forced to flee. The Duke of Orleans, who took the name of Louis Philippe I, came to the French throne. Nicholas I reacted quickly to the events in France. It almost came to the point of breaking off diplomatic relations. The Russian emperor declared that he could not recognize Louis Philippe as the French king. And after the revolution spread to the Netherlands, where Nicholas's sister Anna Pavlovna was queen, the emperor began trying to organize an intervention by European powers against France and move the Russian army to the banks of the Rhine. But neither Austria nor Prussia accepted Russian proposals. Moreover, Prince Talleyrand became France's ambassador to the United Kingdom and managed to improve Anglo-French relations. This unnecessary zeal of Nicholas I later cost Russia dearly. Relations with France were permanently and thoroughly

damaged. England also began to move away from Russia. As for Austria, it had always been opposed to Russia. Prussia, on the other hand, avoided any contact with its former partner as Russia was being isolated.

And **on** November 29, 1830, revolutionary events unfolded in the Kingdom of Poland, an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. The conspirators attacked the palace of the tsarist governor, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, and seized the arsenal. The governor was forced to flee. The rebels aimed to restore independent Poland. An insurgent government was formed, headed by Adam Czartoryski (a former associate of Alexander I). The emperor refused to negotiate with the "rebels".

On January 25, 1831, the Polish Sejm deposed Nicholas I from the Polish throne. The further development of the Polish uprising worsened the international position of the rebels and decisively strengthened the position of Nicholas I. The conquest aspirations of the Polish nobility in relation to Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine made it easier for Russia to negotiate with Western European diplomats. The tsarist government declared that the rebels had taken up arms not in the name of preserving the charters of 1815, but for the sake of seizing Russian provinces. Metternich and Frederick William III signed a convention with Nicholas I. It was directed against the rebellious Poles.

England was not interested in Poland. At first, France wanted to advise the tsar to promise amnesty to "rebellious subjects," to affirm Poland's constitutional rights and extend them to Lithuania, but after Nicholas was overthrown, France refused to support Poland. After battles with the Polish army near Stochok and Grokhov, Russian troops stormed Warsaw on September 8, 1831. The uprising was crushed. The Polish Constitution of 1815 was effectively abolished. In order to prevent a liberation movement in the Polish lands, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed a convention in October 1833 on mutual guarantee of Polish possessions and on the extradition of participants in the national liberation struggle.

Almost simultaneously with the Polish uprising, the revolution in Belgium began. Belgian rebels opposed submission to the Netherlands. The Dutch king appealed to European powers for help. But only Prussia was ready to send troops to save him. France categorically opposed this. England wanted Belgium to have its own king. But the French king also tried to put his son, the Duke of Neure, on the Belgian throne. The European powers did not allow Louis's son Philip to take the Belgian throne. The Belgian National Congress elected Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg to the throne (152 votes in favor out of

196). His candidacy suited everyone except France. On November 15, 1831, in London, Russia, Austria, England, Prussia, and Belgium signed a treaty establishing the Kingdom of Belgium. The borders of Belgium were defined, and it was declared to be an "eternally neutral state".

Russia, Austria, France, England, and Prussia were the guarantors of compliance with all articles of the treaty. The consequences of all three revolutions were settled without direct clashes between the great powers. However, the political map of Europe did undergo serious changes: a new state, Belgium, emerged. Nevertheless, a pan-European revolutionary explosion was averted. In the view of most European politicians, the main threat to the Vienna system continued to lie in the uncertainty and instability associated with the attempt to resolve the Eastern question. Indeed, events in the East were developing rapidly. The defeat of Porte in the Russo-Turkish war and in the struggle against the Greeks made the sultan's subjects think that it was inexpedient to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Egyptian Pasha Mehmet Ali, who had been only symbolically obeying the sultan for quite some time, decided to openly break with Istanbul. In 1832, he captured Syria. The Turkish Sultan Mahmud II began to look for opportunities to repel the Egyptian army's offensive. A diplomatic struggle between Russia, England, and France erupted around the Turkish-Egyptian crisis. The latter sought to capture Egypt and Syria. England wanted to prevent Russia's military intervention. The leading European powers did not want Russia to participate in the resolution of the eastern conflict. But events developed contrary to the wishes of France and Great Britain. The sultan's position worsened. The troops of Ibrahim (the son of Egyptian Pasha Mehmet Ali) resumed their offensive in Syria.

The Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse. In February 1833, Turkey turned to the Russian emperor for help. The Russian fleet was sent to the capital of the Ottoman Empire and 40,000 troops landed. The British and French ambassadors in Constantinople used all their influence to demand the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the Bosphorus. In an effort to get their way, France and England took countermeasures. French and British squadrons were sent to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The Western European powers succeeded in reaching a peace between Sultan Mahmud and Ora Mehmed Ali.

The decision to support Turkey was dictated, on the one hand, by the tsarist government's general policy of preserving the stability of the Ottoman Empire, and, on the other hand, by the desire to strengthen Russian influence

in the Middle East. The conclusion of the **Treaty of Unkyar-Iskelesi on a defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey on July 8, 1833,** was a great success for Russian diplomacy in the Middle East. The treaty strengthened Russia's position in this strategically important region, gave the Russian Orthodox Church access to the Holy Places, and weakened France's influence. Attempts by England, France, and Austria to annul it failed. In the second half of the 1930s, two knots of contradictions in the Middle East finally formed.

The first included contradictions between the Western European powers and Russia for political influence in Constantinople. The second refers to the Anglo-French colonial contradictions in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. At that time, England was Russia's main adversary in the Middle East, and it began to exert increased pressure on the sultan, which to some extent weakened the Russian position in Turkey. Thus, the international situation changed significantly, and by the end of the 1930s, the Russian government preferred to keep its hands free in the Middle East. Moreover, the ruling circles of Russia did not tolerate the interference of other states in their international affairs.

By the mid-1940s, a new trend emerged. It was associated with the weakening of Russia's economic and political positions in Turkey, and the tsarist regime mistakenly assumed that it would make a deal with Great Britain and find an ally in its person in resolving Middle Eastern affairs. The only thing that united Russia and Great Britain was cooperation in weakening France. The Convention of 1840, concluded in London and signed by England, Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Prussia, was directed against France and Egypt. It was a victory for British diplomacy and the beginning of a new course of rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain.

The first convention of 1840 was followed by the second London Convention of 1841, an agreement between the five powers and Turkey on the principles of closing the Straits, which was an indicator of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, its inability to keep the Straits under its control, as well as the weakening of Russia and a significant blow to its sovereign rights as a Black Sea state. Thus, the London Conventions of 1840-1841 deprived Russia of many political and economic rights in the Middle East region. But the Russian government did not want to accept this, and it saw a way out of this situation in strengthening the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in the East, whose rights were limited, but still left some room for supporting Orthodoxy in Palestine.

The London Treatises radically changed the living conditions of Palestine, which now received special attention from Western powers. After a

series of internecine wars, Mehmet Ali of Egypt was forced to leave Palestine, which was returned to the Turkish government by the Treaty of London in 1840. From that moment on, the eastern question became acute, and the problem of the Holy Places became the focus of many international projects aimed at getting the patronage of the Christians of the East into one or another hand. After Russia gave up its position on the protection of the Christian population in the East, all the leading powers tried to take its place in turn.

While the attention of politicians and diplomats was drawn to the Eastern question, serious qualitative changes were taking place in Europe itself. The rapid development of industrial relations led to the formation of large industrial areas, such as the Ruhr, Alsace, Saarland, and Silesia. The size of industrial potential was now directly linked to the level of power of the state. Not surprisingly, it is the regions where the main industrial potential is concentrated that are the subject of increased attention from the great powers, which seek to take them under their firm control.

The industrial revolution generated fundamentally new problems, the effectiveness of which depended on the internal stability of states and, consequently, their capabilities in the international arena. tensions. All the great powers were faced with the problem of adapting to the new conditions, and the nature of their relations in the system of international relations and the fate of this system itself depended on how successfully they solved it. In 1848, a powerful wave of revolutionary uprisings swept across Europe, giving rise to a series of new conflicts in the sphere of interstate relations. The revolutions of 1848 began in France.

On February 22, revolutionary protests began in Paris, and in March they unfolded in the Austrian Empire, Prussia, and all cities of the Germanic Union. In France, the monarchy was overthrown and a republic was declared.

On March 14, 1848, Nicholas I issued a manifesto against Western European revolutionaries. Russia also broke off diplomatic relations with France. In the same year, Louis Napoleon was elected president of the French Republic. But the republican system in the country lasted only four years, and France became an empire again. However, these processes did not help to normalize bilateral relations between empires. But this could not stop the revolutionary movement in Europe.

In March 1848, Schleswig and Holstein attempted to secede from Denmark. Prussia tried to create a union of the North German states under its auspices, which caused sharp disagreements among the great powers.

Although Prussia failed to achieve its goal, the issue of German unification was becoming increasingly acute. The situation in the center of Europe was sharply complicated by the fact that a revolution broke out in different parts of the Austrian Empire, bringing this state to the brink of collapse. It was saved from this only by the help offered to the young Austrian emperor Franz Joseph by the Russian tsar.

The troops he sent helped to suppress the Hungarian uprisings, which sought to establish a state. Subsequent events showed that Nicholas I, who had been captured by ideological dogma, had made a mistake. The collapse of the Austrian Empire and the emergence of an independent Hungarian state did not contradict, let alone threaten, Russia's national interests. Based on these interests, Nicholas I provided assistance to Prussia.

In the spring of 1848, a Polish uprising was being prepared in Poznan. The rebels hoped that the uprising would spread to the Polish provinces of Russia. The Prussian king begged Nicholas I to move his troops to the borders of Prussian Poznan to jointly suppress the Polish movement. The tsar concentrated an army of 420 thousand people in the Polish provinces of Russia, and any attempt at an uprising became impossible there. The uprising covered only Poznan and was quickly suppressed by Prussian troops. This helped improve relations between Tsarist Russia and Prussia. The governments of England and France rejected any idea of supporting the rebels, although European public opinion was on the side of the fighters against tyranny. But the national interests of the leading European powers lay in a completely different plane.

As a result, the tangle of contradictions in the center of Europe became even more confused. The situation was further complicated by the fact that during this period centripetal tendencies within the Germanic states intensified, as evidenced by the fact that in March 1848 Schleswig and Holstein attempted to secede from Denmark, and Prussia tried to create a union of the North German states under its auspices, which provoked sharp opposition from the great powers. Austria, whose ruling circles had their own plan to unite the German principalities, called the "Greater Germanic" plan in historiography, as opposed to the "Lesser Germanic" project of Prussia, was particularly strongly opposed to the union.

A sharp clash between the two states over the Germanic question occurred at the turn of the 40s and 50s. After Austria refused to discuss Berlin's plans to reorganize the Germanic Union, Prussia signed a separate agreement with Saxony and Hanover in 1849 (the "Union of the Three Kings"

or Prussian Union). The matter almost came to a military conflict between Austria and Prussia, but due to the intervention of foreign diplomats, primarily because of the position of Nicholas I, who supported the Austrian emperor, everything ended in the **"Olmütz humiliation" of Prussia:** in Olmütz, it actually abandoned its claims to pan-German hegemony. Although Prussia failed to achieve its goal, the issue of German unification was becoming increasingly acute.

Even during Napoleon's domination of Europe, the Germanic lands had undergone major changes: The Holy Roman Empire disappeared, political fragmentation decreased (Napoleon created the union of German states-the Rhine Union-and the Kingdom of Westphalia, headed by his brother Jerome), and anti-feudal transformations were carried out.

In Prussia, which had been severely reduced in territory after the Treaty of Tilsit, the ruling elite went for moderate reforms: personal dependence of peasants was abolished and very difficult conditions for the redemption of land payments were set, though. The government carried out a tax reform, secularized church lands, created self-governing bodies in cities, introduced universal military service, and reorganized the army. The mixture of refreshing changes and national feeling offended by military defeats, occupation, and economic subjugation by France gave rise to a patriotic movement in the German lands. However, the Prussian monarchy benefited most from it. Prussia made a number of territorial acquisitions.

The most important of these were the economically developed areas on the Rhine and in Westphalia with the rich Ruhr coal basin. This, as well as the solution of the agrarian question in favor of Prussian landlords who retained their latifundia and at the same time accumulated significant funds (the Junker way of developing capitalism in agriculture, which formed the basis of the class compromise between the Junkers and the upper bourgeoisie), made Prussia the leader of the industrial revolution in the German lands. In the 1830s, under the auspices of Prussia, the Customs Union was created, which included two dozen states, which was the first step toward formalizing the country's economic unity.

The main outcome of the violent revolutionary events of 1848-1849 in the German lands was the failure of the revolutionary version of German unification "from below". The reason for this was the weakness of the German democratic movement, and, most importantly, the position of the leading powers, which did not need a united Germany, because in its person they would have gained a serious competitor.

Vienna's eventual loss in the struggle with Berlin can be attributed to Prussia's much more successful steps along the path of bourgeois progress and ethnic contradictions that weakened Austria. Finally, the situation in Northern Italy became sharply more complicated, with, on the one hand, a growing desire for an independent Italian state, and, on the other hand, sharply escalating Franco-Austrian contradictions caused by the desire of both states to strengthen their positions in the region.

The era of the struggle for the unification of Italy is known in historiography as the Risorgimento (translated from Italian as "revival"). It began at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at the time of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. In the course of these wars, grandiose economic, social, and political transformations of a bourgeois nature were carried out in the Italian lands: the remnants of peasants' personal duties were eliminated and a procedure for the redemption of land payments was introduced; church tithes were abolished, church lands were sold off; monopolies, customs barriers, and workshop restrictions were abolished; the monetary system was regulated; the population with a certain property qualification gained access to administrative and judicial power, albeit controlled by the French.

The fragmentation of Italian lands was significantly reduced. Eventually, Napoleon, incorporating some of them directly into the French Empire, established two puppet states on the remaining territories, the Kingdom of Italy, which he headed himself, and the Kingdom of Naples, which was transferred first to his brother Joseph and then to his son-in-law Murat.

The downside of Napoleon's rule was the transformation of Italy into an agrarian and raw material appendage of the Empire, subject to additional bondage payments and duties. The contradictory combination of the beneficial changes brought to Italy by the French Revolution and Napoleon and the national humiliation it experienced gave impetus to the patriotic movement to overthrow foreign rule. However, its participants had different ideas about the future political fate of Italy.

The most militant part of the patriots was united by the Society of Carbonari, whose cells (venti) were organized on the principle of Masonic lodges. The Congress of Vienna restored the former monarchies in Italy: The Bourbons in the Kingdom of Naples (since 1816 - the Kingdom of Both Sicilies), the dukes, tied by dynastic ties to the Habsburgs, in Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, the secular power of the Pope, and the Savoyard dynasty in the Kingdom of Sardinia (which included Piedmont, Savoy, Genoa, and the island

of Sardinia). The legislation of the period of Napoleon's rule was abolished, although some of the transformations carried out at that time remained in force. But most importantly, the economic and political fragmentation of Italy became a reality again.

And the Austrian Habsburgs, who gained the Lombardy-Venetian region and made all Italian regimes, with the exception of Piedmont, militarily and politically dependent on them, were an obstacle to overcoming it. The patriotic movement in Italy, as heterogeneous as before in terms of socio- political coloring, now operated under anti-Austrian slogans. However, the failures of two revolutionary attacks in the early 20s (revolutions in the Kingdom of Sicily and Piedmont) and early 30s (in Modena, Parma, and the Papal State) put a revision of the previous methods and organizational forms of struggle on the agenda. The era of the Carbonari became a thing of the past, and a new stage in the Risorgimento began, during which two main currents emerged.

The democratic current represented by Giuseppe Mazzini's Young Italy organization put forward the task of creating a unitary Italian republic of the Jacobean type from the Alps to Sicily (the principle of "natural borders") through a popular uprising and guerrilla war against the Austrian occupiers and the Habsburg monarchies.

The Mazzinistas paid special attention to propaganda and education, defining patriotic service as a religious duty of every Italian, their motto being "God and the people." However, the democratic current did not link the solution of the political issue of Italian unification to social issues, and above all to the solution of the agrarian issue, for fear of alienating the liberal nobility and landed bourgeoisie. This weakened the social base of Young Italy. The growth of the bourgeois strata, including at the expense of the newly economizing nobility, was the reason for the liberal program in the Risorgimento. Its ideologues emphasized reforms in the Italian states that would ensure the freedom of entrepreneurship and trade and at the same time link Italy into a single economic organism.

Politically, the liberals advocated a federation of Italian monarchies under the auspices of the Pope or King Charles Albert of Sardinia, which was opposed to this idea. The mouthpiece of this trend was the newspaper Risorgimento, published (since 1847) in Piedmont by Count Camillo Cavour. During the revolution of 1848-1849, which took on an all-Italian character, the programs of both movements were tested by practice. The weaknesses of the

democratic platform were revealed, and hopes for the Pope and the goodwill of the monarchies to unite in an Italian federation collapsed.

But the Savoyard dynasty loudly declared itself as the champion of a united Italy. As a result of all these conflicts, the situation in Europe changed significantly. Nationalism became a factor in international relations that could not be ignored. The idea of creating nation-states received a powerful impetus. In Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, it became a practical idea. The economic and political fragmentation (different systems of measures, weights, and coins, customs barriers, and legal confusion) in these countries was the main obstacle to social development.

Only a strong unified state could provide favorable conditions for the development of capitalism within the country and protect the interests of national capital outside it. In both countries, the unification was intended to complete the process of nation-building and to promote the flourishing of national culture. This meant that the period of sustainable development of the Vienna system came to an end.

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. *What were the main goals of the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), and which states played leading roles in its work?*
2. *What were the key provisions of the Final Act of the Vienna Congress, and how did they influence the new European order?*
3. *What principles formed the basis of the "European Concert" system?*
4. *What was the Holy Alliance, and how did it affect international relations in post-Napoleonic Europe?*
5. *In what ways did the Vienna system attempt to maintain peace and stability in Europe after 1815?*

Lecture 7. International Relations during the Unification of Germany and Unification of Italy (1848-1871)

7.1 Germany after the Congress of Vienna

Germany after the Congress of Vienna. Let me briefly recall the main decisions of the Congress of Vienna on Germany. First, the German Union was created (by the act of June 8, 1815). This union was not a state; it was only a union of German states.

The members of the union – 35 German states and 4 "free cities" enjoyed the same rights, regardless of the size of the member state (and here a great power like Prussia enjoyed the same rights as some free city). Unanimity was required on the following issues: (1) the basic laws of the German Union; (2) changes in the basic institutions of the German Union; (3) legal matters; and (4) religious matters. It is not surprising that under such arrangements the Union Sejm in Frankfurt, the main organ of the German Union, soon became the laughing stock of all Europe because of its utter impotence.

Secondly, the Congress of Vienna resulted in the following territorial decisions on Germany: 1) The Duchy of Warsaw went to Russia, with the exception of Torun and Poznan, which went to Prussia; Krakow became a free city; Eastern Galicia went to Austria. 2) 2/5 of the Kingdom of Saxony went to Prussia. In addition, Prussia received Danzig and Swedish Pomerania, Westphalia, the left bank of the Rhine. In the Kingdom of Hanover military roads were secured for Prussia. 3) Territorial accretions are given to Bavaria, but the Duke of Frankfurt does not get his duchy back; Frankfurt becomes a free city. 4) Dukes mediatized by Napoleon remain mediatized, but are compensated. 5) The Kingdom of the Netherlands annexes Belgium and Luxembourg (the latter, however, becomes a member of the German Union).
6) Austria receives Venice and Lombardy.

Although 2 German states - Austria and Prussia - were formally among the great victorious powers, nevertheless the Germans were clearly offended by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. And it was not even just the fact that the principalities of Schleswig and Holstein, populated predominantly by Germans, remained part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Much more significant was another thing: reactionary orders established in Germany under the pressure of Metternich, Alexander I, Friedrich-Wilhelm and other reactionaries, hindered the national development of the country.

Thus, during the Carlsbad meeting (August 1819) Metternich managed to impose the following draconian measures on Prussia and the rest of Germany: elimination of university autonomy, preliminary censorship of the press, a special commission of inquiry to investigate revolutionary activities. It is true that during the meeting in Vienna (November 1819-May 1820)

Metternich was not able to achieve the abolition of the constitutions that had been granted by some German sovereigns (for example, the Prince of Württemberg). However, all this was only due to the impotence of the German Basic Law of 1815. 3) Finally, this Basic Law itself was the biggest barrier to the national unification of Germany. 2. German Union. Austria was quite satisfied, however, with the completely powerless position of the German Union, since the powerlessness of the German Union = the subordinate position of Prussia in relation to Austria. However, underlying changes were also taking place in Germany.

It was not just that throughout the 1820s and 1830s, despite the Carlsbad reaction, elected legislatures appeared in Hanover, Brauschweig, Hesse and Saxony. Perhaps of far greater importance was the rapid development of capitalism in Germany and the emergence of a common German market, which also prepared the political unity of the country. In his time, Metternich did not pay much attention to the formation of the Customs Union of Prussia and a number of northern German states, as a result of which Prussia became the economic core of the entire Northern Germany. He realized this too late.

Thus, in June, 1833, in a report to the Austrian Emperor, Metternich wrote: Prussia will certainly take advantage of the lure of material advantages in order to make relations with us colder, to make them look with hope or fear only to Berlin, and, finally, to make Austria what, from the point of view of commerce, she is now in relation to all these states, and what Prussian writers portray her with such persistence and fervor, namely, a foreign state. “I would like to note in this connection that the word "Prussia" was perceived in the

19th century in a very different way than in the 20th century. While in the last century the word "Prussia" was inextricably linked with the word "militarism", in the 19th century Prussia became a symbol of the Germans' aspiration for freedom and national unity.

Prussia had a well-developed system of local self-government, after the revolution of 1848 the country had one of the most liberal constitutions in Germany (which will be discussed below), finally, it was Prussia that became, as already mentioned, the economic locomotive of Germany - already in 1860 the level of industrial development in Prussia was 1.5 times higher than in Austria. Hence the sympathy for Prussia on the part of not only Germans, but also other progressively thinking Europeans.

What could the Austrian Chancellor counteract these negative (for Vienna) processes. During the Austrian-Prussian-Russian summit conference held in Teplitz and Munichgreuz in August-September 1833, Metternich managed to pass resolutions condemning parliamentarism, and even forced the participants of the conferences to adopt a formal treaty, according to which each sovereign had the right to call on Austria, Prussia and Russia, or any other power, for help in case it was threatened by internal turmoil and external dangers.

Moreover, in January 1834 in Vienna (despite Prussia's displeasure) Metternich managed to get the Allied Sejm to approve a protocol by which the Sejm had the right to effectively override the decisions of German parliaments in the event of disagreements between parliaments and governments on such matters as, for example, budgetary expenditures. But Metternich was unable to delay the development of a bourgeois economy and civil society in Germany.

7.2 German revolutions of 1848 and the first efforts at unification

As is known, the revolution in France served as a signal for the revolutionary wave that swept across Western and Central Europe from Paris to Budapest, and from Berlin to Naples. However, the synchronicity of the revolutionary processes did not mean that there was any coordination in the actions of French, German, Italian, and Hungarian revolutionaries; in fact, the goals of all these national revolutions of 1848-1849 were often quite opposite. It is no accident that there were few examples of revolutionary solidarity; the

main slogan of the revolutions was *fara da se* (we can do without), the response of King Charles-Albert of Sardinia to the offer of help against the Austrians by the provisional French government.

Nor could it have been otherwise. France (or, more precisely, the French national bourgeoisie) sought to finally throw off the Viennese system of 1815 and restore its hegemony in Europe, and to begin with, to re-subjugate Belgium and seize the left bank of the Rhine. The German national bourgeoisie, in turn, sought the reunification of Germany, and if this goal were achieved, Germany, not France, would become the European hegemon. Up until Sedan, Paris did not realize that German nationalism was far more dangerous for beautiful France than Russian tsarism or Austrian reaction; after 1871, however, the French finally realized that their country could coexist only with a weak and humiliated (at least in the military-political sense) Germany. It goes without saying that German national aspirations were completely incompatible with the

Polish national liberation movement: the Germans were not going to grant independence to the Poles of Prussian conquest: they were going to Germanize them and incorporate them into Greater Germany. Paris had similar illusions about Italy: Louis-Napoleon, himself an Italian Carbonari in his youth, regarded the liberation of Italy from Austrian oppression as one of the most important goals of his foreign policy.

The result of the unification of Italy, however, was not the emergence of a natural ally of France, but, on the contrary, an influential and active competitor in the Mediterranean. Still greater contradictions marked the Austrian Revolution, or rather a whole series of revolutionary events in the territory of the patchwork empire.

These revolutionary processes, which embraced all of Austria's major ethnic groups of Germans, Italians, Magyars, and Slavs, brought the empire to the brink of total collapse, primarily because of the multidirectional nature of these processes. All the peoples of the Austrian Empire wanted freedom - but freedom for themselves at the expense of others. It was this circumstance that gave the government of the empire a chance to act according to the principle of divide et impera, to restore its power. As a matter of fact, the result of the 1848-1849 revolution in Austria twenty years later was a compromise between the Germans and Hungarians at the expense of the Slavs, who remained an oppressed and disenfranchised element even in the dual monarchy of 1867.

As for Germany in particular, the thesis that Germany could have been united peacefully in the event of the victory of the democratic revolution and

that only the triumph of reaction allowed Bismarck to unite it with iron and blood is highly doubtful. The victory of the democratic revolution in Germany would surely have led to a revolutionary war just as it happened in France half a century ago and there would have been much more blood and iron.

At any rate, the deputies of the all-German Constituent Assembly, meeting in Frankfurt in the spring of 1848, after the victory of the armed insurrection in Berlin in March, 1848, were very militant. Above all, they supported Prussian actions to seize the Danish provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. These actions immediately made the Prussian King Frederick- Wilhelm IV the idol of the Frankfurt assembly. Particular resentment in Frankfurt caused the actions of the Austrian government, which took advantage of the help of Russia and the South Slavs bitter enemies of the Germans to suppress the revolutions in Austria and Hungary. It should be recognized that consistent republicans like Carl Schurz and even communists like Marx and Engels took part in the revolution in Germany, but they remained in a complete minority: the majority of the German bourgeoisie was openly chauvinistic and dreamed not so much of liberal freedoms as of territorial conquests (Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.). The other internationalists during the German Revolution, along with the communists and republicans, were, strangely enough, reactionaries, advocates of the revival of the Holy Alliance and the cooperation of Austria, Prussia and Russia in the struggle against the revolution. They, these reactionaries (Gerlach, Stahl, Bismarck) clustered around the notorious Kreuzzeitung and tried in every possible way to dissuade Friedrich-Wilhelm IV from his liberal designs.

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1848, the king gave Prussia a very liberal (for those times) constitution, providing not only universal suffrage and democratic freedoms, but even a responsible ministry. This step completely reconciled the king with the German nationalists, who took an even more anti- Austrian stance: on January 19, 1849, the Frankfurt assembly decided that the Austrian monarch would be allowed into the future German Empire only in accordance with the already adopted articles of the imperial constitution, which prohibited the political merger of any German state with a non-German state. German nationalism thus came into irreconcilable contradiction with Austrian imperialism, and it was around this point that the struggle for German unification was subsequently fought.

On March 28, 1849, the Frankfurt parliament granted Frederick-Wilhelm the imperial dignity; at the same time, in accordance with the constitution of March 4, the emperor, the political, military, and diplomatic head of Germany,

ruled through ministers responsible to a bicameral parliament elected on the basis of universal suffrage.

The Prussian king, while not formally rejecting the proposal, at the same time maintained that only an assembly of German monarchs could make him a legitimate monarch. At the same time, he thundered that he would always and everywhere defend the honor and interests of Germany. But it was only Vienna (and, above all, St. Petersburg) that had to shout at the Prussian king, and all these dreams were at once put to an end. The king not only dissolved the Prussian Chamber of Deputies and the Frankfurt Sejm, but also formally renounced the imperial crown (April 27).

Moreover, in May and June Prussian troops were sent to the German states (Saxony, Hanover, Rhine region) to suppress revolutionary movements. Thus Friedrich-Wilhelm tried to gain the support of the German sovereigns in the struggle for leadership in Germany. On May 26, 1849, the Union of the Prussian, Saxon, and Hanoverian kings was concluded, according to which the military forces of the three states were united in case of necessity. The members of the Union undertook to grant Germany a new constitution and electoral law, as well as a provisional court of arbitration.

Two days later the Berlin cabinet published its draft of a new German constitution, the Limited Union, which provided for the formation of an all-German government, which was to be in charge of foreign policy and military affairs, customs, communications, monetary system. A bicameral parliament was created, with the lower house elected on the basis of universal suffrage. Rights and freedoms consistent with the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen were proclaimed.

A week later, 28 small German princes joined the Restricted Union; but the large German states were rather cold to this project. At the same time, all these actions alienated the liberal bourgeoisie from Frederick-Wilhelm IV; to top it all off, on July 6, 1849, the Danes, supported by a number of powers (England, France, Sweden), inflicted a major defeat on the Prussians.

The Prussian king's authority in the eyes of the German public was finally destroyed by the shameful failure of the London conference (July 1850), which recognized the belonging of Holstein and Schleswig to Denmark. In these circumstances, Austria managed to strengthen its position, especially after the victories in Italy and Hungary. Austrian Chancellor Schwarzenberg restored the so-called Seventeen Sejm, a pro-Austrian body in the German Union. In the fall of 1850.

Prussia and Austria were on the eve of war, the Austrians were preparing

a punitive expedition against Holstein and Hesse, the Prussians were going to prevent them from doing so. And here the decisive role was played by Nicholas I, who most resolutely demanded from the Prussian king to make concessions. Berlin was forced at Olmütz (November 29, 1850) to renounce the Restricted Union and make concessions in Hesse and Holstein.

In 1851 the good old German Union Sejm of 1815 was restored, and everything went on as before. Reaction seemed to have triumphed in Germany. In particular, Otto von Bismarck, one of the most vocal reactionaries and obscurantists, was appointed to represent Prussia. But it was he who played an extremely revolutionary role in German history to crush the power of Austria and unite Germany.

4. The struggle between Austria and Prussia for hegemony in Germany.

The new round of the struggle for hegemony in Germany thus began under extremely unfavorable circumstances for Prussia: it was publicly humiliated and demoralized. It seemed that it was Austria who would be the all-German hegemon.

Thus, on August 23, 1851, Schwarzenberg succeeded in getting the Allied Sejm to repeal the Fundamental Rights, which had been vetoed by the Frankfurt Parliament. The international situation, in particular the Bonapartist coup d'état in Paris on December 2, 1851, contributed to the pan-European triumph of reaction. However, Vienna's most serious failure was the refusal of the Allied Sejm to include the Kingdom of Lombardo-Venetia and Hungary among the German states.

But it was not only these individual diplomatic failures. Every year the balance of power between Austria and Prussia changed more and more, and not in favor of the former. After the revolution of 1848, an industrial revolution began in Prussia and other German states members of the Customs Union. The 1850s were years of entrepreneurial fever for Prussia. New enterprises were founded, industrial production grew, and entire industrial districts were created.

By 1860, Prussia was already one and a half times more industrialized than Austria. Prussia was thus becoming the economic motor of Germany, and politics, as we know, is just a concentrated expression of economics (Lenin). The first demonstration of Prussia's growing industrial power and the political influence based on it was the conflict over the Customs Union in the fall of 1852.

As a result of this conflict, the Union was renewed, while Austria, despite

all efforts, was left out of it. This was 1852, the year of the triumph of reaction; at that time the Russian Czar seemed to dominate Europe indiscriminately, and the Viennese cabinet in Germany. And here was such a slap in the face. Incidentally, the firm position taken by Berlin in the Customs Union dispute was largely due to the dispatches which the Prussian Government received from Bismarck, Prussia's representative in Frankfurt. Already then, Bismarck apparently came to the view that a conflict between Austria and Prussia in the struggle for German hegemony could not be avoided. And even then Bismarck began to carefully prepare the diplomatic and political isolation of Vienna.

Events in Europe in the 1850s and 1860s made Bismarck's task in many ways easier.

1. After the Crimean War, Russia's power and influence in Europe had been undermined; in fact, Tsarism was no longer able to play the role of Europe's gendarme and prevent German unification. Moreover, the Austro- Russian rapprochement was at an end, and for good. Austria and Russia remained mortal enemies until the revolutions of 1917-1918, which ended the Habsburg and Romanov empires.

2. The rapprochement between France and Russia, which had been envisioned after the Paris Congress, was thwarted by the Polish events (1863-1864). The Polish national liberation movement was used by the powers as an excuse to press Russia. In particular, Napoleon III made extensive plans for a large-scale war against Russia and Prussia, as a result of which Poland should be restored, Austria should be compensated at the expense of Prussia and Turkey, and the latter should receive the Circassian region, which should be detached from the Russian Empire. This scheme Alexander II. could never forgive Louis-Napoleon.

3. On the other hand, during the suppression of the Polish uprising, Prussia supported Russia, to the point of unprecedentedly allowing Russian punitive units pursuing Polish rebels to enter Prussian territory. This rapprochement between Berlin and St. Petersburg was 100% utilized by Bismarck in 1864, 1866, and 1870.

4. Relations between Austria and France had fallen on hard times after the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, as a result of which Austria's dominance in Italy was crushed and the latter managed to achieve unification. All these circumstances allowed Bismarck to play the multi-move game that resulted in the proclamation of the German Empire with the Hohenzollerns at its head at Versailles in January 1871.

The first move in this combination was the war with Denmark (1864). Bismarck played this game quite subtly: without challenging the provisions of the 1852 London Treaty on the status of Holstein and Schleswig, Bismarck at the same time demanded autonomy for them under the London Treaty. Here, too, Prussia received an invaluable service from Great Britain: the Palmerston government encouraged Christian IX that he would not stand alone in the struggle for the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

At the same time, the war for Schleswig and Holstein would be a land war, which England was unable to fight in the absence of an ally on the continent. The British cabinet tried to encourage Napoleon III to side with Denmark, but France would never agree to a war with a united Germany without guarantees from London - and the Palmerston government was reluctant to give Paris such guarantees. As a result, Denmark, hoping for support from England and France, took a tough and intransigent stance on the duchies issue, thereby giving

Bismarck the much-desired casus belli. So, little Denmark was left alone not just with Prussia, but with the whole of united Germany, including Austria. Vienna could not avoid taking part in the intervention against Denmark: otherwise German public opinion would have sided with Prussia. In concluding the agreement with Berlin of January 16, 1864, the Viennese cabinet flattered itself with the hope that it would be a conservative alliance that would keep Prussian foreign policy under Vienna's control and even provide Berlin with guarantees to maintain Austrian control over Venice. Very soon, however, Austria had to suffer a severe disappointment.

On February 1, 1864, Austro-Prussian troops crossed the Schleswig border, and on August 1 of the same year it was all over: Christian IX signed the preliminary terms of peace, which served as the basis for the treaty concluded in Vienna on October 30. By virtue of this agreement, the Danish king renounced all rights to Lauenburg, Schleswig and Holstein in favor of the Prussian king and the Austrian emperor. Now Austria was no longer needed Bismarck, and it was time to finally show who was master of the house.

Europe was still living outdated ideas; in European capitals believed that the Prussian army, at best, equal in its fighting power to the Austrian army, and the war between these two German states will be protracted and heavy. Therefore, in Paris, for example, it was believed that the Austro-Prussian war would not lead to a radical change in the balance of power in Europe; on the contrary, this war would even give the French Empire to profit at the expense of fratricidal war between the Germans.

Meanwhile, during the 1860s, Prussia underwent a very real revolution in military affairs, which for the next one and a half hundred years determined the system of military training of the world's leading powers. It was a system of universal conscription, which allowed to have a colossal trained reserve, which in the conditions of industrialization could be quickly put under arms and transported to the theater of war by railroads.

Another Prussian novelty, which was forced to be adopted by all military powers without exception, was the General Staff, which prepared not only plans for future wars, but also the theaters of war not after (as it was before), but before the outbreak of hostilities. This ingenious invention of the Prussian military - Moltke senior, von Roop, et al. - became one of the main reasons for all Prussian victories of the 1860s: over Denmark, Austria, and France. All these circumstances were not properly taken into account in Paris; worse, according to the general consensus of all diplomatic historians without exception, the government of Louis-Napoleon had Bismarck wrapped around his finger.

During Bismarck's rendezvous with Napoleon III at Biarritz (October 1864), the German chancellor tried to impress upon the French emperor how fruitful a close alliance with Prussia would be for France. In particular, Bismarck said that the annexation of Belgium to France would not meet with objections in Berlin. For Prussia, the Iron Chancellor asked for nothing more than a small piece of territory in Hesse and Nassau, and even the correction of the border between Prussia and Hanover.

Well, such a trifle as the reform of the Union in accordance with the wishes of the German nation was mentioned as if in passing. The deal seemed highly favorable, and it was not surprising that the little nephew of a great uncle, an adventurer, who all his life was surrounded by adventurers and adventuresses, gave in to Bismarck's provocation. There was another circumstance that induced Louis-Napoleon to refrain from immediate intervention in the Austro-Prussian conflict: in Paris were guided by outdated and incorrect ideas about the balance of military forces between Vienna and Berlin, according to which this war should be persistent and protracted - and only after the exhaustion of the forces of the parties Napoleon III was going to dictate to both German states his terms. Finally, there was still a conflict in Mexico, in which French troops were involved - and in these conditions it was pure madness to intervene in a new war (and even Napoleon III realized this). It was not difficult to get Italy on your side, it was only necessary to promise Italy Venice. In addition, the Italian government was granted a military loan.

On April 8, a treaty of alliance was signed between Italy and Prussia. It

remained to find a suitable pretext for war with Austria. The fact is that the Austro-Prussian war would hardly be popular in Germany: there it was seen as fratricidal, and here Bismarck had to reckon with the sentiments not only of his reactionary friends from the Cross newspaper, but also with the feelings of many representatives of the liberal public. It was necessary to find a pretext for war that was flawless from the point of view of international law and public sentiment, and such a pretext was the **Gastein agreement between Austria and Prussia of August 14, 1865**, on the Austro-Prussian condominium with regard to the Duchies of the Baltic.

This treaty was drafted in such a way that virtually all control over the duchies remained in the hands of Berlin, and Vienna soon realized this. Actually, Vienna was never interested in Schleswig or Holstein, and the Austrian cabinet would willingly exchange both for territorial concessions to Prussia, for example, somewhere in Saxony. But here Bismarck refused flatly, and the fight became inevitable.

On June 5, 1866 Prussian troops entered Holstein, which was, according to the Gastein Agreement, under Austrian rule. On June 12, Austria severed diplomatic relations with Prussia. On June 14, after the Allied Sejm adopted an anti-Prussian resolution at Austria's suggestion, Berlin declared the German Union non-existent. On June 15, Prussian troops entered the territories of Hanover, Saxony, and Courgesen.

On June 17, Austria declared war on Prussia, and on June 20, Italy declared war on Austria. Certainly Bismarck proved himself during the events of 1864-1866 as the most skillful diplomatist of his time; nevertheless, it must be recognized that the inflexible and backward-looking diplomacy of Vienna was of great help to the iron chancellor. The desire to hold on to any scrap of a patchwork empire at any cost, as well as the bad habit of always preferring defeat to compromise, were sooner or later to lead to the isolation of the Austrian Empire on the international scene.

In fact, by 1866, on the eve of the conflict with Prussia, Austria's relations with Russia were hopelessly spoiled (as already mentioned above); France and Italy were dissatisfied with Vienna's intransigence on the question of Venice, and as for London, firstly, it did not want to interfere in the intra-German conflict and, secondly, without an ally on the continent, Great Britain alone was unable to fight. All these circumstances certainly helped Bismarck to provide diplomatic preparation for the Austro-Prussian war.

There is a romantic legend that on the **eve of the Battle of Sadova (July 3, 1866), which decided not only the outcome of the Austro-Prussian War**

but also the long-running struggle for hegemony in Germany, Bismarck had poison in his pocket. He himself later said that he had never had to put everything at stake to such an extent as in June and July 1866. All this seems a somewhat romantic exaggeration.

Of course, the Italians were easily defeated by the Austrians in the land battle of Kustocza (June 24) and the naval battle of Lisse (July 20). But to wage war on two fronts patchwork empire was clearly not able to. The big question is whether Austria could have stood up to Prussia alone. During the crisis of 1850, Crown Prince Wilhelm loudly said that the Prussian army would certainly defeat the Austrians. And after the Prussian revolution in military affairs, mentioned above, the Prussian military had no doubt that Austria would be quickly defeated. And so it happened.

Another thing is that Bismarck (although he liked to pose in a military uniform) understood absolutely nothing about military affairs and was forced to rely on the judgment of Moltke Sr. and Roop. The real battle, however, Bismarck had to endure after Sadovaya. Here is what he wrote to his wife on July 9: "We are doing well, despite Napoleon, if we do not exaggerate our claims and do not think that we have conquered the whole world, we will also achieve peace, which is worth the effort. But we are just as quickly intoxicated by success as we are inebriated, and I have the thankless task of pouring water on the foaming wine and proving that we are not alone in Europe, but with three other powers that hate and envy us.

Indeed, after Sadova, when the road to Vienna was open and it seemed that Berlin could dictate to the defeated enemy any terms of peace, it cost Bismarck a colossal effort to persuade the king to make peace on the most moderate terms - and as soon as possible. After all, on July 5, two days after the Garden, Napoleon announced his mediation of the conflict between Austria, Italy, and Prussia.

By doing so, the French Emperor was making it clear that France would not be left on the sidelines should the war continue. These arguments, however, hardly reached the consciousness of the Prussian king and his generals. At one point Bismarck (if we believe his memoirs) thought of resigning and even suicide. Yet he managed to persuade the king (with the help of the crown prince) to conclude a moderate peace that would leave the territory of Austria and Saxony intact. A preliminary peace was signed at Nikolsburg on July 26, and the final peace treaty was signed at Prague on August 23.

The victory over Austria led not only to Prussian dominance in Germany

(indeed, the old German Union was abolished; in its place, in 1867, the North German Union was created. the North German Union was created, under the constitution of which the Prussian king headed all German states north of the Main and was supreme commander and head of the Union's foreign policy; Prussia annexed Hanover and made defensive and offensive agreements with Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse, and Baden).

This victory led to Bismarck's dominance of German domestic politics. The Prussian Landtag, with whom Bismarck had been at odds for several years, immediately vottaged all war loans requested by the Iron Chancellor. Bismarck's policy of unifying Germany with iron and blood, on the basis of a compromise between the Junkers and the bourgeoisie (as well as the upper working class) bore brilliant fruit.

7.5 The Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. Completion of the Unification of Italy

If the victory over Austria united all of North Germany, the war with France, the age-old enemy of the Germans, was, according to Bismarck's plan, to unite all of Germany. Preparation for war with France was conducted by Bismarck according to the same scheme as the preparation for the Austro- Prussian war. And the most important part of this scheme was the foreign policy isolation of the potential enemy.

Of course, isolation of "beautiful France", the country that for many centuries was the hegemon of European politics is not the same as isolation of a patchwork empire, which is unclear how it existed at all. And here (as in many other cases) Bismarck was helped by the miscalculations of his opponents. France had a chance to create a united anti-Prussian front: as early as 1866, the Russian government offered England and France to protest against the proposed destruction of the German Union and the annexation of Hanover and other German states.

Gorchakov proposed to put the question to an international congress. (Of course, at this congress, the Russian Chancellor intended to raise and the question of the Black Sea Fleet, and the situation in the Balkans). He was expected to be rejected. London at that time, after the death of Palmerston (1865), generally did not see any benefit in intervening in events on the continent: the British were much more concerned about the French work on the laying of the Suez Canal. And if London had any intention to intervene in

the conflict between Berlin and Paris, after July 25, 1870 Bismarck published a draft Franco-Prussian treaty, prepared by the French ambassador in Berlin Benedetti, according to which Belgium was to go to France, the British cabinet took a position of neutrality in the Franco-Prussian conflict, and very unfriendly to Paris.

France, on the other hand, was not prepared to revise the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 (which St. Petersburg wanted). Finally, as far as Italy was concerned, the Bonapartist regime, dependent on the clerics, stubbornly refused to give its consent to the annexation of Rome to the Kingdom of Italy. Thus the isolation of France on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War was predetermined - which was just what Bismarck needed.

Bismarck's famous Ems provocation was aimed at creating the most favorable political and diplomatic conditions for war against France. Inciting Paris to declare war on Prussia, the "Iron Chancellor" achieved complete isolation of France even in relation to the few countries that were still ready to support her, namely Austria and Italy. After France's declaration of war (July 17), it was stated to the French representatives in Vienna that since France was the attacking party and, moreover, the Austrian cabinet was not properly informed of Paris's intentions, Austria could not support France. In fact, both Austria and Italy were waiting for the Franco-Prussian war to enter a protracted phase - and that was when Vienna and Rome were about to take the stage.

Upon learning of the Ems incident, Alexander II said to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, "You behave as if you were the only one with honor." Indeed, Paris' demands that the Prussian king publicly guarantee that no prince of the Hohenzollern dynasty would ever claim the Spanish throne were humiliating and insulting to William I. The form in which these demands were made was also insulting. And this is what Bismarck needed: in the eyes of not only the Germans, but the whole of Europe, it was the French as provocateurs and warmongers.

The Unification of Germany and Europe. The defeat of France in 1870. - so brilliantly described in the novel of the same name by E. Zola - was not only a military defeat, but also the collapse of the entire European policy of France, since at least 1815. It revealed the futility of Paris' claims to "leadership" on the European continent, to some "special role" in German affairs. All the efforts of this kind, which had been going on since Richelieu's time, turned out to be forever buried under Sedan and Metz. Especially ridiculous after 1871 looked

the role of "patron" of the South German states, which Paris had assumed - because during the Franco-Prussian war, all of southern Germany, in unison with northern Germany, rose up to fight against the original, age-old enemy in the West.

France henceforth had to put up with the role of a second-tier power, which is forced to oppose the German power not its own strength, and diplomatic maneuvering. Hence the pro-Russian bias in French foreign policy, which became a reality after 1871. But the St. Petersburg cabinet was no less impressed by the sudden appearance of a 70-million-strong German colossus in the center of Europe - in place of a bunch of weak and dependent German states. And to think that 20 years ago Prussia was publicly humiliated in Olmütz, and 15 years before that it was simply not allowed to enter the threshold of the Paris Congress.

Now St. Petersburg had to state with concern that the times of the Russian emperor's patronizing attitude to the Prussian king were over. In the West, Russia bordered not with a weak and dependent Prussia, but with a powerful and growing as a yeast German Empire. At that time Russia itself had to overcome not only the consequences of the Crimean defeat (up to the end of the 1880s Russia actually had no Black Sea Fleet, i.e. the southern borders of the Empire were not protected), but also faced growing difficulties in carrying out internal reforms. Hence the gradual growth of pro-French tendencies in Russian foreign policy after 1871.

The other members of the "European concert", and above all England, were understandably concerned about Berlin's success. Nevertheless, for 20 years after Sedan, the "Iron Chancellor" managed, using the methods of preventive diplomacy, to upset potential anti-German coalitions. His successors, however, were not so skillful, and in a few years after the departure of Otto von Bismarck from the political arena around the German Empire began to form a hostile coalition of foreign powers. But we will talk about this next time.

Self-Assessment Questions

1. *What was the political structure of the German Confederation after the Congress of Vienna, and how did it affect the prospects for unification?*
2. *What were the key goals and outcomes of the German revolutions of 1848 in the context of national unification?*
3. *How did the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 influence the balance of power in Central Europe?*

4. *What role did the Franco-Prussian War play in the final unification of Germany under Prussian leadership?*
5. *How was the process of Italian unification completed, and what international factors influenced its success?*

Lecture 8. The «Eastern Issue» in International relations in the 19th century

8.1. International relations during the Crimean War.
8.2 The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878.
8.3 Russian-Turkish War and the results.

8.1 International relations during the Crimean War.

Crimean War of 1853-1856. The European Revolution of 1848-1849 caused reactions in the Balkans in the form of a national liberation movement in Moldavia and Wallachia. It was suppressed by tsarist and sultanic troops. The revolutionary events in Europe gave impetus to a new upsurge of the national liberation movement in Bulgaria. Serious unrest arose in Bosnia.

The Albanians rebelled. Serbia had already virtually seceded from Turkey. Montenegro, which had never submitted to the Turkish feudal lords, continued to defend its independence. Under these circumstances, the tsarist government considered the moment to get its share of the "Ottoman inheritance". The Russian Tsar hoped to conclude an agreement with England on the division of the Ottoman Empire. He did not realize that England, as well as France, claims to dominate the whole of Turkey, especially Constantinople and the Straits, and that Austria, despite the assistance rendered to it by the Tsarism during the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, remains an implacable opponent of Russian policy in the Balkans.

This miscalculation of Nicholas I cost Russia dearly. In May 1853, the Porte rejected the ultimatum presented by Russia to recognize the Russian tsar's right to patronize all Orthodox Christians in Turkey. In the fall of the same year, the Russo-Turkish war began. After the outbreak of Russia's war with Turkey, the European powers took a hostile stance towards Russia. In 1854, after the end of military preparations of the Western powers, Great Britain, France and Turkey concluded the Treaty of Constantinople against Russia. This treaty was one of the most important diplomatic acts that determined the balance of power in the Crimean War. Under its terms, both Western powers agreed to provide the Turkish Sultan "the help he asked for", and recognized the need to preserve the "independence" of his throne and the former borders of Turkey.

England and France undertook to send land and naval troops to aid

Turkey and to withdraw them from Turkey immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty. For his part, the Sultan gave an undertaking not to conclude a separate peace. After the signing of the Treaty of Constantinople, England and France at the end of March declared war on Russia. Shortly thereafter, the Treaty of London of 1854 was signed between England, France and Turkey, which supplemented and expanded the Treaty of Constantinople of Union.

The Treaty of London was based on the pretext of England and France protecting Turkey; in reality, it was intended to secure their political interests in the struggle against Tsarist Russia. The obligations imposed on Turkey bound its freedom of action and did not allow it to withdraw from the war, although influential Turkish circles after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube Principalities were inclined to peace with Russia. Austria and Prussia refused to support Russia, and after England and France declared war on Russia they signed a treaty of alliance against Russia in Berlin.

Austria soon signed a treaty of alliance with France and England against Russia. The Austrian court signed this act in the hope of gaining control of Moldavia and Wallachia after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. Austria assumed the defense of Moldova and Wallachia from Russian troops. It was decided to form in Vienna a commission of the authorized representatives of the three powers and Turkey to settle questions relating both to the situation of the principalities and to the passage through their territories of the allied armies.

The parties concluded between them a defensive and offensive alliance and pledged themselves not to sign a separate peace. Prussia joined the treaty. After the signing of the treaty, Austria increased its diplomatic pressure on Russia in the interests of France and Great Britain. Russia found herself at war with Turkey, Britain and France, and from 1855 with Sardinia, in the absence of any support from Prussia and with Austria's clearly hostile attitude. As early as the summer of 1854. The Allies worked out the so-called "four conditions" of a future peace treaty with Russia: replacement of the Russian protectorate over the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by a common protectorate of the Great Powers; freedom of navigation on the Danube; transfer to the hands of all the Great Powers of the protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey; revision of the London Conference of 1841 on the Straits.

These conditions formed the basis of the negotiations at the Vienna Conference of 1855. Diplomatic representatives of Russia, Austria, France, Great Britain and Turkey met in the spring of 1855 to clarify the terms of peace. Britain and France were aware that Russia had accepted four points of

the preliminary peace terms. After the fall of Sevastopol in September 1855, when Russia's defeat was finally determined, the new Emperor Alexander II had to agree to open peace negotiations on the basis of the "four conditions" with the inclusion of a clause on the neutralization of the Black Sea. In this case, Russian diplomacy sought to use the contradictions between the winners, their predicament due to heavy losses at Sevastopol.

Paris was chosen as the place of peace negotiations at the suggestion of the Allies. In February 1856, the Paris Congress began its work. Before the Congress, the French Foreign Minister and Napoleon III himself made it clear that the French side would moderate the British and Austrian demands. The rapprochement between Russia and France, thus outlined and further intensified, was the defining moment of the work of the Paris Congress and the elaboration of the terms of peace.

The first real expression of this rapprochement was Napoleon III's refusal to support English demands for independence for Russia's Caucasian possessions. Similarly, Napoleon III was not inclined to fully support Austria, which demanded that Russia cede Besarabia to Turkey. The Russian plenipotentiaries quickly agreed to Russia's refusal to strengthen the Aland Islands, just as the British plenipotentiaries did not insist on Russia giving up the Caucasus. Without difficulty the participants in the Congress of Paris agreed to declare freedom of navigation on the Danube under the control of two international commissions, in connection with which Russia ceded to the Moldavian Principality the mouth of the Danube and the adjoining part of Southern Besarabia.

The question of transferring the patronage of the Christian subjects of Turkey into the hands of all European powers was resolved by the Sultan's rescript of February 18, 1856, which declared the freedom of all Christian denominations. Russian representatives agreed without objection to the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian principalities established by the **Küçük-Kaynarji peace treaty of 1774.** All powers jointly guaranteed the autonomy of the principalities within the Ottoman Empire. The Congress of Paris obliged Austria, which had occupied the Danubian Principalities in 1854, to withdraw its troops from their territory. It was decided to convene a special conference to finalize the position and rights of the Danubian Principalities.

On the question of Serbia, it was decided that the contracting parties would jointly guarantee its full internal autonomy while maintaining the supreme authority of the Sultan over it. Russia was offered the return to the

Turks of Kars, occupied during the war. The Russian plenipotentiaries demanded that the treaty should specify the return of Kars to the Turks in exchange for Sevastopol and other cities in the Crimea. The hardest condition for Russia was the neutralization of the Black Sea. Military defeat forced the Russian government to agree to this demand, which infringed on Russian state sovereignty. The Paris Congress decided that the Black Sea is declared neutral, the passage of military vessels of European powers through the Bosporus and Dardanelles is prohibited. Russia could not keep in the Black Sea more than 6 military steam ships of 800 tons and 4 ships of 200 tons. and should not, as well as Turkey, to have in the Black Sea naval arsenals. The Treaty of Paris, signed as a result of the Paris Congress, ended the Crimean War. The Treaty of Paris marked the beginning of a new course of Russian foreign policy. In a note drawn up on behalf of Alexander II by Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode and sent to Orlov in Paris on April 17, 1856, it was said that the Holy Alliance, as the war and, especially hostile to Russia behavior of Austria, had shown, ceased to exist; Russia's relations with Turkey remained tense after the conclusion of the peace. The hostility to Russia on the part of England, not satisfied with the Peace of Paris, did not diminish. The note said that in order to eliminate the threat of a new coalition against Russia should try by all means to maintain favor with Russia France. This new course Russian foreign policy adhered to for several years after the Paris Congress.

8.2 The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878.

By the 70s of the 19th century a significant part of the Slavs in the Ottoman Empire - Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina - were still under the Turkish yoke, and the question of national liberation was the main issue that these peoples sought to resolve. The most active participants of events in the Balkans during this period were Turkey, Russia, England and Austria-Hungary.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 intensified the struggle among European states for trade routes to the Mediterranean, for Asian and African possessions of Turkey, especially between England and France. Russia tried to take advantage of the Western contradictions to restore its influence in the Balkans. Turkey, while formally maintaining its sovereignty, was gradually losing its independence. It embarked on the path of foreign loans, which led

to the strengthening of its economic and political dependence on the states of Europe. England felt particularly confident in Turkey.

Its politicians regarded the Ottoman Empire as a profitable market for products and capital, as a territory of great political and strategic importance. Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of German support, gradually strengthened its position in the Balkans. Germany acted cautiously: on the one hand, it supported Austria-Hungary's expansion in the Balkans, on the other hand, it supported the Slavic peoples. In the middle of the 70s of the XIX century. national liberation movement in the Balkans flared up with renewed vigor. It was caused by the strengthening of economic and political oppression of the Turks and the socio-economic development of the peoples under their control.

The July uprising of 1875 in Herzegovina and the anti-Turkish uprising in Bosnia in August of the same year marked the beginning of a powerful liberation movement of the Balkan peoples. The Eastern crisis began. Seeking to help the rebels, but not wanting to bring the matter to a military conflict, Russia proposed to Austria-Hungary to jointly demand from Turkey to grant the rebels autonomy. Austria-Hungary feared the spread of the national liberation movement to its territory, which threatened its imperial principles. However, it was not able to hold on to this position. There were influential elements in Austria who hoped to solve the South Slavic question in a different way: they thought to incorporate the South Slavic regions of the western half of the Balkans into the Habsburg state, starting with the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The supporters of this plan were ready to agree to Russia taking the eastern part of the Balkans.

Emperor Franz Joseph was anxious to compensate himself at least in some way for the losses suffered in Italy and Germany. He therefore listened with great sympathy to the voice of the annexationists. These politicians energetically encouraged the anti-Turkish movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia was in favor of supporting the uprising, but without entering into conflict with Austria-Hungary. A. Gorchakov decided to intervene in Balkan affairs in contact with Austria-Hungary. This policy was in line with the principles of the agreement of the three emperors. In August 1875, the

European powers offered the Turkish Sultan their mediation in the settlement of relations between the Porte and the rebels.

Moreover, A. Gorchakov insisted on Turkey's fulfillment of all obligations towards the Christian population of its regions. D. Andrassy, with the consent of A. Gorchakov, prepared a note containing a draft of reforms for Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to this project it was envisaged to provide the population with full freedom of religion, abolish the system of buying, use the revenues of the regions for local needs, establish a mixed commission of Christians and Muslims to oversee the reforms, and provide the Christian population with land. On December 30, 1875, Andrassy handed a note to the governments of all the powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris of 1856, outlining this project of reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All Powers expressed their agreement with D. Andrassy's proposals.

On January 31, 1876, the project of D. Andrassy in the form of the Vienna ultimatum was presented by Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany, England, France and Italy to the Turkish government. The Porte gave its consent to the introduction of the reforms proposed in D. Andrassy's note. But the rebels put forward a number of more radical demands: an immediate truce, the transfer of a third of the land to the peasants, the guarantee of the Powers in the issue of reforms. The Turkish government rejected these demands. Thus, D. Andrassy's diplomatic enterprise failed.

Then Russian diplomacy came on the scene again. A. Gorchakov offered Andrassy and Bismarck to organize a meeting of the three ministers in Berlin, timed to coincide with the upcoming visit of the Tsar. In May 1876, the meeting took place. The project of A. Gorchakov's project, unlike D. Andrássy's note, did not demand reforms, but autonomy of some Slavic regions of the Balkan Peninsula. However, D. Andrassy failed Gorchakov's plan, making so many amendments to it that it lost its original character.

The finally agreed proposal of the three governments, called **the Berlin Memorandum of 1876,** stipulated that if the steps outlined in it did not yield proper results, the three imperial courts would agree to take "effective measures to prevent further development of the evil". So, the Berlin Memorandum, adopted on May 13, 1876 by Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and joined by France and Italy was handed over to the Turkish

government. The Berlin Memorandum demanded that the Turkish government conclude a two-month truce with the rebels, assist them in rebuilding their homes and farms, and recognize the rebels' right to keep arms.

The goal of the three imperial courts was to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but this was conditioned on alleviating the plight of the Christians, in other words, an "improved" status quo. This was the new diplomatic term by which A. Gorchakov expressed the main idea of the Berlin Memorandum. France and Italy agreed with the program of the three emperors. The English government in the person of B. Disraeli, disagreeing with the Berlin Memorandum, spoke out against the new intervention in Turkish affairs and thus supported the struggle of the Turkish Sultan. In addition, England did not want Russia's assertion in the Straits and strengthening its influence in the Balkans. England saw the Balkans as a bridgehead from which to threaten Constantinople. At the same time, she began to take possession of the Suez Canal and the establishment of English dominance in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

With the passage of the Straits into Russian hands, the main communication lines of the British Empire could threaten the Russian fleet. Therefore, England sought to bring not only Egypt but also Turkey under its control. In case of conflict over the Balkans, she could count on Turkey and Austria-Hungary. Therefore, it was more favorable for England to unleash the struggle with Russia not in Central Asia, where she alone stood face to face with Russia, but in the Middle East. By his refusal to accept the Berlin Memorandum, B. Disraeli gained a dominant influence in the Turkish capital, upset the European "concert" in Constantinople and encouraged Turkey to resist the demand of the three emperors. Almost simultaneously with the appearance of the Berlin Memorandum, the Turks brutally suppressed the revolt in Bulgaria. B. Disraeli tried to somehow obscure the Turkish atrocities.

Meanwhile, Serbia and Montenegro were already preparing for armed intervention in favor of the Slavic rebels. Russian and Austrian representatives in Belgrade officially warned against this. But on June 30, 1876, the war of Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey began. Under these circumstances, the delivery of the Berlin Memorandum was postponed, and soon it lost all

meaning and was no longer put forward. There were about 4 thousand Russian volunteers in Serbia, including many officers. In addition, monetary aid was coming from Russia. By secretly encouraging both the rebels and the Serbian government, Russian tsarism risked a conflict with the great powers, for which Russia was not ready either militarily or financially. Although the tsarist government feared such a conflict and nevertheless pursued such a policy.

The Serbo-Turkish war increased the danger of a pan-European explosion. If Turkey had won, it was inevitable that Russia would have to intervene and would have to face Austria-Hungary. If Serbia had won, it would most likely have caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this case, it would hardly have been possible to prevent a brutal battle between the Great Powers over the Turkish inheritance. The policy of Russian diplomats in the second half of 1876 tried to solve a difficult diplomatic problem: to support the Balkan Slavs, but at the same time not to clash with Austria-Hungary. The Serbo-Turkish war made it necessary for the Russian government to secure an agreement with Austria-Hungary in case of a widening political crisis in the Balkans.

Alexander II and A. Gorchakov's meeting with Franz Joseph and D. Andrássy in Bohemia, in the Reichstadt Castle, on July 8, 1876, was devoted to solving this problem. The Russian government secured an agreement with Austria-Hungary, although no formal convention or even a protocol was signed at Reichstadt. The outcome of the Austro-Russian collusion was recorded on behalf of A. Gorchakov and D. Andrássy. According to both records, it was agreed in Reichstadt that both Powers would adhere to the "principle of non-intervention" for the time being. In case of Turkish success, both sides undertook to act by mutual agreement, to demand the restoration of the pre-war situation in Serbia, as well as reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event of a Serbian victory, the parties pledged that "the Powers would not assist in the formation of a large Slavic state." Due to discrepancies in the records of Russian and Austro-Hungarian diplomats, the Reichstadt Agreement was the germ of many misunderstandings and conflicts.

Having failed to agree on the terms of peace in the Balkans, the Powers, on the initiative of Russia, again demanded of the Porte that it should

immediately conclude an armistice with Serbia. To this performance of the "European concert" Turkish diplomacy responded with a peculiar maneuver.

The Porte not only agreed to grant Serbia a truce, but for a period of 5-6 months. In reality, it meant a long occupation of Serbian territory and prolongation of peace negotiations. When Serbia refused such a long truce, the Turks resumed their offensive. The Serbs suffered further defeats. In view of this, the Russian government delivered an ultimatum to the Porte demanding an immediate truce for 4 or 6 weeks.

A 48-hour period was given for a reply. The frightened Porte hastened to accept the demands made upon it. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople succeeded in obtaining a unanimous decision to present Turkey with the following demands: the introduction of an autonomous system in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria and some expansion of the territories of Montenegro and Serbia. But on the day when the conference was preparing to formally announce its decision, the Turkish sultan held a coup d'état, and proclaimed a constitution.

The labors of the conference were declared completely superfluous: for the constitution already granted all the necessary reforms. On this ground Turkey rejected the decisions of the conference.

The conference was disrupted. Chancellor Bismarck's refusal to force Austria-Hungary to become Russia's ally in the event of a Russo-Turkish war convinced the Russian government of the necessity of ensuring Austria-Hungary's neutrality.

On January 15, 1877, **a secret convention was signed in Budapest**, which stipulated that in the event of a Russo-Turkish war, Austria-Hungary would maintain a benevolent neutrality towards Russia. In exchange she was given the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina with her troops.

Thus, in January 1877 the tsarist government secured the neutrality of Austria-Hungary, and in March the consent of Romania to the passage of Russian troops through its territory. After the failure of the Constantinople Conference, Russian-Turkish relations deteriorated sharply. The matter was heading for war. Nevertheless, the Russian government made another attempt to force Turkey to make some concessions to the Great Powers.

The success of this diplomatic attempt depended on the position of the British government. In February, 1877 Ignatiev was sent to the European governments with a special mission, who was charged to induce them to sign a protocol that would confirm the resolutions of the Constantinople Conference. On March 31, 1877, representatives of Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy signed the London Protocol. Although the British government signed the protocol, it encouraged Turkey to reject it. In response, Russia declared war on Turkey on April 12, 1877.

The Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin Having suffered a complete defeat in both the Balkan and Asian theaters of war, the Turkish government was forced to ask Russia for an armistice. In 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, which ended the Russo-Turkish war. This treaty established the full independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania with the granting of new territories: Romania received Northern Dobruja; Bulgaria from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid became a nominally dependent on Turkey, but an autonomous principality with the right to elect a prince; Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy; Russia received the part of Besarabia, which had been ceded from it in 1856. part of Besarabia, as well as Ardagan, Kars, Batum, Bajazet; Turkey was obliged to pay Russia 310 million rubles to compensate for military expenses; it agreed to implement reforms in Armenia.

The most important political outcome of the Russo-Turkish war, enshrined in the treaty, was the liberation of Bulgaria from Turkish domination; Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina received autonomy; Serbia, Montenegro and Romania received independence.

The treaty aroused sharp opposition from the Western powers, especially Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, which demanded its revision. First of all, England feared that Russia, through Bulgaria, would strengthen its influence in the Balkans and gain access to the Mediterranean Sea.

On the eve of the opening of the Congress of Berlin, England and Turkey concluded the Cyprus Convention, which gave England the island of Cyprus as well as control over the Turkish government's reforms in Asia Minor. At the Congress of Berlin, which began on July 21, 1878, it was replaced by a multilateral treaty much less favorable to Russia and Bulgaria. Finding itself in

diplomatic isolation, the Russian government made concessions. The Treaty of Berlin established: Bulgaria was limited only to the Bulgarian regions north of the Balkan Range; it was recognized as an autonomous state with the right to choose its own prince, approved by the Sultan with the consent of the Great Powers; the Bulgarian regions south of the Balkans formed a separate territory called Eastern Rumelia, which remained under the authority of the Sultan, but received administrative autonomy.

All territories up to the Adriatic coast in the west and the Aegean Sea in the south remained under Turkish rule. Austria-Hungary was granted the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro, Serbia and Romania were recognized as independent from Turkey. Romania received Northern Dobruja. The Danubian section of Besarabia was returned to Russia. Ardagan, Kars and Batum with their districts were annexed to Russia, which returned the Alashkert valley and Bajazet to Turkey. Batum was declared a free trade harbor. The rights of the Danube European Commission were confirmed and expanded, which included a representative of Romania. Freedom of navigation on the Danube from the Iron Gate to the Black Sea was established. Turkey pledged to carry out reforms of local self-government in the regions inhabited by Armenians. In Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, as well as in all the possessions of the Sultan, complete freedom of conscience was proclaimed, civil and political rights were extended to persons of all faiths.

The final article of the treaty confirmed all the resolutions of the Paris Congress of 1856 and the provisions of the London Convention on the Straits of 1871, which were not canceled or changed by **the Berlin Congress.** The Conference of European powers excluded the possibility of Russian hegemony in the Balkans. Russia was deprived of a significant part of the fruits of her victory. "Defenders" of Turkey without a single shot captured: England - Cyprus, Austria - Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the essence of the Treaty of Berlin was reduced to a partial partition of Turkey. The decisions of the Berlin Congress dealt a blow to the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula.

The dismemberment of Bulgaria, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary for an indefinite period of time, the return

under Turkish rule of Macedonia and the New Bazaar sanjak - all this made it extremely difficult to solve the main historical task facing the Balkan peoples. The Treaty of Berlin was an intricacy of diplomacy of the great powers of Western Europe with many problems, thanks to which for many years the Balkans gained the infamous reputation of the "powder cellar" of Europe.

Suffice it to name the fratricidal Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885, the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the Sarajevo assassination and many other things that were in one way or another a direct or indirect consequence of the Berlin Treaty.

Despite the limited and inconsistent nature of the Berlin Treaty, one cannot but recognize that the results of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 were of great importance. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 led to the elimination of the Turkish yoke in the Balkan Peninsula. This is the enduring historical significance of its results. The Treaty of Berlin was an important international document, most of the provisions of which remained in force until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.

However, it left unresolved the most important nodes of contradictions in the Balkans and exacerbated Russian-Austrian and Serbian-Bulgarian rivalry. Already in the early 1880s, Serbian government circles underwent a change of orientation in their foreign policy, which reflected a shift from reliance on Russia to attempts to enlist the support of Austria-Hungary. Shortly after Bulgaria's liberation in 1885, with its direct support, a coup d'état took place in Eastern Rumelia, which was annexed to the Bulgarian principality. Following this, the Serbian king invaded Bulgaria under the pretext of "upsetting the balance" in the Balkans. However, the Serbian troops were repulsed, which signaled the emergence of new dangerous contradictions in the region. In 1886, a coup took place in Bulgaria and the dictatorship of S. Stambolov was established, who broke off relations with Russia. England, Germany and Austria-Hungary supported the new Bulgarian government.

After the war of 1877-1878 the former allies Russia and Romania also separated. The Romanian government could not accept the return of Southern Besarabia to Russia and in 1883 joined the Austro-German alliance against Russia. The Congress of Berlin also revealed the extreme tension in Russian-English relations. The Tsarist government feared that in the event of a new

conflict with England may appear English fleet in the Straits and the Black Sea. At the Congress of Berlin it became clear that England does not intend to comply with the principle of closure of the Straits for military vessels. In the face of such a danger Russia, first of all, had to acquire its own fleet in the Black Sea.

Self-Assessment Questions

1. *What were the main causes and international implications of the Crimean War (1853–1856)?*
2. *How did the Crimean War alter the balance of power among the European states?*
3. *What triggered the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878, and how did it affect the relations between the Great Powers?*
4. *What were the key events and outcomes of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878?*
5. *How did the "Eastern Question" shape the foreign policies of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the major European powers in the second half of the 19th century?*

Lecture 9. Formation of the Triple Alliance and the Entente

9.1 The formation of the Union of the Three Emperors Germany after the Congress of Vienna

The Frankfurt Peace Treaty of 1871, signed at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, signaled the defeat of France and brought Germany to the forefront of Europe. Germany received Alsace, East Lorraine and a 5 billion francs contribution. The defeat of France led to great changes in the international situation of the time. The emergence of the German Empire, which demonstrated its strength by defeating France, the apparent weakening of France and the activation of Italy, which had completed its unification, significantly changed the situation in Europe.

Chancellor Bismarck tried to keep France in isolation, sought to ensure that she could not find allies, moreover, he tried to attract possible allies to his side. According to the apt expression of the Russian Diplomat Count P. Shuvalov, O. Bismarck was haunted by the "nightmare of coalitions". Austria-Hungary, which was defeated by Prussia in 1866, could become an ally of France and take the path of revenge policy. However, as early as 1871, a government of German liberals who favored close relations with Germany came to power. This contributed to Germany's rapprochement with Austria- Hungary. In August 1871,

Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph met with German Emperor Wilhelm I and Chancellor O. Bismarck. This date opened a whole series of meetings between the monarchs, which played an important role in the history of foreign policy in the 70s of the XIX century. Chancellor Bismarck was in favor of the following combination: friendly relations with Austria-Hungary and Russia, the creation of the Union of the Three Emperors. By this he hoped to prevent the possibility of a coalition between Austria-Hungary, France and Russia.

In its policy, the German Empire relied on Russia, and for tactical reasons,

since there were no major political differences between it and Russia. Nevertheless, German diplomacy believed that good relations with Russia should not lead to a deterioration of relations with Austria-Hungary, which, given the security interests of the German southern and southeastern borders, it tried to attract to its side, supporting its policy in the "Eastern Question", which, however, led to a complication of good relations with Russia. Soon after the conversation with O. Bismarck in Gastein, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister D. Andrassy turned to England to try to realize his plan of Austro-English rapprochement against Russia. However, the cabinet of W. Gladstone refrained from any allied commitments. Austria-Hungary had to move closer to Russia, despite the contradictions that existed between them for influence in the Balkans. Russia also sought rapprochement with Austria-Hungary.

In September 1872, the three emperors met in Berlin, during which the most lively negotiations took place between the ministers. Russian Chancellor A. Gorchakov tried to use the Berlin meeting to break Austria-Hungary's orientation towards England, while O. Bismarck encouraged Austrian Minister D. Andrássy to move closer to Russia.

In turn, D. Andrassy sought from A. Gorchakov some guarantees in the Balkans in connection with the liberation struggle of the Serbs and the Great Serbian movement against Austria-Hungary. Both ministers reached a verbal agreement to maintain the status quo in the Balkans and the principle of "non-interference" in Balkan affairs in case it was violated. Chancellor Bismarck's main objective remained the isolation of France, but this was the least of Russia's plans.

The weakening of defeated France threatened to upset the balance of power in Europe, and A. Gorchakov made it clear that Russia would not support Germany against France. However, this did not mean that Russia did not value the maintenance of Russian-German friendship at all. The aggravation of Anglo-Russian relations in Central Asia pushed Russia to cooperate with Germany. German Chancellor O. Bismarck, a supporter of an open struggle with France, was also interested in improving relations with Russia, which would allow him to prevent the threat of a war on two fronts. Austria-Hungary hoped to find in Germany an ally in case of a clash with Russia in the Balkans and at the same time to agree with Russia on the division of spheres of influence in this area.

Thus, Germany, represented by Chancellor Bismarck, pursued a policy of excluding the possibility of an alliance between France and Russia. Russia, continuing the struggle with the Ottoman Empire, advancement into Central

Asia, preferred to maintain favorable relations with Germany and neutrality with Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary, failing to find support from England, pursued a policy aimed at an alliance with Russia with the help of Chancellor Bismarck, while maintaining the status quo in the Balkans. That is, in the early 70s of the nineteenth century, the international situation led to a convergence of interests of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. On April 24, 1873, Russia and Germany concluded a military convention that obliged both sides to send a 200,000-strong army to the aid of the ally in case of an attack on one of them by any other European power.

The convention stipulated the right of each side to terminate it in 2 years after one of the parties warned the other. O. Bismarck stated that the convention would be valid only if Austria-Hungary joined it, which on May 25, 1873 concluded with Russia an agreement like a consultative pact. As a result of a series of meetings between Emperors Alexander II, Wilhelm I and Franz Joseph, and most importantly, negotiations between Chancellors O. Bismarck, A. Gorchakov and D. Andrássy in the fall of 1873, an agreement was reached, which was called the "Union of the Three Emperors".

By concluding this agreement, Russia sought to prevent the formation of an Austro-German alliance directed against it and to gain the support of neighboring powers against Great Britain; Germany hoped to prevent the Franco-Russian rapprochement and provide itself with support for the secondary defeat of France. As early as 1875, however, the alliance of the three emperors was seriously shaken.

9.2 Franco-German contradictions in 1872–1875

The period after the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871 was characterized by the continuation and intensification of Franco-German hostility. France could not reconcile herself to the terms of the plundering peace imposed on her. With the loss of Lorraine, the German threat came closer to Paris, and the danger of a new German invasion loomed. From this time, one of the new and important knots of contradictions - the Alsace-Lorraine question, which became a factor in the war. This question gave rise to extremely sharp contradictions between France and Germany.

France, being militarily much weaker than Germany, preparing for a new war of revenge against her, tried to find allies or at least find reliable support in the person of a third country. Germany, expecting sooner or later on the

part of France attempts of revenge, intended to prevent them with a new preventive war against its western neighbor and tried to keep it in a state of international isolation. So, the main task that French politicians faced in the 70s was to restore their forces as soon as possible and to look for allies. Without an ally, one on one, it was difficult for France to confront Germany. It was too weakened to start a war. This was clear to many French politicians. The question before the leaders of French foreign policy was where to find effective support for German pressure. To decide which of the great powers could help France, French diplomacy had to take into account the position taken by each of the European powers during the war, and the emerging trends in their policies after the Peace of Frankfurt.

The most likely partners for France, it seemed, would have to remain Austria-Hungary and Italy. Although their position during the Franco-Prussian War was far from what French diplomacy had hoped for. Still, these states had in the past been the closest to France. To the existing divergence between France and Italy was joined the anxiety caused by increased Italian activity in Tunisia. Although the struggle between French and Italian capital in Tunisia had not yet taken such a sharp form as it did ten years later, yet already in 1871 this rivalry was being taken into account by the leadership of French foreign policy.

The other power on which France most relied as a natural ally, Austria-Hungary, also by its new policy left no more hope for the possibility of any serious rapprochement with it. Increasing difficulties in domestic politics and, above all, unsolvable national problems, aggravation of relations with Russia, and most importantly, the undeniable military superiority of Germany over the two-united monarchy, forced the Habsburg government to go for a close rapprochement with a powerful neighbor. Pro-German orientation of the new Austro-Hungarian foreign minister did not cause any doubt among French politicians. Therefore, given the new balance of power, France abandoned plans for Austria-Hungary as a force ready to support her. So, Austria-Hungary and Italy were excluded from the calculations of French diplomacy as its possible allies.

Both A. Thiers and his successors as heads of French foreign policy - the Dukes de Broglie and Decazes – as a future ally of France represented primarily Russia. It was undeniable that Russia was seriously concerned about the unforeseen scale of the German successes, seeing them as a threat to her interests, and therefore she did not want to further weaken or disadvantage France. It was also certain that no serious or significant contradictions and

disagreements between France and Russia were foreseen in the near future. Neither in European politics nor in the policy of colonial conquest pursued by either country were their interests seriously clashing at that time. But an alliance between these states was out of the question at that time.

The official course of the tsarist government was aimed at strengthening cooperation with Germany O. Bismarck's diplomatic methods were characterized by the fact that, without making a single attempt to mitigate Franco-German contradictions, he acted towards France by the method of pressure and threats.

Thus, in April-May 1872, when France and Germany were negotiating on the ways of early payment of the remaining 3 billion of contributions, the Chancellor forced A. Thiers to accept the German terms of settlement.

In 1872 France introduced a system of universal conscription and began to quickly rebuild its army, and in September of the same year, the German occupation troops left French territory. After that, France began to show more independence in foreign policy. In addition, after the fall of the government of

A. Thiers in France came to power monarchists who sought revenge in foreign policy. Now O. Bismarck began to fear that monarchist France could more quickly find allies. To prevent France from rebuilding its armed forces, the chancellor was ready to resort to the threat of war. In August 1873, O. Bismarck used a sermon by the bishop of Nancy urging the faithful to pray for the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France as a pretext for a new diplomatic offensive against France. Militarily, war with France in 1874-1875 was advantageous for Germany, but more difficult was the diplomatic side of the problem.

The question was whether the neutrality of the other great powers could be secured and the Franco-German war localized along the lines of 1870. France appealed to Austria-Hungary, Russia, and England for protection. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia wished to further strengthen Germany and assured the French ambassador that they condemned the actions of Chancellor Bismarck, that is, made a joint demonstration in favor of France. England also warned the German Emperor that if Germany starts a new war against France, it could lead to dire consequences.

Under these circumstances, the German chancellor suspended further development of the conflict. In 1874, O. Bismarck, seeking to start a new Franco-German war, decided to take more decisive action to isolate France. First of all, he tried to deprive her of support from Russia, with the help of the "Eastern Question". Especially since the Middle East was attractive to Russia,

but of little interest to Germany at the time.

In February 1875, a special mission was sent to St. Petersburg by the German diplomat Radowitz, who enjoyed the special confidence of the Chancellor. The story of Radowitz's mission is quite characteristic as an example of diplomatic probing. Radowitz endeavored to prove to the Russian Tsar that unity of political line could be achieved between Germany and Russia in the "Eastern Question."

The Czar expressed his satisfaction at the agreement existing between the three imperial courts and declared his intention to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. Then the German diplomatist, promising to assist Russian Middle Eastern policy, tried to get Russia to declare that France had lost all hope of Russian support. But these proposals of his were not accepted. In 1875 a law was being prepared in France to increase the regiment from three battalions to four. In February of the same year Germany made a series of demands upon Belgium for changes in its domestic laws. Such interference in the internal affairs of Belgium could create at any time a pretext for breaking relations with it and using Belgian territory for military action against France.

At the same time, O. Bismarck began direct threats against France, that is, a military alarm was formed. The French Foreign Minister, the Duke of Decazes, managed to turn against Chancellor Bismarck the very weapon with which he acted against France. Gathering various proofs of Germany's aggressive designs, he tried to mobilize Russia and England to act in favor of France. British diplomacy, fearing the plans for a German invasion of Belgium, was concerned about the possibility of the emergence of Germany on the shores of the Pas de Calais and even more - the prospect of a new defeat of France. English policy, as we know, has always sought to maintain the "European balance", to prevent hegemony in Western Europe, one of their two rival great powers. Russia also supported France and made a diplomatic demarche with England, forcing Germany to retreat. The events of 1875 confirmed Chancellor Bismarck's belief that Russian diplomacy was the main opponent of German aggression.

9.3 Austro-German alliance

The escalation of contradictions during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 led to a worsening of Russian-German contradictions, as Germany was supported by Austria-Hungary's position. However, initially after the Congress of Berlin, the Tsarist government did not take a position hostile to Germany.

On the contrary, Russian diplomats sought support from German delegates in the commissions set up by the congress to clarify new borders in the Balkans. But in 1878, at the behest of O. Bismarck, the German delegates to these commissions took an anti-Russian stance. After all the diplomatic failures and in the situation of extreme political tension in Russia, the tsarist government painfully perceived such a turn of German policy.

Another reason for the complication of Russian-German relations were economic contradictions. Germany, being the second importer of Russian raw materials after England, in 1879 established an almost complete ban on the import of Russian livestock. Soon Chancellor Bismarck in the same 1879 introduced significant duties on Russian grain, which adversely affected the agricultural economy of Russia.

"Veterinary" measures and bread duties hit Russian agriculture. They threatened to finally undermine the Russian monetary system. This caused a new rise in anti-German sentiment in Russia. Relations between Russia and Germany sharply escalated. Customs war with Russia brought Germany closer to Austria-Hungary.

The deterioration of Russian-German relations allowed O. Bismarck to consolidate long-planned cooperation with Austria-Hungary. Initially, the Chancellor sought from Austria-Hungary such an agreement, which would be directed not only against Russia, but also against France. D. Andrássy flatly refused to do so.

A treaty specifically directed against Russia was clearly unacceptable to Wilhelm I. To break the Emperor's resistance, O. Bismarck, on his return from Vienna, convened the Prussian Council of Ministers and got his colleagues to agree to a collective resignation if the alliance with Austria-Hungary was not concluded. In the end, the emperor relented.

So, the Austro-German alliance treaty of 1879, signed in Vienna by Count D. Andrássy and the German ambassador Reis, was directed against Russia. The treaty stipulated that in the event of a Russian attack on one of the parties, the other would come to the aid of the other with all its armed forces, and the parties would not conclude a separate peace.

If one of the parties should be attacked by any other power, the other pledged itself to benevolent neutrality. The treaty was to remain secret; one of the motives for this was that D. Andrássy feared serious opposition in the Austrian parliament. Despite the fact that the treaty of alliance was formulated as a defensive treaty, in reality it turned out to be a source of innumerable complications. The treaty was for five years. It was the first link in a chain of

agreements that led to the formation of a coalition of powers led by Germany and the division of Europe into two hostile camps. It was the first in a series of treaties that began the formation of one of the two coalitions that clashed in 1914.

Attempts to renew the Union of the Three Emperors

In concluding an alliance with Austria-Hungary, O. Bismarck did not turn a blind eye to the dangers lurking in it. However, he was sure that he could get away with this act hostile to Russia with impunity. Due to financial exhaustion and the alarming internal situation of the country, the tsarist government could not think of resuming an offensive policy in the coming years.

When the Austro-German alliance against Russia was signed in 1879, A. Gorchakov considered the Union of the Three Emperors no longer existed. But the German Chancellor, endeavoring to delay Russia's rapprochement with France, made strenuous efforts to renew the Union. Russia was extremely interested in getting out of the state of political isolation in which it had found itself at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This task Russian diplomacy hoped to solve by renewing the agreement of the three emperors. At the same time, Russian diplomacy sought to alienate England from its probable allies and, above all, from Austria-Hungary, England's ally at the Berlin Congress. The second task was supposed to be solved by advancing the Russians in Central Asia. The next task of Russian diplomacy was to make England feel that Russia could cause her trouble in such a sensitive place as the north-western approaches to the limits of India. An attempt was contemplated to detach Turkey from England. The solution of this task was also envisaged by the renewal of the agreement of the three Emperors.

But, above all, it was unexpectedly helped by England's seizure of Egypt: it pushed Turkey away from England and destroyed the Anglo-Turkish alliance. Finally, in the absence of a fleet was important to move at least the land forces of Russia closer to the Straits. This task the Russian government hoped to accomplish by strengthening Russian influence in Bulgaria and organizing the Bulgarian army under the leadership of Russian officers. Dominating the Bulgarian bridgehead, Russia could keep under attack the Straits. These were the goals that the situation of the late 70s of the XIX century put forward before the leaders of Russian diplomacy. By this time there were events in Russia that affected its foreign policy.

A. Gorchakov withdrew from active participation in foreign policy. In the last years of A. Gorchakov's life, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was really led by his deputy N. Girs. Having neither authority nor public support, he showed

no initiative and obeyed any order of the tsar without question. Military Minister D. Milyutin, who believed that while the army was being reorganized, Russia needed a calm foreign policy, had a great influence on the formation of foreign policy strategy. In March 1881, Emperor Alexander II tragically died and his son Alexander III came to the throne. As for Austria-Hungary, after Vienna realized that it could not count on England, it agreed to renew the Union of the Three Emperors.

On June 18, 1881, the weakened Union of the Three Emperors was reinforced by a treaty between Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, which reaffirmed its obligations. Unlike the treaty of 1873, which was a consultative pact, the treaty of 1881 was primarily a neutrality agreement. Neutrality meant: if one was attacked by a fourth, particularly in the case of England attacking Russia or France attacking Germany, the powers would assist. This meant that Russia pledged to Germany not to intervene in the Franco-German war. Germany and Austria-Hungary in exchange guaranteed the same to Russia in the event of an Anglo-Russian war.

The guarantee of neutrality extended to the case of war with Turkey. It was stipulated that none of the parties to the treaty would attempt to change the existing territorial situation in the Balkans without prior agreement with the other two partners. In addition, Germany and Austria-Hungary promised Russia that they would provide it with diplomatic support against Turkey, if it would give up the principle of closing the straits to military vessels of all nations. This point was important for Russia, it prevented the possibility of Anglo-Turkish agreement and eliminated the danger of the English fleet in the Black Sea.

Thus, Germany guaranteed itself Russian neutrality in case of war with France, Russia - the neutrality of Germany and Austria-Hungary in case of war with England. For Austria-Hungary there was an important reservation regarding war with Turkey, which obliged Russia to consider its position in this case.

The treaty provided for territorial changes in Turkey's European possessions only by mutual consent of all three parties to the treaty. Austria-Hungary reserved the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all three states agreed not to prevent the reunification of Northern and Southern Bulgaria. The vulnerability of this diplomatic combination was that the agreement of the three emperors could only hold until the Austro-Russian contradictions, which had softened after the end of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, reawakened.

The treaty was signed for three years, and then in March 1884 in Berlin it was extended for another 3 years. But as early as 1885-1886, the Union effectively ceased to exist due to the negotiation of the Treaty in Berlin. The Union actually ceased to exist due to the aggravation of contradictions between its participants because of the Bulgarian question.

9.4 The Triple Alliance

Germany, having concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879, in order to isolate France, vigorously sought a new ally in the person of Italy. It can be said that German diplomacy not only found this ally, but partly created it itself, as for this purpose it had to overcome the Francophile tendencies of the then Italian government, the old hatred of Italians for their former oppressor - the Austrians and the desire of Italian nationalists to take away from Austria-Hungary not only Trentino, but also Trieste.

The primary task of Italy's foreign policy was to find an ally on which to rely. And the possibilities for choosing allies she had limited. England adhered to the isolationist course, and to rely on France for a number of reasons became increasingly difficult. First of all, because of the difficult situation in which France itself. In addition, Franco-Italian relations were seriously affected by Paris's position on the "Roman question", the question of the secular power of the popes.

It seriously affected both the domestic political life of Italy and its international position. Any of the European powers could defend the papal claims, or use the Italian-Vatican differences in the diplomatic struggle with Italy. This complicated the country's international position.

Italy's orientation toward Germany was prompted by the similarity of the formation of a single state, and the fact that Germany, having barely entered the international arena, confidently took the place of the leading power. Berlin also favored the idea of an alliance with Italy, because O. Bismarck sought to attract to the country. Bismarck sought to attract possible friends of France to his side.

But the Chancellor was in no hurry to conclude only a bilateral, Italian-German alliance. He made it clear to the Italian government that the way from Rome to Berlin runs through Vienna, that is, Germany will go to the alliance with Italy only together with its ally Austria-Hungary. Such an offer from Germany was not easy for Italy to accept because of its hatred of the former oppressor. But hatred for the invader of Tunisia republican France was

stronger than hatred for Austria-Hungary. In addition to the task of incorporating Italy into the milieu of European powers, the colonial question also caught the attention of its government. In the course of the diplomatic struggle around Tunisia, Italian-French relations sharply aggravated. In 1881 France launched an armed invasion of Tunisia. Predictably, the seizure of Tunisia pushed Italy closer to Germany. Italian-Austrian negotiations began in 1881.

Despite a successful start, they did not develop further. The Austro-Hungarian side lost interest in negotiations with Italy after the conclusion of the Austro-German-Russian treaty on June 18, 1881. For Italy, the seizure of Tunisia by France was a serious diplomatic defeat: having lost hope of acquiring it, it received no compensation. The main task for the near future, Italy saw in the conclusion of an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary and an alliance or at least friendly relations with England in the balance in the Mediterranean Sea. In principle, the Chancellor had consistently expressed his willingness to conclude an alliance between Italy and the Central Powers. Moreover, having achieved his aim of preventing a possible alliance between Italy and France, he was now, after the capture of Tunisia, was not averse to a rapprochement with Italy, which was in complete isolation. In Rome inclined to an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary went for an alliance with Italy, because it provided the rear of Austria-Hungary in case of its war with Russia.

Self-Assessment Questions

1. *What were the goals and significance of the Union of the Three Emperors, and why did it eventually collapse?*
2. *How did the Franco-German contradictions between 1872 and 1875 influence the diplomatic climate in Europe?*
3. *What were the strategic reasons behind the formation of the Austro-German alliance, and how did it shape European alignments?*
4. *When and why was the Triple Alliance formed, and which countries were its members?*
5. *How did the emergence of opposing alliances like the Triple Alliance and the Entente contribute to growing tensions in pre-World War I Europe?*

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